With the ongoing tensions over territorial disputes in Northeast and
Southeast Asia, regionalism in East Asia seems to have taken a beating.
Notwithstanding great power rivalry threatening to erode ASEAN unity, ASEAN
centrality is important to both the US and China.
REGIONAL COOPERATION in East Asia
has suffered several setbacks recently. Since July, tensions in Northeast Asia
have flared over long-running territorial disputes involving the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. The latest spats have resulted in
Seoul and Tokyo suspending a military exchange programme while fanning nationalist
sentiments in China, Japan and South Korea. The United States has declared its
neutrality in both disputes, although a State Department spokesperson
acknowledged that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands fell within the scope of the
US-Japan Security Treaty.
Earlier in July the failure of
ASEAN’s foreign ministers to produce a joint communiqué at the ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh owing to disagreement over the South China
Sea disputes sparked considerable debate in the international community. Some
experts observed that this was a reflection of China’s expanding influence
intruding into ASEAN’s agenda.
Amid such tensions, concerns have
emerged that ASEAN unity may erode as major powers tussle for regional
influence. However, ASEAN centrality can be advantageous for both the US and
China. This could motivate both powers to preserve ASEAN centrality even as
they seem to find themselves at odds with each other in the midst of tenuous
inter-state relations in the region.
For The US: Managing The ‘Spokes’
Washington has repeatedly
stressed that its bilateral alliances “remain the bedrock of [its] engagement in
the region”. Under the hub-and-spokes model, the US constructed a web of
bilateral alliances with regional countries such as Japan, South Korea,
Thailand and the Philippines. In the evolving international environment, the US
has also recognised the importance of multilateral forums, even as its
bilateral relationships remain central in its Asia policy.
One of the US’ strategies for
maintaining regional influence, vis-à-vis a rising China, has been to encourage
closer ties between its ‘spokes’. The US has pushed for closer relations
between Japan and South Korea, the two “lynchpins” of its security strategy in
Asia. This task has often been disrupted by the historical and territorial
disputes between Tokyo and Seoul. The US’ calls for both allies to hold consultations
on the latest dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands appear impossible to
realise, as Seoul has rejected Japanese attempts to negotiate the sovereignty
of the islands.
In the face of bilateral
antagonism, multilateral channels such as ASEAN and its associated mechanisms
could provide a platform for reducing tensions. This is even if the dispute is
not on the official agenda of the talks. For example, on the sidelines of the
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) in October 2010, Beijing and
Tokyo agreed to set up a liaison system for maritime conflicts, in the wake of
a collision between Chinese and Japanese ships which saw bilateral relations
plummet.
Given the informal and
non-pressurising nature of such bilateral talks, Seoul and Tokyo could also
reach a resolution on the sidelines of the next ASEAN meeting to manage their
dispute. Furthermore, even if the Northeast Asian states are embroiled in
disputes, cooperation via ASEAN-centred platforms ensures that dialogue among
them continues. For the US, the value of ASEAN and its associated channels thus
lie in the potential of advancing cooperation amid conflicts between its
allies.
For China: Managing Threat Perceptions
China’s interest in multilateral
forums is partly driven by its desire to manage perceptions of its military and
economic rise. At meetings such as the East Asia Summit and the ADMM-Plus,
Chinese officials have reiterated that China’s rise is non-threatening, and
stressed that China’s security policy is defensive rather than offensive.
Only through engaging other
states can China assure the region that it has no hostile intentions behind its
“peaceful development” agenda. Furthermore, the ASEAN way of diplomacy,
involving consensus-based decision-making and non-interference in the internal
matters of member states, sits well with the direction of Chinese foreign
policy.
China has declared support for
ASEAN’s centrality in East Asian regionalism, particularly when it involves
non-traditional security issues. Premier Wen Jiabao has also called for
“promot[ing] East Asia integration with [ASEAN] 10+3 as the main vehicle.”
Indeed, a rising China may find a united ASEAN useful in stabilising the
external environment and quelling regional tensions.
It will not be in China’s
interest if ASEAN is no longer in the driver’s seat of East Asian
multilateralism. China needs a strong ASEAN to fulfil its own goals of
calibrating perceptions of its rise and managing transnational issues.
Likewise, the US requires ASEAN to remain a central platform in regional
cooperation, so that an avenue exists to manage bilateral tensions between its
Northeast Asian allies. Thus, despite emerging tensions within ASEAN, its
centrality is unlikely to be in any danger of being eroded by great power rivalry
in the foreseeable future.
Sarah Teo
Sarah Teo is a Senior Analyst with the Multilateralism and Regionalism
Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang
Technological University.
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