How would the country’s foreign policy change under the two leading
candidates for the presidency?
The
emergence of Jakarta Governor Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and former special forces
general Prabowo Subianto as two Indonesian presidential candidates has prompted
widespread discussion about how both candidates differ from each other. What
foreign policy changes should be anticipated from the upcoming leadership?
A good
start to understanding the candidates’ foreign policies is to look at the
policy platforms they submitted to the Election Commission a few days ago. In
his 42-page document, Jokowi outlines a well-structured foreign policy vision
in around 500 words. He details four foreign policy priorities: (1) promoting
the “archipelagic state” concept as the Indonesia’s main foreign policy
identity, which emphasizes the need for solving its territorial dispute by
peaceful means; (2) carrying out “middlepowermanship” through active
participation in various international forums; (3) expanding the regionalism
project by strengthening the Indo-Pacific regional architecture; and (4)
widening the public outreach on foreign policymaking. Prabowo on the other
hand, explains his foreign policy in three brief sentences: (1) maintaining the
Indonesia’s Bebas Aktif (Free and Active) principle; (2)
making a more active effort to deal with global climate change; and (3)
protecting the rights of Indonesian migrant workers.
Jokowi’s
detailed and structured foreign policy might come from his competent
international relations advisors. One of his most prominent confidants is Dr.
Rizal Sukma, the executive director of the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS). Sukma, along with two or three other candidates
among career diplomats, should be closely watched as a leading candidate to be
the next foreign minister. In addition to his strong academic background,
Sukma’s position as a member of the central executive board of Muhammadiyah,
Indonesia’s second largest Muslim organization, which could make him a
“representative” of more puritan Muslim population.
Prabowo
also has some leading international relations experts on his campaign team,
such as Harvard graduate and the National Mandate Party’s head of foreign
relations Bara Hasibuan. That said, Prabowo’s less detailed foreign policy
platform could be a reflection of the difficulty he has reconciling differences
between his nationalistic rhetoric and other parties’ diverse foreign policy
orientations. During the recent legislative elections, Prabowo’s party Gerindra
consistently advocated for more “self-reliant” stances. After establishing a
formal alliance with four Islamic political parties, Prabowo has to deal with
aspirations for a more “Islamic foreign policy.” Even more complex, he must wed
his self-reliance rhetoric with his running mate Hatta Rajasa’s public
perception as a neoliberal policymaker, reflecting his endorsement of a fuel
subsidy reduction when he was an economic minister.
Of
course, making a foreign policy comparison based only on vague glimpses of
campaign platforms would be incautious. Nevertheless, these political platforms
do offer hints at the conduct of foreign policy.
The
success of the new president’s foreign policy will depend heavily on his
ability to work with foreign policy actors and solve complex interagency
coordination issues. Jokowi likely prefers bottom-up foreign policymaking,
gathering as much as information from his advisors as he can before choosing a
policy path, making his policy rich with careful consideration. Jokowi is not
as internationalist as Yudhoyono, but his competent advisors are his strong
point. Prabowo, on the other hand, is more instructive and decisive, but less
interested in detail. For the detail, Prabowo will let foreign ministry
officials take whatever actions and strategies needed, as long as they are in
line with his grand policy. This will result in a high degree of foreign policy
cohesiveness within the executive government, but on the other hand could lead
to confusion among the diplomatic corps in finding the best detailed items to
match with his policy outline.
Despite
these somewhat contradictory leadership and managerial styles, whoever the
president is, there
will in general be more continuity than ideological and substantial foreign
policy change for the next five years. This is not entirely because Indonesia
lacks the resources to pursue radical transformation, as some observers have
argued, but because of the long-standing nature of Indonesian politics, which
always emphasizes the importance of finding “consensus.” As with his
predecessors, including the incumbent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the next
president will prefer to satisfy demands from diverse foreign policy interests
at home by choosing a “middle way.” Whoever wins, the government will be a
coalition of five or six political parties in which each has diverse foreign
policy aspirations, forcing the upcoming president to take a middle-ground strategy
toward diplomacy.
In
dealing with the South China Sea dispute for instance, Indonesia will
not follow either the Philippines’ path of aligning with the United States or
Cambodia’s choice of close relations with China. Instead, the next leader will
still emphasize the need for ASEAN cohesiveness and at the same time advocate
peaceful management of the conflict.
The new
president will inherit Yudhoyono’s strong legacy of active involvement in a
broad range of issues and forums. There will be some new initiatives,
especially related to demand for a more active global role as a result of
Indonesia’s increasing economic weight. Nonetheless, Indonesia’s foreign policy
direction will likely follow current practices, which are based on three
pillars: (1) using ASEAN as its foreign policy cornerstone; (2) exploiting its
soft power advantages, such as compatibility between Islam and democracy; and
(3) giving economic diplomacy a growing priority.
A
clearer picture of the new president’s approach to foreign policy will begin to
emerge shortly after his inauguration on October 20 this year. An early test
will be the ASEAN Summit from November 10-12 in Myanmar, where the Indonesian
president will be expected by other ASEAN leaders to provide clear and firm
leadership on difficult issues, such as growing tensions in the South China
Sea, ongoing turmoil in Thailand, and widespread pessimism toward the ASEAN Economic Community scheduled
to be created in 2015. A few days later, the president will attend the G20
Summit in Brisbane. Aside from the G-20 issues themselves, the visit to
Australia will be watched with interest by the people of both nations for any
gesture in handling the deterioration in bilateral relations that has come in
the wake of last year’s spy scandal.
Nationalist
rhetoric offered by the candidates on the campaign trail should not
automatically be construed as auguring an inward-looking Indonesia. As is the
case around the globe, the Indonesian election is always about domestic
politics. Once a candidate takes power, there will be a tendency to tone down
the grand pronouncements and turn to pragmatism.
Awidya Santikajaya
Awidya
Santikajaya is a PhD candidate at the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, the
Australian National University. He also runs a blog called The
Indonesianists.
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