The security architecture in Asia is changing
rapidly, and the EU needs to respond.
One of
the most remarked upon developments of the 2013 Shangri-La Dialogue – a
Singapore-based meeting for Asia-Pacific leaders organized by the London-based
IISS think tank – was presence of Catherine Ashton. Amid much announcement and
noise, Catherine Ashton had flown to Singapore to represent the EU, and not
just one of its member states. This was a first for the EU, eager as it is to
contribute to the coming Asian security architecture.
The
high representative delivered a noted speech, calling on her Asian audience to
consider the EU a long-term security partner and expanding on the European’s
so-called “comprehensive approach.”
Coming
on the heels of a number of other initiatives – in 2012, the EU revised its
Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia, signed the
Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced
Partnership, and acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
Asia (TAC) – the presence and speech of the High Representative signaled the
EU’s own “pivot” towards East Asia. The EU appeared committed to strengthening
its presence in East Asia, not just in economic terms, but also in the political
and security spheres.
This
year, the EU was not present at Shangri-La. This absence is not accidental: it
sends a clear though implicit signal to both European and Asian audiences that,
in times of crisis, the EU is prioritizing other foreign policy issues closer
to home than East Asia’s spiraling security dilemma. While not intrinsically
good or bad in itself, this position has to be clear if it is to be positively
welcomed. Otherwise, it is destined to weigh on the EU’s credibility and
status. Mixed signals can have a utility in international affairs but
developments in the South China Sea should compel Brussels to better inform its
partners of its perceptions and intentions, and, above all, clarify its own
strategy vis-à-vis the changing security architecture in Asia and the world.
Missing
in Action?
The May
2014 edition of the Shangri-La Dialogue was the scene of considerable
diplomatic trepidation. Much had to be discussed after a year of affirmative
action by China, keen to develop – as reiterated in October 2013 by President
Xi Jinping at a conference organized by the Beijing-based CICIR – “every window
of strategic opportunity.”
The
most recent in this series of actions was the deployment of Chinese oil rigs in contested waters of
the South China Sea, triggering a major spat between China and Vietnam.
Bilateral relations, until then thriving, nosedived, with each side accusing
the other of provocations and insisting that their respective position was
consistent with international law. Sino-Philippine relations also dipped in the wake of
multiplying incidents and mutual accusations of misconduct in the South China
Sea. These tensions are not just a matter of conjuncture. They follow, and are
part of a series of events signaling major and systemic transformations in the
parameters of regional stability.
For the
last fifty years, Asia’s path to prosperity relied on a fluid security system
centered on the United States, falling short of any kind of “Asian NATO.” To
date, this system was upheld not just by the U.S. military presence in East
Asia and its network of alliances, but also by more or less tacit agreement by
other countries, including through China’s “peaceful rise” policy. But with a
changing of the guards in most Asian capitals over the last three years and the
emergence of Xi Jinping – giving a new, less conciliatory face to the rise of
China – things are changing fast.
In this
atmosphere, the European absence at the Shangri-La Dialogue was not neutral.
Obviously, Catherine Ashton had good reason not to attend. This spring, many
developments – including the Ukrainian crisis, enduring instability in the
Middle East, and eruptions of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa – contributed to
stretch the attention and resources of European foreign policy institutions. But
among a pragmatic Asian audience, the discrepancy between the U.S. (the
Secretary of Defense explicitly condemned China for undertaking destabilizing,
unilateral actions) and the EU (absorbed in its own neighborhood problems) was
sharply felt. The presence of the French and British defense ministers did
little to alter that.
A
Paradigm Shift
Reacting
to events without strategic direction would be a dangerous game for the EU.
Therefore, to appear as a credible political and security partner, Brussels
should embrace the ongoing changes in regional and global power configuration
and security architectures. Bypassing East Asia is assuredly not an option. A
sustained – increased even – presence in East Asia is necessary in several
respects.
First,
picturing itself a “long-term security partner” without a coherent and
consistent presence will not help the EU much in raising its political and
economic profile in East Asia. Words need to be followed by deeds, especially
in times of crisis. Visibility in, and commitments to high-level gatherings and
summits are important. Second, volatility in the South China Sea requires
careful monitoring and attention from the EU, for Brussels has a considerable
interest in maritime security there, where a major share of its trade transits.
It also requires an adequate response.
A
concise statement of concern, urging all parties to “undertake de-escalating
measures and refrain from any unilateral action […]”, has been issued by the
Spokesperson of Catherine Ashton and the G7, but this hardly suffices to
demonstrate the EU’s commitment and implication in East Asia’s security
affairs.
Third
and more important, recent events point to a systemic change in the South China
Sea, a shift in the parameters of regional stability that provides a perturbing
echo to the Ukrainian crisis. In their closing statement, G7 members confirmed
how closely related the Ukrainian crisis and South China Sea issue may be in declaring that they opposed “any unilateral
attempt by any party to assert its territorial or maritime claims through the
use of intimidation, coercion or force” and calling “on all parties to clarify
and pursue their territorial and maritime claims in accordance with
international law.”
Until
recently, a particular modus vivendi had seemed to have
crystallized in the South China Sea. All parties found an interest in
maintaining a form of “controlled instability” and strategic uncertainty. This
did not require them to clarify their claims, their basis, and the actions they
would be ready to undertake to defend them. The DoC and CoC negotiation processes, bilateral consultations,
and the defense of UNCLOS have since provided useful – while not too
constraining – tools to both contain escalation risks and foster a constructive
image abroad.
However,
current developments hint at China’s determination to curb the evolution of the
regional security architecture in its favor, finding in the growing power
asymmetry with its neighbors both the means and legitimating tool to assert a
Sino-centric order in the region. A politicized history is here central to
China picturing this push to prominence as benign, and resistance to it as
provocative. Seen from Beijing, this is only part of a “democratization” of the
international system, a “return to normal” after centuries of anomalous
domination of the region by other powers. China is increasingly vocal in
claiming great power status, and its political elites are leaning ever more
towards imperial rhetoric and ambitions.
In
effect, while the drivers and individuals behind China’s policy in the South
China Sea remain ambiguous, its results are tangible. Southeast Asian countries
seem increasingly willing to balance China. The U.S. is moving ever closer to
its allies, even on slippery slopes such as on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands
issue. And these movements of resistance in turn feed into China’s “siege
mentality,” thereby fueling the nationalistic agenda of influent constituencies
and government agencies.
What
stems from the May 2014 events can be interpreted as nothing less than a new
step in a paradigm shift in East Asia. These initiatives pointed to a selective
and partial use of international law by parties to the disputes and more
worryingly, to the use of national armed forces to ensure that one’s own views
prevail. This evolution is explained by the maritime interests and ambitions of
parties (and specifically China). For all, stakes are high: the economic
resources derived from the sea (hydrocarbons, fisheries, etc.) and those
transiting through it are crucial to their economies.
South
China Sea sandbanks, reefs and islets have come to embody, in a region bent on
fighting the interferences of external powers, the capacity of national
governments to stand up for their rights in the face of external aggression,
and defend their sovereignty. For China, control of the South China Sea is also
a prerequisite to consolidating its access to both the Indian and Pacific
oceans and challenge the U.S. Navy. In Kaplan’s words, the South China Sea is for China what the Caribbean
is for America: the strategic maritime domain over which they necessarily have
to gain control to establish themselves as great powers.
Assets
and Options
South
China Sea tensions reflect a challenge brought onto norms and conventions
underpinnings the regional security architecture. The “rules of the game” that
held the region relatively stable up to now have become a divisive issue among
regional states. For China, these rules have to change. Xi Jinping even called
for a new Asian Security framework at the CICA May 2014 forum (Conference on
Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia).
To push
this ambition forward, Beijing primarily resorts to political pressure, backed
by military and economic power. The U.S. has opposed to this a defense of the
status quo, relying on political and military resolve, economic integration and
diplomatic wooing. The EU is, for its part, largely out of the military
equation in the South China Sea, except for its arms exports and some
particular initiatives of its members. Nevertheless, it is also an agent of
change in the region’s architecture, relying on political dialogue and economic
incentives to foster, on the basis of the ASEAN-EU relationship, a rules-based
regionalism. This option is, in the European experience and view, the most
conducive to both peace and prosperity. In this perspective, it has brought a
distinctive input in the security debate.
In
other words, what is at stake is whether East Asia’s unfolding new security
structure will be forged on an exclusionary (“an Asian security mansion” in Xi’s words) or inclusive
basis (with a place for the EU). Even if there is little indication that
China’s vision will be realized in the short to medium terms, it is certain
that its endgame is to limit U.S. influence in the region and rebalance global
security. Very concretely, this would restrict the Asian security dilemma to a
Chinese/American face-à-face, implying less room and opportunities for the EU.
Europe should thus not remain in the shadow of an uncontrolled power game, but
stake out a position with its own assets: a decisive experience in security dialogue
and peace-making.
The
Shangri-La Dialogue is just one among many forums on politics and security in
Asia-Pacific, and certainly not the most important. But it is a comparatively
low-risk, highly visible place for policy announcements. A presence would have
enabled the EU promote its own added value in the ongoing strategic debate. It
would also have been of great help for Brussels to understand the complex
dynamics at the core of rising tensions in the South China Sea. There is a
price to pay for being a different actor. And this may well be that the EU is
little equipped to deal with the challenges inherent to a changing world order,
and the realist thinking inherent to Asia’s changing strategic landscape.
It is
not too late for the EU to be more involved in understanding and contributing
to a changing security architecture in East Asia. Tensions with China may open
a door to ASEAN. The Southeast Asian bloc has recently sought to better
organize the diverging positions of its members to gain credence as a more
united front, the only way to break China’s “salami slicing” strategy (bilaterally deal with each state
to avoid a common position among them). In facing the disproportionate military
power of China, ASEAN members are simultaneously bolstering their deterrence
capabilities, and investing more and more in the legal instrument. On both
fronts, the EU has an interest. A former top Vietnamese diplomat recently
called on the EU to have a stronger voice and a clearer position on South China
Sea tensions. There is room for Brussels to weigh in.
However,
what came out of recent developments is also that the EU risks falling between
two chairs: a pivot and a look East policy. On the one hand, as Nicola
Casarini argued in 2013, “the EU and its member states already
began their own rebalancing towards Asia roughly a decade ago. Although this
development has gone largely undetected, it could well warrant the label of a
European ‘pivot.’”
Certainly,
when Europe begun to realize how important the Asia-Pacific theater was poised
to become in the twenty-first century, it gradually stepped up its engagement
of the region. The 2012-2013 period represented a culminating point in this
endeavor. But calling this a European “pivot” inevitably makes EU foreign
policy fall prey to comparisons with U.S. policy choices. Brussels has long argued
that it was seeking a different kind of partnership with Asia than Washington
was, based on its experience in the region and economic relations rather than
any military presence. Still, terminology does matter, and an actual pivot
would require the EU to alter its resources allocation paradigm, and shift
considerably more resources to East Asia than it does today.
On the
other hand, the crisis in Ukraine has brought Euro-Russian relations back to
the fore of Brussels’ foreign policy agenda, and precipitated the EU
reinvestment in its Eastern neighborhood. Adding to continued instability in
the Middle East and eruptions of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, this reminded
the EU of the volatility of its vicinity. By shifting its attention towards
Kiev and Moscow, the EU had not so much rolled back its pivot to Asia as
reacted to international developments by prioritizing more proximate and
immediate issues. While a pivot to East Asia and an Eastern neighborhood could
coexist so far, recent events made this dual approach problematic for the EU.
The more Russia tilts towards Asia to compensate for deteriorating relations
with Europe, as exemplified by the $400 billion gas deal it just signed with Beijing, the more
Europe will have to display a “Eurasian” policy in place of its two
disconnected “Eastern” and “East Asia” policies.
In
other words, Europe will increasingly have to deal with a geographical and strategic
continuum to its East. This “Look East” policy implies the impossibility of
actually pivoting to one region or another without prior consolidation of both
its neighborhood policies (to its South and East) and transatlantic ties.
Either way, there is a choice to make for the EU. And now is a good time.
Sophie
Boisseau du Rocher
Sophie
Boisseau du Rocher is Senior Research Associate at GRIP and author of “The EU’s
strategic offensive with ASEAN: some room left but no time,” Analysis Note,
GRIP, January 8, 2014. She has written extensively on security affairs in
Southeast Asia for the last 30 years. Bruno Hellendorff is Research Fellow at GRIP’s Asian Desk and author of
« Dépenses et transferts militaires en Asie du Sud-Est : Une
modernisation qui pose question », Note d’Analyse, GRIP, June 12, 2013 & « Territoires contestés en mer de Chine
méridionale ; quels enjeux pour l’Europe ? » , Eclairage, GRIP, June 18 2014 (also published in European Geostrategy here).
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