The strategic trends say the more things change the more they'll stay
the same
Global trends over the next two
decades are likely to be defined by risk rather than reward, according to
Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, the US National Intelligence Council's
stab at futurology which was released in early December.
The Council sees the global
economic system recovering and growing patchily, at different rates and likely
only in regional pockets. However, the study considers that much of the world's
population has little to contemplate other than little to no advancement or
actual decline over this admittedly artificial timeline.
Southeast Asia was almost wholly
absent from the comprehensive but largely and unsurprisingly US-centric
analysis. This is a curious omission given that much of the Obama
administration's 'Asian pivot' strategy rolled out in late 2011-early 2012
revolves around expanding the US military bootprint across much of the region.
So, in order to help fill in the
blanks here are some thoughts on how trends and issues in Southeast Asia may
evolve - or regress - over the coming 17 or so years covered in the NIC report.
Just as any assessment of
conflict invariably reflects previous wars, so any attempt at divination begins
from the current base. Some of the predictions below are obvious, reflecting
the often glacial pace of change in the political and social structures of many
Southeast Asian countries.
Most reflect looming problems
rather than the fruits of progress, a view based on the premise that the rapid
and 'easy' economic expansion of the past few decades has ended and global as
well as parochial trends now point towards domestic priorities and
consolidation.
This venture into crystal ball
gazing is divided into two parts, generic and specific, with the former looking
at what the NIC likes to call 'megatrends' while the latter considers the main
trends and issues set to affect individual countries.
Generics
Evolution - there is likely to be
little structural movement to the colonial-era political legacy that continues
to define governance across the region. Political structures either nurtured by
the departing foreign powers or that emerged in opposition to them are set to
remain largely intact.
Transition - tensions and
conflict have typified efforts to transform the region's various centralist,
ethnic or semi-feudal based governing systems and structures. This has not
removed the powerful pressures, mainly from below or from within sections of
the marginalized elite class, from emerging and deepening. However, it has
increased the risk and raised the price of serious internal divisions resulting
from any challenge to the status quo.
Resilience - managing or
controlling transitional pressures will define the period to 2030 in many
Southeast Asian countries. This process will be made more complex as economic
relevance and the benefits and costs of waning or waxing resources impose new pressures
to adapt to, increase or reject social equity.
Patronage - the region's growing
role as an arena of major power competition will strain domestic intercommunal
ties and force decisions on how to balance the interest of foreign patrons with
internal agenda and priorities. In the broadest terms, this may be
characterised as steering between China's paternalism tinged with menaces vs US
parochialism backed by militarism.
Environment - the degradation of
natural resources is a universal threat, if a greater immediate challenge to
some countries than others. Counter-measures are likely to remain specific,
with small and wealthy regional countries able to offset local threats through
investment in defensive or sustainable structures and systems, while the elites
in larger and poorer nations may opt to exploit available resources for as long
as they retain the ability to do so.
Specifics
Burma - the key issues are to
reconcile the interest of the deeply embedded military establishment with
greater economic opportunity and political representation for the majority. The
country will also struggle to retain a position on the margins of China's and
India's orbits without being drawn in closer to the center of either
neighboring great power. A key threat is that internal divisions could prove
too hard to resolve through democratic or peaceful means, leading to a return
to authoritarian rule and de facto isolation.
Thailand - the key
issue that will define the country's stability over the medium-term, at least,
is the monarchical transition and its aftermath. Failure to reconcile the now
entrenched divisions among the majority of Thais can only increase the risk of
future military intervention, with the added threat that factionalism within
the army may result in a direct intra-military confrontation. The country also
faces major environment challenges, notably around Bangkok, that require
massive investment and organizational abilities to resolve. Territorial and
trans-border issues will continue to test relations with neighbours, though the
likelihood of any sustained conflict during the period is small.
Laos - the abiding and
permanent issue for the landlocked country is maintaining a balance among its
larger neighbors - Thailand, China and Vietnam - in order that none feel
threatened by the influence of the others. This will become a far more complex
position as work on a trans-Laos railway built to serve China's interests gets
underway during 2013. Opposition to the project may also lead to a resumption of
the low-level insurgency by Hmong minorities, perhaps discreetly supported by a
Vietnam uneasy over China's increased strategic presence on its western flank.
A quiet struggle for influence by the neighboring powers within the country's
ruling party and powerful military may also lead to destabilizing internal
divisions and a deepening of already resurgent authoritarianism.
Cambodia - stability
largely rests on Prime Minister Hun Sen's longevity and his control over the
ruling Cambodian People's Party, the de facto successor to the past communist
regime. Inter elite factionalism will increase and become more threatening if
significant offshore oil and gas reserves are found and trigger a scramble for
assets, as will the potential for territorial disputes with neighbouring
Thailand and Vietnam.
Vietnam - the principal task
facing the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam is reconciling its own priorities
and privileges with the aspirations of the majority of the population. There is
also a risk that a north-south divide may become more pronounced, leading in
effect to re-emergence of two Vietnams - essentially Annam and Cochin - based
on economic performance and access to resources. Looming over such domestic
issues remains China's apparent determination to ensure its neighbours, and
many of their assets, remain within its political and economic sphere.
Malaysia -
Intercommunal and intra-Malay issues and tensions will continue to drive
politics and the economy over the period, and almost certainly beyond. The
dominant United Malays National Organisation has always linked social and inter
ethnic stability with an electoral acceptance that only its brand of leadership
can maintain racial harmony. Any further erosion of this 'mandate' by
opposition may be expected to produce a response from Malay nationalists that
could have a rapid and profound impact on the communal relations and the
economy, while also drawing in other global and regional powers if rhetoric is
transformed into action against the ethnic Chinese minority.
Brunei - The main risk to
the sultanate stems from declining oil and gas revenues and the ruling family's
ability to see that it has sufficient revenue to ensure domestic political
torpor. While depletion of existing oil and gas reserves is inevitable, its
full impact will be beyond the period under review.
Singapore - The
country's wealth and demographics are its principal challenges. Economic
success has made Singapore an attractive oasis within a complex region, while
the now irreversible decline in the national birth rate has made the country
increasingly dependent on imported labor and skills. Space constraints and
policies directed towards emphasizing long-term personal financial security
have made many Singaporeans hypersensitive to their declining status within the
country and the rising influence of new arrivals and migrants. This has been
manifested in a growth in xenophobic sentiment, reflected through the 2011
election results that saw past deference to the ruling People's Action Party
fade to the point of near contempt. The period up to 2030 will be dominated by
efforts of the PAP to maintain its authority and relevance against an
opposition supported by a highly educated and politically literate electorate.
A return to an emphasis on authoritarian control would almost certainly fail to
end demands for greater liberalism, and could instead undermine Singapore's
international economic position.
Indonesia - Efforts to
match the country's economic potential with the narrow interests of an
entrenched elite, popular aspirations for greater access to existing wealth,
regionalism and efforts by the center to reclaim lost authority are set to
drive Indonesia over the period. The most pressing domestic issue will be to
what extent popular and specific responses to the elites' unwillingness to
share wealth and influence remain a political issue and where it may diverge
into more dangerous and destabilizing action. Two strands are already clearly
evident: the deepening of political Islam and the growth of secular class-based
organisations largely centered on the labor movement and non-government
organizations. The position of the military will remain crucial to the outcome
of any confrontation between these powerful forces.
Philippines - Efforts to
meet the demands of a rapidly growing urban population and a rural sector
barely raised beyond centuries-old feudal relationships have produced some
positive results, but the process will have to rapidly accelerate in order to
meet local aspirations. The country's economy is uniquely cushioned by the
efforts of overseas workers, whose remittances have become a crucial source of
national income. Any sustained loss of this income stream would have an
immediate impact on state and personal finances, making the Philippine economy
highly sensitive to, for example, events in the Middle East. The Muslim
separatist and communist insurgencies will remain a costly distraction but pose
no direct threat to the state.
(Gavin Greenwood
Business & Investment Opportunities
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