Probably not. But there will be plenty of sturm und drang
Could the standoff "over
something intrinsically worthless - the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands," drag
Japan, China and the United States into a war?
"It seems almost laughably
unthinkable that the world's three richest countries - two of them
nuclear-armed - would go to war over something so trivial," wrote Hugh
White, a professor of strategic studies at Australian National University, in a
recent op-ed article in the Sydney Morning Herald. "But that is to confuse
what starts a war with what causes it. The Greek historian Thucydides first
explained the difference almost 2,500 years ago. He wrote that the catastrophic
Peloponnesian War started from a spat between Athens and one of Sparta's allies
over a relatively insignificant dispute. But what caused the war was something
much graver: the growing wealth and power of Athens, and the fear this caused
in Sparta."
White calls the analogy with Asia
today "uncomfortably close and not at all reassuring. No one in 431BC
really wanted a war, but when Athens threatened one of Sparta's allies over a
disputed colony, the Spartans felt they had to intervene. They feared that to
step back in the face of Athens' growing power would fatally compromise
Sparta's position in the Greek world, and concede supremacy to Athens."
That analogy assumes that China,
its economic and military power growing exponentially over the past two
decades, is beginning to feel obstreperous enough to take on the greatest
military power on the globe.
Ehsan Ehrari, the author of a new
book, The Great Powers vs the Hegemon, published in 2012 by Palgrave Macmillan,
cites statistics that probably indicate China is more circumspect than the
overheated rhetoric would have us believe. The United States accounts for 46.5
percent of the entire world military spending budget, he points out. China
today accounts for an estimated 6.8 percent.
Ahrari, the author of 11 books,
is a veteran defense consultant who formerly taught at the National Defense
University's Joint Forces Staff College is a Professor of West Asian Studies at
the US Air War College. He also lectures at the NATO School, the George C.
Marshall Center, and the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Civil-Military
Relations and is a regular contributor to Asia Sentinel.
China, has every intention of
becoming a superpower, Ahrari points out in his analysis, a 266-page study of
the great-power competition between not just the US and China but also with
India, seeking to grow into a great power, and Russia, seeking to regain its
global standing. "Neither the United States nor China is convinced that
the competitive aspect of their mutual ties - it is competitive because they
are both great powers, one of them is the superpower and the other wishes to
be, and the lone superpower wishes to have no proto-peer - will remain so for
the foreseeable future."
White, in his op-ed piece, says
the Senkaku issue is "likewise a symptom of tensions whose cause lies
elsewhere, in China's growing challenge to America's long-standing leadership
in Asia, and America's response. In the past few years China has become both
markedly stronger and notably more assertive. America has countered with the
strategic pivot to Asia. Now China is pushing back against President Barack
Obama's pivot by targeting Japan in the Senkakus.
As White points out, the Japanese
themselves genuinely fear that China will become even more overbearing as its
strength grows, and they depend on America to protect them. But, Aharari
writes, "US-China relations are driven by constant apprehension on the
part of the lone superpower regarding the true intentions underlying china's
rise. For its part, has been equally concerned about calming America's
anxieties."
All of the littoral states
surrounding the South China Sea are concerned about US staying power in the
event of chinese assertiveness. The Obama "pivot," the growing
assertiveness of the US to keep its military potentially in harm's way, is meant
to answer those concerns. In 1997, as China furiously rattled its rockets at
Taiwan, "test-firing" missiles near the island, US President Bill
Clinton responded by sending the US Seventh Fleet down the 160-km-wide Strait
of Taiwan. Whether China felt it had made its point, or whether the presence of
the world's most formidable navy was intimidating, the test firing stopped.
Certainly, it is questionable if the US could pull off that stunt again.
In last fall's furious protests
in China over the Japanese response on the Senkaku/Diaoyus, Japanese cars were
trashed, businesses were intimidated, boycotts were instituted against Japanese
products. But the US presence and pivot was never a part of the equation.
The risk, White writes, "is
that, without a clear circuit-breaker, the escalation will continue until at
some point shots are exchanged, and a spiral to war begins that no one can
stop. Neither side could win such a war, and it would be devastating not just
for them but for the rest of us. No one wants this, but the crisis will not
stop by itself. One side or other, or both, will have to take positive steps to
break the cycle of action and reaction. This will be difficult, because any
concession by either side would so easily be seen as a backdown, with huge domestic
political costs and international implications."
Beijing, he continues,
"apparently believes that if it keeps pushing, Washington will persuade
Tokyo to make concessions over the disputed islands in order to avoid being
dragged into a war with China, which would be a big win for them. Tokyo on the
other hand fervently hopes that, faced with firm US support for Japan, China
will have no choice but to back down."
But, Ahrari says, Deng Xiaoping's
decision to get China involved in a global economic interaction started a
process of transformation of that country into a "manufacturing
juggernaut." China in the 21st century, he points out, "has developed
an enormous stake in the smooth functioning of global economic institutions and
has been comfortable with the exercise of ‘system maintenance' at the global
level."
Thus, he feels, China may rattle
its rockets again, as it did in September and October. But it will rattle them
with a purpose. Intimidation, not only of Japan but of all of the countries on
the edges of the South China Sea and Taiwan may feel the dragon's hot breath.
But hopefully the teeth will remain sheathed.
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