Government tolerates freedom of expression, and the Burmese target
Chinese investments
Following the Burmese
government’s suspension of a controversial joint-venture hydroelectric dam
project with China in the far north of the country, another flashpoint has
emerged in relations between the two countries – a massive copper mine at
Latpadaung, a mountain near Monywa northwest of Mandalay in Upper Burma.
The Myitsone hydroelectric
project, being built to supply power to China, was cancelled in the face of
strong local resistance. This time, local residents are protesting against a
Chinese company. Wanbao Mining, a joint venture with the Burmese military’s
main commercial enterprise, Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, or UMEH. Wanbao
has been accused of destroying cultivated fields, polluting nearby water
sources and desecrating Buddhist shrines. No less than 3,150 hectares of land
from 26 surrounding villages were confiscated for the project.
The public outcry could also
force China to rethink its often insensitive – some would say aggressive –
policies towards smaller countries in the region.
UMEH’s involvement is merely as a
recipient of fees from Wanbao, a subsidiary of the North Industries Corporation,
or Norinco, China’s main weapons manufacturer which is also involved in other
business activities.
When the agreement between
Norinco and the government of Burma was signed 10 June 2010, the Chinese
company said on its website that Monywa is “abundant in copper mine resources
with excellent mineral quality, which is of great significance to strengthening
the strategic reserve of copper resources in our country, and to enhancing the
influence of our country in Myanmar (Burma).”
That influence is now on the wane
as Burma tries hard to distance itself from China - which for more than two
decades has exerted considerable economic, political and even military
influence over this Southeast Asian country - while improving political
relations with the United States, the European Union and Japan. But after last
year’s suspension of the US$3.6 billion joint venture Myitsone dam project in
the northern Kachin State, which shocked the Chinese, Burma must tread
carefully in dealing with Wanbao Mining. For the country’s new leaders, it is a
dilemma: They cannot crack down on the movement in Monywa without risking its
still tenuous relationship with the West. But a continuing struggle could
impact relations with Burma’s powerful northern neighbor.
The campaign against the Chinese
company is led by two unlikely local heroes: Thwe Thwe Win, 29, and Aye Net,
34. Neither of the two young women has more than the compulsory five-year
primary education behind her, and more than a year ago, both were selling
vegetables in the local market in Monywa.
“The Chinese company came and
bulldozed our fields and the Chinese officials made rude gestures at us when we
came to complain,” says Thwe Thwe Win in an interview in Monywa.
The police did nothing, except
arrest the two women and some of their comrades. That ignited a mass movement,
at a time when freedom of expression is becoming tolerated in Burma after
decades of iron-fisted military rule and when anti-Chinese sentiment is rising
across the country. Student and labor activists from the old capital Rangoon
and elsewhere traveled to Monywa to show support. On 26 October, more than
1,000 local miners, Buddhist monks and members of the general public defied an
order by local authorities restricting access to the mine and marched past
roadblocks to make merit at a pagoda inside the mining area.
The two women vow not to give up
until the project is scrapped and the Chinese company leaves Monywa.
Elsewhere in Burma, people are
also complaining about how China treats their country. For more than 20 years,
Chinese companies have stripped large swathes of the north of trees, denuding
ecologically crucial watershed areas. Chinese merchants have also flooded Burma
with cheap consumer goods and fake medicines, explains a local businessman in
Rangoon. “China does produce goods of good quality, but only for export to the
West,” he said. “Here, they sell only junk. This is an almost racial attitude
towards us.”
Even within the ruling military,
anti-Chinese feelings run high. Already in 2004, a document was compiled by
Lieutenant Colonel Aung Kyaw Hla, a researcher at Burma’s Defence Services
Academy located in Pyin Oo Lwin, an old hill station in the highlands northeast
of Mandalay.
The 346-page top-secret, thesis,
titled “A Study of Myanmar [Burma]-U.S. Relations,” outlines in Burmese the
policies now being implemented to improve relations with Washington and lessen
dependence on Beijing. The establishment of a more acceptable regime than the
old junta after the November 2010 election has made it easier for the Burmese
military to launch new policies and have those taken seriously by the
international community.
The thesis bluntly states that
having China as a diplomatic ally and economic patron has created a “national
emergency” that threatens the country’s independence. Aung Kyaw Hla, probably a
committee of army strategists rather than a single person, goes on to argue
that although human rights are a concern in the West, the US would be willing
to modify its policy to suit “strategic interests.” Although the author does
not specify those interests, the thesis makes it clear that includes common
ground with the US vis-Ă -vis China. The author cites Vietnam and Indonesia
under former dictator Suharto as examples of US foreign-policy flexibility in
weighing strategic interests against democratization.
If bilateral relations with the
US were improved, the master plan suggests, Burma would also gain access to
badly needed funds from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and
other global financial institutions. The country would then emerge from
“regionalism,” where it currently depends on the goodwill and trade of
immediate neighbors, including China, and “enter a new era of globalization.”
At the same time, China is
clearly taking the new signals from Burma seriously. In February and March this
year, the Beijing-based, Chinese-language weekly Economic Observer ran a series
of articles about the suspension of the Myitsone dam trying to analyze what
went wrong with China’s relations with Burma. “How could something like this
happen?” columnist Qin Hui asked. The 14 October Global Times, a daily tabloid
published under the auspices of The People’s Daily newspaper, said in a
commentary that Chinese companies need to “attach more importance to grassroots
voices” in carrying out investment projects such as the Monywa copper mine.
According to Burmese journalists, reporters from The Global Times are calling
them with questions about pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, which never
happened before.
It’s too early to say whether
Myitsone, and now Monywa, will become a turning point in China’s relations with
Southeast Asia, paving the way for a more tactful relationship with countries
such as Burma. But popular struggles against two Chinese megaprojects here have
no doubt been wake-up calls for the leaders in Beijing. Even smaller countries
– and a movement led by two former vegetable vendors in a town in the Burmese
outback – are now brave enough to challenge the region’s most powerful economic
and political player.
Bertil Lintner
Business & Investment Opportunities
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