History doesn’t appear to support claims by the Cambodian opposition to
the Vietnamese island of Phu Quoc.
The
popular Khmer view of Koh Tral – as reflected in the Khmer blogosphere, in
popular song, and on YouTube travelogues – is that the island which Vietnamese
know as Phu Quoc is historically Khmer, that Cambodia has never relinquished
its territorial claim, that Koh Tral was unfairly awarded the Vietnamese in
1954 over Cambodian protest, and that because the maritime border used a 1939
French colonial administrative line never intended to reflect sovereignty (the
“Brevie Line”) international law should dictate the island’s return to
Cambodia.
This
view and the quest by leading Khmer politicians to secure Phu Quoc for Cambodia
appears rooted in myth. It reflects a misunderstanding of the history of the
island and the Khmer’s connection to it, an exaggeration of Khmer leaders’
continuing commitment to the cause of Koh Tral, and a lack of appreciation of
the legal hurdles involved in wresting the territory from Vietnam in courts of
international law.
It is a
common refrain among Cambodia’s opposition movement, as currently embodied in
the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), and particularly popular with party
leader Sam Rainsy to “remember the sad fate of Kampuchea
Krom,” or that chunk of southern Vietnam that was once part of the Khmer
kingdom.
The
prevailing admonition regarding Kampuchea Krom in general may reflect
resignation, but such is not the case with Koh Tral. CNRP party leaders Kem
Sokha and Sam Rainsy have committed themselves and their party to seek recovery of the island to Cambodia by legal means,
citing international law as favoring such a return.
But
both the historical record and the legal avenues that would have to be pursued
to secure Koh Tral’s return to Cambodia differ quite substantially from the
popular view.
A
Khmer Island?
While
Cambodia certainly laid early claim to the island, no one has offered
compelling evidence that Khmers have ever had a substantial modern presence
there, or that a Cambodian state exercised authority during a time of Khmer
occupation. For many Khmers the case of Koh Tral is one of history imagined
rather than remembered.
Artifacts
in the Heritage Museum at Phu Quoc evidence human habitation going back 2,500
years, long before a Khmer nation existed. Pottery there from what the
Vietnamese refer to as the Oc Eo period (1st -7th century AD) suggests at least
a proto-Khmer presence on the island during a period preceding the
establishment of the Angkorian empire.
The
earliest Cambodian references to Koh Tral are found in royal documents dated
1615, reflecting the allocation of the various governors’ authorities among the
territories of the Khmer empire. We don’t know how many Khmer inhabitants the
island may have had, nor do we know how the Khmer sovereign’s authority was
reflected in the life of the hardy souls who may have been resident. It must be
recalled that this was a chaotic period for the Cambodian state; no fewer than
15 kings occupied the throne during the 17th century.
Around
1680, one of these kings granted Chinese merchant and explorer Mac Cuu the
authority to settle and develop a large swath of unproductive Cambodian coast,
a project that resulted in Mac Cuu’s establishing Ha Tien and six other
villages as trading centers newly populated by fellow Chinese immigrants and
Portuguese traders, including one village on Phu Quoc. With Vietnam and
Cambodia besieged by Thai invaders in a struggle for regional dominance fought
mostly on Cambodian soil, by 1714 Mac Cuu had changed allegiance and recognized
the authority of the Vietnamese sovereign. In return Mac Cuu’s family gained
the right to oversee his lands as a fiefdom, paying tribute to the Nguyen lords
who ruled southern Vietnam.
Nguyen
protection notwithstanding the Thais completely destroyed and depopulated the
Mac’s Ha Tien in 1717. (It would be sacked again in 1771.) Though not
documented it would not be surprising if the same fate befell nearby Koh Tral
for it was the Thai military’s standard practice until the end of the
Thai-Vietnamese war in 1847 to destroy that which they could not occupy and
haul off surviving inhabitants to Thailand or Thai-occupied Cambodian
territory.
Three
reports from the island coming just before and just after the turn of the 19th
century suggest that Phu Quoc had ceased to be a Khmer island. In the 1770s
Pierre Pigneu de Behaine, seeking to expand missionary activities following the
destruction of the mission at Ha Tien established a seminary for Vietnamese
converts at Phu Quoc where he also gave refuge to future Emperor Gia Long.
Descriptions of this mission make reference to the local Vietnamese population
of the island but not the Khmer.
An 1810
description of the coastal route from Vietnam to Thailand prepared by court
officials to Gia Long describes Phu Quoc as having a local (Vietnamese)
administrative office and military officers, with a dense population devoted to
a range of economic activities.
British
East India envoy John Crawfurd’s 1821 embassy to Cochin China paints a
colorful portrait of life among the fishermen and traders of Phu Quoc, but it
is a life without a Khmer presence. Phu Quoc residents reported to Crawfurd
that among four or five thousand occupants “aside from a few Hainanese
sojourners the population of the island is 100% Cochin Chinese.” There is no
mention by Crawfurd of Cambodian authority or interests on the island.
Crawfurd’s 1828 map of the area is cited by some as evidence of Phu Quoc being
part of Cambodia rather than Cochin China but in fact the map shows no
territorial boundaries.
The map
contains the island’s name in Thai and Vietnamese but not in Khmer.
Sydney-based
attorney Bora Touch is the primary legal advocate working on behalf of
Cambodian sovereignty for Koh Tral. His own version of history fixes 1789 as
the end of Cambodian authority over Koh Tral. His writings speak
not at all to the Khmer population of the island or to how Cambodian authority
was earlier displayed.
Vietnamese
historian Nguyen Dinh Dau researched 19th century land transfers on Phu Quoc.
He told BBC he found no evidence of a Khmer presence in these land transaction
records .
At the
time the French established their colony of Cochin China the island had a
population of only about 1,000. The French brought new crops and plantations to
the island but by the turn of the 20th century there were still just 5,000
inhabitants. Today, with new industry and tourism providing jobs for new
arrivals, the population of Phu Quoc is 85,000. It is predominately Vietnamese
(ethnic Kinh). The 1989 census found the Khmer population of the island to be
approximately 300 (less than 1 percent of the total). Khmers on the island
today estimate that approximately 200 Khmer families call Koh Tral home.
Ambivalent
Claims
A
linchpin in the quest to regain Cambodian sovereignty is that Cambodia has
never relinquished its claim of ownership of the territory. It is a commonly
accepted belief, yet one that is contradicted by history. Koh Tral has been
viewed as an exchangeable commodity since before the establishment of the
Protectorate and there is substantial evidence that Cambodia gave up Koh Tral
in the name of regional security decades ago.
The
first indication that Koh Tral was viewed as expendable is given in King Ang
Duong’s letter of 1853, in which he offered France the island (which Ang Duong
did not control) in exchange for French protection. There was no response. Two
years later the King in a second letter to Napoleon III urged the French not to
accept transfer of the island from the Vietnamese who controlled it, but this
would be the last expression of a claim by a Khmer sovereign on behalf of Koh
Tral for one hundred years.
When in
1939 French officials felt obliged to publish the Brevie Line for
administrative purposes, it was indicative that Cochin Chinese management of
the island was a touchy matter for Cambodian colonial officers but did not
suggest a royal conviction to press the Cambodian case with France.
In
1954, King Sihanouk objected to the treaty by which independent Vietnam gained
full control from the French authorities over Kampuchea Krom and Koh Tral. He
noted that Cambodia reserved the right to bring the issue of the territories to
the United Nations. However meritorious he and those who have followed him
might have gauged Cambodia’s case to be, no head of state has chosen to act on
that reserved right in the 60 years since independence.
With a
number of border issues remaining unresolved, Sihanouk in 1964 proposed to the
Vietnamese a map aimed at settling those issues. As part of the compromise
Cambodia offered to accept the colonial Brevie Line as the maritime boundary,
thus abandoning its claim to Phu Quoc. The Vietnamese issued a unilateral
declaration in 1967 that accepted the map’s proposals.
The
parties never signed a treaty confirming the earlier agreement, however, and
both soon changed their minds. In 1969 Sihanouk renewed his claim on Koh Tral
as did the Lon Nol administration which followed. The Vietnamese hardened their
position and backed off their previous acceptance of the Brevie Line seeking
more generous sea lanes around the islands.
The
Khmer Rouge, whose Democratic Kampuchea* was accepted by the United Nations as
the legitimate government of Cambodia, fully accepted the Brevie Line in their
talks with the Vietnamese (despite an ill fated 1975 island landing), though
the parties again failed to reach agreement given expanded Vietnamese demands.
Cambodia’s
PRK government affirmed Vietnamese sovereignty over the island in their 1982
and 1985 border agreements with Vietnam. Bora Touch and others in the Cambodian
opposition make compelling arguments that these treaties are null and void
under the terms of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement as they were signed while Cambodia
was occupied by Vietnamese military forces.
Interestingly,
though, the Sydney attorney in 2002 and 2004 letters to King Sihanouk assures him
that in the event the 1982 and 1985 agreements were nullified the 1967
Vietnamese Declaration would be determinative, thus relinquishing any Cambodian
claim to Koh Tral but retaining for Cambodia greater territorial waters. This
part of the legal argument understandably doesn’t get play in the CNRP
blogosphere, although Bora Touch’s letter is found on CNRP’s internet homepage.
Irrespective
of the status of the 1982/1985 treaties, in 1999 the Cambodian representative
to the Vietnam-Cambodia Joint Border Commission affirmed the state’s acceptance
of the Brevie Line and Vietnamese sovereignty over Phu Quoc, a position
reported to and accepted by the National Assembly. Commenting prior to the
national elections last year on CNRP claims regarding the island, Prime
Minister Hun Sen reiterated that position.
A
Quixotic Legal Strategy
Political
advocates of Cambodian sovereignty argue that a CNRP government should bring
Vietnam to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over the issue of Koh Tral.
This position betrays a misunderstanding of what the ICJ does. In settling
territorial disputes the ICJ relies on the willingness of both parties to
submit to ICJ jurisdiction and accept as final its judgment. Unless Cambodia
demonstrates to the Vietnamese a willingness to go beyond political rhetoric
with economic sanctions or a military confrontation there is nothing that might
compel Vietnam to submit to ICJ authority on a matter it deems already
resolved.
Were
Vietnam to submit to ICJ authority it is quite likely it would prevail. There
is precedent in international law (see Island
of Las Palmas, Netherlands v. United States) which establishes
that a claim to sovereignty based solely upon discovery (we found it) and
contiguity (it’s closer to our land) even with corroborating maps can fall
before a counter-claim based on long-term display of sovereignty and effective
occupation, both of which Vietnam can easily document. Would Mac Cuu’s
temporary recognition of Khmer authority, if it could be clearly documented
(the chronicles are inconsistent) be sufficient to evidence Cambodian
sovereignty? Perhaps, but it is a tough case to argue on the merits made even
more difficult by the lack of documentation.
Bora
Touch argues that Cambodia’s best hope for Koh Tral is that the United Nations
determines the island falls within its provisions for decolonization described
in the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries
and Peoples. Kem Sokha and Sam Rainsy have both posited the case of Singapore
as a comparable example of this process.
There
seems little chance of this happening. The colonial powers subject to the 1960
Declaration were specifically identified as the European powers who emerged
from World War II with overseas territories which the UN viewed as deserving
the right to self-determination. Vietnam is not identified as a colonial power,
Phu Quoc is not a state, and as for the right to self-determination it is
unlikely the 99.5 percent Vietnamese population of Phu Quoc would opt for
allegiance to Cambodia.
There
is some legal precedent to suggest that self-determination might not always be
the highest priority in all cases of decolonization. Still, it’s hard to
imagine how Cambodia’s claim, given Cambodia’s lack of substantial interest in
the island and clearly ambivalent position on sovereignty, could override
Vietnam’s interest in maintaining its territorial integrity, something the UN
established as a critical principle in examining cases of decolonization.
Ultimately,
the quest for Koh Tral can only be viewed as quixotic. Should the matter
actually reach courts of international law Cambodia can only expect an
unfavorable outcome sure to intensify feelings of victimization. It is hard to
see this effort as being in the best interest of the Cambodian population at
large rather than a cynical effort to mobilize popular opinion against
Cambodia’s eastern neighbor for purely political gain.
Jeff
Mudrick
Jeff
Mudrick is based in Phnom Penh.
*Corrected
from the original “Democratic Republic of Kampuchea”.
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