OB Markers: My Straits Times Story, by Cheong Yip Seng, former Editor-in-Chief of
the Singapore Press Holdings, published by Straits Times Press.
From the very first chapter of
this book to the last, it is full of detailed and astonishing revelations about
the mainstream media in Singapore. It is an incredible resource for those
trying to understand the control of the media and Singapore's brand of
self-censorship. Indirectly, Cheong Yip Seng's My Straits Times Story is
invaluable in helping to explain the dominance of one political party through
its "symbiotic" relationship to all the mainstream print media in our
country.
The book begins with an account
of how Cheong was appointed to his job as editor-in-chief of the Straits Times
in 1986. This was not a private dinner with a publisher or a board meeting or
even the result of a secret ballot at a conference of editors.
Instead, Cheong describes how he
was summoned by Chandra Das, a prominent Singapore politician, on a plane to
Burma with the words "The boss wants to see you". Cheong was given a
seat in the first-class cabin next to the then-Deputy Prime Minister, Goh Chok
Tong. Goh wanted him to take over the editorial leadership of the Straits Times
from the previous editor, Peter Lim, who had been found wanting.
Apparently Lim's "sin"
was that he (and the ST) had during the regional uproar over the Israeli
President Chaim Herzog's 1986 visit to Singapore "failed to recognize the
educational role of the Straits Times" which infuriated then PM Lee Kuan
Yew who believed that the ST coverage "did not help Singaporeans fully
understand the facts of regional life and what it took to be an independent
sovereign nation."
Apparently Lim had relied too
much on the Malaysian English-language media in its coverage of the Malaysian
outrage without adequately carrying some of the more rabid reactions from the
vernacular media from across the causeway. This was the final straw which led
to Lim's firing as the Istana had apparently "reached the point of no
return with the Straits Times."
In the months before that, Cheong
reveals, the government was planning on a "GTO (government team of
officials) moving into Times House" similar to what was done with the bus
company. The response by the ST leadership is instructive. Instead of
protesting against this attempt at interference in professional journalism,
apparently Peter Lim and CEO Nigel Holloway met the PM at the Istana repeatedly
to negotiate against the presence of government officials in the newsroom. The
solution they negotiated was instead a "monitor at Times House, someone
who could watch to see if indeed the newsroom was beyond control". This
person was identified by Cheong as (former Singapore president) S R Nathan.
The threat of a GTO together with
the presence of a "monitor" made sure that the SPH newspapers toed
the party line. This is something that many in civil society in Singapore have
suspected for a long time but it is nice to see it confirmed here from the best
source possible.
There is more evidence of
intimidation documented in this book, mainly from Lee Kuan Yew, who actually
endorsed the book prominently. For example, after an early event at the Chinese
Chamber of Commerce, Cheong was threatened by Lee with the words, "If you
print this, I will break your neck". Cheong's response to what appears on
the surface to be a brutal threat is interesting was: "I was taken aback
by his thunderbolt...It was my first taste of Lee Kuan Yew's ways with the
media...Thankfully not every encounter would be as bruising as (that)...but
there were many occasions when the knuckleduster approach was
unmistakable."
Such blatant intimidation is
presumably rare in Singapore. The title of the book, however, describes the
life of a Singaporean journalist constantly trying to negotiate the
"OB" or "Out of Bounds" markers. Cheong explains the origin
of the term "OB markers", ascribing it to former minister George Yeo,
who described them as "areas of public life that should remain out of
bounds to social activism and the media. Otherwise, society paid an
unacceptably high price."
Outside of race and religion, the
most important OB marker was then PM Lee Kuan Yew's argument that the press
could not be a "fourth estate" or center of power because it was not
elected.
This is not a valid argument to
me as it could be argued that the press are far more accountable than
politicians as they have to seek the approval of the newspaper purchasing
public every day rather than every four to five years in elections.
Instead, Lee's view of the press
was that it was a tool for dissemination and promotion of government policies.
One illuminating illustration was a "furious" call from Lee's office
that was received by the (now defunct) New Nation Editor David Kraal. The
editors were "flummoxed" to discover that the then PM was provoked by
a photograph of a large family to illustrate a story of a happy Singapore
family. Apparently, this was perceived by the PM as "subtle but effective
criticism" of the "Stop at Two campaign" in which Lee sought to
limit families to two children.
There are other OB markers which
Cheong found "bewildering". These included stories on Stanley
Gibbons, a stamp dealer; carpet auctions; monosodium glutamate or MSG; feng
shui; unflattering pictures of politicians, and scoops.
I think many Singaporeans too
would find it difficult to understand why these "should remain out of
bounds to social activism and the media. Otherwise, society paid an
unacceptably high price." These are, however, hallmarks of an authoritarian
regime which can install boundaries at whim without having them questioned.
Another OB marker was appearing
overly critical of local TV programs. George Yeo apparently pointed out that
"If the Straits Times created the impression that our TV programs were not
worth watching, Singapore would lose an important channel of
communications." As a result, even the TV critics were reined in.
The issue of scoops is a
recurrent theme. Cheong reports that "Lee Kuan Yew was determined to purge
the newsroom of the culture of scoops". He did not want a situation like
the Watergate affair in which a dishonest president was exposed by
investigative journalists who became cult heroes. Cheong writes that "The
PM took the position that Singapore was not America: he had no skeletons in the
closet and challenged the press to find one because he wanted to be the first
to know..."
But of course, the press could
not use investigative journalism to find out - they had to depend on the
official version of events. This kind of Alice in Wonderland argument doesn't
seem to trouble Cheong or perhaps by re-stating the argument in this context,
he is exposing its hollowness.
Cheong actually admits how much
of a struggle this was for him as a journalist. He quotes Number 5 Chinese
Leader Li Changchun as urging mainland Chinese journalists to go for scoops and
explains his predecessor Peter Lim's Faustian bargain for Singapore journalists
thus: "it was better to produce the best story than the first
story...Finding scoops in Singapore with many OB markers carried a real
risk".
Indeed, one gets a sense of how
difficult life is for journalists who might inadvertently break a story that
covered the sensitive subject of MSG or bad local TV programs or some other OB
marker and end up being hauled up by the government.
Cheong makes it clear that while
he had hoped that the "knuckleduster era" belonged to the 1970s, it
could reappear any time. For example, he describes how while
"recovering" from the 2006 general election, he received a phone call
in a hotel in Phuket, from Lee Kuan Yew who was "livid" about a
"powerfully argued column by Chua Mui Hoong" in which the deputy
political editor had questioned the policy of placing opposition wards at the
back of the queue for upgrading works. According to Cheong, Lee was "his
old 1970s self. If the Straits Times wanted a fight, he was prepared to do it
the old way, with knuckledusters on". This is depressing but not
surprising to any reader of the ST today.
The extent of micro-management of
the local press Cheong reports is amazing. Apparently, Goh Chok Tong had made a
suggestion during the launch of The New Paper: "Why not consider a Page 3
girl". Cheong quickly clarifies that Goh was not suggesting topless women
that had been made famous by Rupert Murdoch's tabloid The Sun but rather girls
that (as Cheong quotes Goh) "can be scantily dressed". The character
and direction - and not just the OB markers - of the local press are thus
apparently suggested by Singapore's political leadership.
Cheong also provides details
about the ST personnel's relationship with the ruling People's Action Party,
the PAP. He writes that "senior PAP leaders had been impressed with
(columnist Warren Fernandez's) work for us. His columns in particular have been
generally supportive of PAP policies." He was about to be selected as a
PAP candidate for the 2006 elections.
Cheong then emailed the Prime
Minister asking to keep Warren at the ST "unless he was earmarked for
higher office. But the PM's response was that he needed Eurasian representation
in parliament". Apparently Cheong's email had been circulated to the PAP
selection panel before the final interview and Kuan Yew agreed to keep
Fernandez out of the PAP slate. Of course, now Fernandez is the Editor of the
ST.
Reporting on the
"opposition" politicians was even more of a "minefield".
Cheong recalls the 1984 elections when "Peter Lim, then editor in chief,
was under pressure from James Fu, the PM's press secretary, conveying the PM's
request to publish Chiam (See Tong)'s O-Level results....Peter Lim refused: he
was convinced it would backfire against the PAP...The result proved him
right".
What intrigues me about the
incident was not just that the Prime Minister would intervene to try to
persuade the national newspaper to publish such data, but rather that the
editor-in-chief refused not because of journalistic integrity but rather
because he thought it would "backfire against the PAP".
This is typical of what Cheong
describes as the "symbiotic relationship" between the ST and the PAP
which is in fact enshrined in the editorial policy that Cheong crafted in
response to then PM Goh's unhappiness with the local mainstream media. The
three pillars of that policy are (1) "Accuracy and objectivity" of
coverage (2) The nation-building task of advancing and informing the public as
Singapore develops and (3) The symbiotic relationship with the government. Some
journalists were unhappy about this relationship but it stayed in the ST
editorial policy at Cheong's insistence. This documentation again, is what
makes this book valuable to all who read the local press.
There are many revelations in
Cheong's book. We learn that the Ministry of Information, Communications and
the Arts kept a dossier on local press articles which they found offensive.
These include not giving enough prominence to ministers' speeches. We also
learn that when editors were "called up for meetings" with then PM
Lee, they had to send detailed CVs including their O-Level results and their
wives' educational qualifications.
Other specific examples of
censorship included restrictions on reporting conditions in national service
camps in the early days and telling stories of the people who actually lost out
through the Housing and Development Board (HDB) construction and resettlement
process. The latter is poignant as Cheong describes the contrast between the
30,000 square feet (including a pond and a farm) that a friend living in Kampong
Henderson had to give up in exchange for less than $3,000 compensation and a
much smaller HDB flat. The ST was not allowed to report on such negative
aspects of our "urban renewal" process or the HDB "success
story". The threat of the disapproval of the Times House
"monitor" which could cost them their jobs through a GTO ensured
compliance.
Interestingly, the "foreign
investors" whom we religiously try to attract to Singapore are not as keen
on press controls as we have been given to believe. According to Cheong, the
American Business Council, supported by the US State Department, argued that
investors would be deterred without the free flow of information. Cheong
reports how the Singapore government stood their ground but paid the price, in
his words: "liberal democracies and some members of the Singapore
intelligensia saw it as too intolerant for its own good."
Cheong is dismissive of the
online alternative media but he devotes a paragraph to responding to Seelan
Palay's film "One Nation Under Lee" specifically by explaining that
the ISD agents hired by the ST were not sent by the government, they were in
fact, according to Cheong, willingly brought in by himself.
Later on, Cheong describes Lee
Kuan Yew's response to the online question "Who paid for the flying
hospital for his wife" as marking the legitimization of online media.
Cheong acknowledges that the days of traditional media are numbered worldwide,
even in Singapore. He quotes the current PM Lee Hsien Loong as admitting that
he cannot persuade his own daughter to read the news pages of the ST.
The book is not all about the
travails of a court announcer trying to keep the king happy. For me, the most
promising section was the one describing the ST's finest hour - exposing a
scandal involving the National Kidney Foundation. Here is where you get a sense
of what might have been should the ST have decided to serve the people of
Singapore by performing the task of investigative journalists rather than as
disseminators of official information.
Cheong was aware of "strong
pro-NKF sentiments in powerful quarters" including two ministers (Lim Hng
Kiang and Khaw Boon Wan) as the NKF had taken a tremendous load off the public
healthcare sector by keeping alive and healthy 1,800 Singaporeans through its
excellent dialysis centers.
He was initially prepared to pay
S$20,000 as compensation, publish a statement of clarification about the
article by Susan Long, which had the infamous gold taps as part of a
"generally laudatory article" and settle the matter out of court.
Cheong does not reveal who or what made him change his mind and go against Mrs
Goh Chok Tong's efforts to mediate.
T T Durai, then NKF CEO, who was
at the center of the controversy, was incensed and accused the media of trying
to be the fourth estate, which Cheong had already established was a role that
the Singapore mainstream media had given up - except in this case!
Here the ST team excelled
themselves - they tracked down the contractor who prepared the gold taps and
other witnesses who were prepared to sign affidavits. In other words, good
old-fashioned investigative journalism. Like the good journalists that many in
the ST are (before they censor themselves), they want their readers to have all
the facts, including those below the surface so the readers could make
intelligent decisions for themselves.
While the stories in the book are
exciting to any media watcher (and there are many more), there are many errors
such as the misspelling of my uncle David Tambyah's name and SARS was described
incorrectly as occurring in 2002 in one instance (although the proof readers
picked out the correct dates for the three subsequent mentions of the
outbreak).
Cheong himself acknowledges the
problem with the quality of English in the newspaper and says that the ST paid
the price for the "neglect" of the teaching of grammar in schools. It
got so bad that he had to "scour" the world for good copy editors
whom he eventually found in Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India.
For those of us who lament that
our education system seems to have switched from teaching life and career
skills to teaching what is required to top international standardized tests,
that is a statement worth paying attention to.
The question on many
Singaporean's minds is: Why did he write this book? Cheong does explicitly
reveal this. Near the end, however, he gives a telling account of how
journalists found official spokespersons unhelpful as their priority was
"reflecting better on the ministers" rather than allowing journalists
to do investigative or background work. He describes frustrated journalists
recounting their bad experiences in explicit detail - perhaps that is what he
is trying to do himself as some kind of catharsis.
Perhaps wistfully, he talks about
a time when the ST was indeed the "fourth estate" when it did
occasionally demonstrate its independence - although he has to reach as far
back as 1956 when the ST condemned the takeover of the Suez Canal by British,
French and Israelis. British expats in Singapore were incensed and the managing
director of the ST, a member of the British establishment was "spat on in
the (then British only) Tanglin Club."
When I asked a prominent civil
society figure about the reasons for this book, he pointed out that when
authoritarian regimes in Latin America or Eastern Europe were crumbling,
"everyone claimed to be a reformer."
I am an optimist. I think that
Cheong has seen the signs from the recent general, presidential and by-elections
and he knows that the people of Singapore are waking up. Establishment voices
are raising questions about some fundamental assumptions.
The first step, as anyone with a
serious problem knows, is acknowledging that you have a serious problem. Perhaps
this is Cheong's first step. Hopefully for the mainstream media, acknowledging
the problem of control and domination will be the first step to the recovery of
an independent media which can evolve into a free press, a necessity for
democracy for the people of Singapore. The book is a worthy read.
Paul Ananth Tambyah
Business & Investment Opportunities
Saigon Business Corporation Pte Ltd (SBC) is incorporated in Singapore since 1994. As Your Business Companion, we propose a range of services in Strategy, Investment and Management, focusing Health care and Life Science with expertise in ASEAN 's area. We are currently changing the platform of www.yourvietnamexpert.com, if any request, please, contact directly Dr Christian SIODMAK, business strategist, owner and CEO of SBC at christian.siodmak@gmail.com. Many thanks.
No comments:
Post a Comment