By provoking nationalist sentiment, China’s
neighbors are preventing its assimilation.
It is
difficult to look at a newspaper or get on the Internet without seeing another
analysis or op-ed about the rise of China. These pieces often range from
cautionary tales to alarmist declarations of inevitable Chinese aggression.
Though time will tell, the majority reinforce the belief that a more powerful
China will be belligerent and upset the current status quo.
Paradoxically,
China is being led down this very path by regional actors who insist on
publicly labeling China as a regional antagonist, creating an environment of
suspicion and distrust, and using rhetoric that marginalizes China’s growing
economic and political power.
Chinese
economic growth has coincided with a relative expansion of its influence across
Asia. While there are a myriad of arguments as to how the world should respond
to the “rise of China,” by and large these arguments (at least in the eyes of Beijing) recall a Cold-War era
mentality of “containment.”
Stakeholders
in Asia have decided to view China as an almost inevitable threat, and in doing
so have created a political environment hostile to any type of “rise” at all.
Given China’s almost assured development, and the subsequent expansion of its
sphere of influence, this mentality means that conflict is almost guaranteed.
Evidence
of this negative dynamic can be found in many of the region’s forums. Instead
of accommodating China’s emergence by welcoming its attempts at integration
(i.e. attendance at regional forums such as the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting
(ADMM) and the Shangri-La Dialogue), many Asian actors have used these forums
as opportunities for derision and criticism.
For
instance, at the most recent Shangri-La Dialogue, Japan’s Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe harshly criticized Chinese actions in the South China Sea.
He then outlined Japanese plans to become a “proactive
contributor to peace,” emphasizing that his country enjoyed the support of
ASEAN leaders, the U.S., India, Australia, the U.K. and France in doing so.
This helped create a “China-versus-everyone else” dichotomy at the dialogue,
and sidelined any constructive discussions that could have potentially taken
place.
Later
in the dialogue, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel joined Japan in its
public condemnation, calling China’s recent actions in the South China Sea
“destabilizing” and denouncing “any nation’s [i.e. China’s] use of
intimidation, coercion, or the threat of force” to assert territorial
claims. China was angered by these remarks and as a result accused
the U.S. and Japan of collusion. China’s Deputy Chief of the PLA, Lieutenant
General Wang Guanzhong accused Abe of violating the principles of the dialogue
(which he implied were to promote the peace and security in the region through
constructive ideas) and labeled the comments “provocative.”
These
comments may prove to be provocative, in that they are likely to push Beijing
into pursuing the very same behaviors that they condemn. Beijing’s international conduct is closely tied to
nationalist sentiment on the mainland. Marginalizing China in regional forums
is not only unhelpful, it is counterproductive. Comments made by other Asian
states and the U.S. that are seen as “anti-Chinese” serve to create
internal pressure on Beijing to prove (more to its own population than
to anybody else) that it is willing to use force to ensure its economic and
strategic interests.
The
dominant security discourse in Asia of a belligerent China is self-defeating.
Multilateral forums can and should be put to better use as a means of
positively engaging with China. This means not highlighting political
grievances and using these events to more firmly entrench China as part of a
larger Asian community. It also means giving Beijing the respect it deserves as
a regional power and avoiding, at least publicly, the “flaring rhetoric” that
creates domestic incentives for assertive unilateral action.
This is
not to say that Chinese foreign policy is undeserving of censure, but that
public condemnation will only increase pressures on the Chinese ruling party to
respond aggressively to outside criticisms.
There
are many benefits to enhancing engagement with China through multilateral
forums. Foremost, drawing China into regional processes creates a political environment
of constructive engagement, incentivizing Beijing to demonstrate its positive
influence in the region.
Moreover,
smaller Asian states can use multilateral processes such as the East Asia
Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ADMM-Plus to dilute Chinese influence
and present a united front on matters of security policy.
The
fact that Beijing has increasingly participated in multilateral dialogues,
despite a historical resistance to them, indicates its openness to this type of
regional engagement, a tendency that should be encouraged by all states with an
interest in Asian security.
In
short, political actors in Asia need to be cognizant of the domestic political
situation in China and tone down their rhetoric in public forums, otherwise
they contribute to the very instability they are trying to avoid. Regional
actors should also make a public show of engaging China as much as possible in
regional security.
In
doing so they remove any excuse Beijing may have for unilateral action and
avoid fomenting a domestic situation in China that leads to aggression.
Criticisms should not be silenced, but they should be delivered privately,
thereby permitting Beijing to respond without the pressures of nationalist
sentiment.
Doing
so will make China’s peaceful rise both more likely and much easier to
achieve.
Erin
Zimmerman
Erin
Zimmerman is a research associate at the Indo-Pacific Governance Research
Centre within the University of Adelaide. Her research focuses on
non-traditional security issues, informal diplomacy, and the development of
Asian regional security architectures.
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