This month's tragic anti-Muslim violence in
Mandalay has again revealed that dark forces are alive and well in Myanmar. The
violence left two dead and many injured, causing damage to property and
generating a climate of fear in the country's cultural and historic capital.
In the
aftermath of the violence, the government has moved to crack down on hate
speech but has also warned the media against making statements that could
destabilize national security, saying that "action will be taken against
those who threaten state stability."
Tellingly,
however, no action has been taken against those responsible for triggering the
Mandalay violence by spreading false rumors on social media, while journalists
reporting on the riots have already been threatened with violence. In addition,
some observers have noted that the violence has also had a secondary effect- it
has successfully distracted public interest from a signature campaign calling
for amendment to the 2008 Constitution.
Such
patterns are finally leading more and more analysts to ask critical questions
about the nature of recent anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar and the real
motivations behind it. Outside of Myanmar, reporting has been less critical,
with some major media wires referring to the violence as 'sectarian'.
Such
inaccurate diagnosis is not new, as international diplomatic and public opinion
circles have tended to portray Myanmar's anti-Muslim violence as an unfortunate
social consequence of transition from authoritarianism to democracy. In this
view, it is the uncertainty of transition and the new freedom of expression
that have given rise to fear of the Muslim minority and ultra-nationalist
Buddhist extremism.
This
definition, however, is misleading and has resulted in significant confusion
both about the form of violence in question as well as its root cause. Indeed,
from the point of view of many Myanmar Muslims, it appears to be a case of
applying a perfectly sensible theory to the wrong context.
Such
misconceptions not only ignore the reality of decades-long persecution of
Muslims in the country, but they also absolve authorities of their historical
responsibility for manufacturing, endorsing and permitting such violence, both
directly and indirectly.
They
also ignore the role played by Myanmar's generals and their cronies in
manufacturing Burman-Buddhist nationalist ideology and institutionalizing a
culture of fear and distrust of minorities, including the Muslim community.
Anti-Muslim violence is, in fact, not a new phenomenon, and has been stirred by
the military and its proxies since 1981.
The
misdiagnosis also ignores the fact that the military deliberately designed the
2008 constitution to maintain sufficient power to protect their interests and
have historically exploited identity as a tool to divide and control the
country's diverse population.
It also
ignores the reality that many institutions, including some of Myanmar's
Buddhist monasteries, have long been infiltrated by certain military actors and
have served as sites for organizing support for the military and their vision
of nationalism.
That
much of the violence has been carried out by mobs that also involve ordinary
people does not mean that it is purely a social phenomenon free from any
political involvement. Indeed, this form of violence is neither new nor
apolitical, as campaigns to spread public fear against Muslims and the
mobilization of pogroms have been consistently carried out by Myanmar's
military and their proxies throughout the decades of military dictatorship.
The
reality is that the current anti-Muslim violence is sign of continuity with the
past, rather than a break with it.
Mask of reform
President
Thein Sein's government is not the first to employ divide and rule tactics
through a variety of proxies, manipulating religion and ethnicity as a means of
maintaining power.
In the
1960 general election, Prime Minister U Nu published in his manifesto a promise
to declare Buddhism as the state religion if elected. As a result, he won a
landslide election victory.
Thein Sein's
government now appears to be using this old tactic to kill three birds with one
stone- to divert public attention from Chinese interests, to avoid enacting
constitutional amendments that would allow opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi to become the country's next president and to attract voters ahead of the
2015 elections.
Since
Thein Sein took office in 2010, he has faced three major challenges: public
protests against Chinese projects, public protests to amend the 2008
constitution and public support for Suu Kyi. These challenges have coincided
with the re-emergence with anti-Muslim violence across Myanmar. That can hardly
be a coincidence.
Public
opposition to mega-projects, particularly those backed by China, has grown
since Thein Sein took office. While he won praise for suspending the Chinese
mega-dam project in Kachin State in 2011, this was short-lived.
In
August 2012, police used white phosphorus against peaceful demonstrators,
including monks and villagers at the Letpadaung copper mine. Another major
Chinese project is the Shwe gas pipeline, which starts near Kyauk Pyu Township,
Rakhine State and provides an important alternative route for China to
much-needed energy resources should access through either the Malacca Strait or
the South China Sea be blocked in a future conflict.
The
second challenge is the growing public demand to amend the 2008 constitution,
which many in Myanmar view as deeply flawed, undemocratic and designed by the
junta to maintain the power of the army. Since early 2012, activists have been
raising public awareness against the constitution and several public mass
gatherings were organized to protest against the constitution and demand its
amendment.
The
third challenge is the outcome of 2012 by-election, which placed the
military-backed ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) on the
horns of a dilemma. Although Thein Sein successfully convinced the
international community to recognize him as a reformist, even receiving a peace
award from the International Crisis Group, his party has not yet convinced his
country's own voters.
On the
contrary, members of the USDP are well known for their record of corruption and
it is not surprising that Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party
won a landslide victory at the 2012 by-election. The poll result was alarming
for the ruling party and has created anxiety about the upcoming general
election in 2015. The ruling party and its military backers may have thus
considered applying political tactics that had already been tried and tested.
Political scapegoats
As the
government came under increasing pressure from these multiple challenges, a new
wave of anti-Muslim violence emerged. Violence broke out in Rakhine State in
June and October 2012 where Rohingya and Kaman Muslims were targeted.
Tensions
between Muslims and Buddhists have historically been at their highest in
Rakhine, with ethnic cleansing campaigns against the Rohingya occurring in
1942, 1978 and 1991, making it an easy target for igniting anti-Muslim
violence. But anti-Muslim mobilization was not limited to Rakhine and was soon
followed by hate-speech campaigns in Karen State at the end of 2012 that spread
to other parts of the country. In March 2013, anti-Muslim pogroms erupted in
Meiktila in central Myanmar.
Government
and crony-controlled media have also played a dangerous role by portraying
Rohingya as intruders from Bangladesh and Islam as a threat to Buddhism. They
have succeeded in obscuring real problems such as land grabbing by the army,
civil war and the use of rape as a weapon against minorities. The majority of
Buddhists are unaware that they are being brainwashed by the powerful cronies'
media.
It is
highly likely that many extremist Buddhist monks are agents of Myanmar's army
and part of a vast propaganda machine. In a context where monks are the most
revered figures in society, this strategy has proven highly effective and faces
almost no opposition. Those who have spoken out against radical monks have been
intimidated.
During
the crisis, the inflammatory rhetoric of Thein Sein and his spokesperson Major
Zaw Htay received strong support from Buddhist extremists. In a meeting with
the head of UNHCR in July 2012, Thein Sein denied the existence of the
Rohingyas, stating that they are the illegal immigrants and should be sent to
third countries or kept in concentration camps as refugees. His comments have
directly put the lives of Rohingya into great danger, encouraged hatred against
them and allowed the extremists to target them without condemnation by the
wider public.
During
a recent attack on Rohingyas, Zaw Htay posted provocative anti-Rohingya
propaganda on his Facebook account in Burmese. Exercising scare tactics, he
used the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, an organization known to be almost
defunct for several decades, as a scarecrow, claiming that RSO members had
crossed into Myanmar to invade Rakhine State and threaten the lives of
Buddhists. He also warned opposition parties and critics not to oppose
government policy towards the Rohingya on the basis of human rights.
Anti-Muslim
hate campaigns led by the radical 969 movement, including those led by Buddhist
monk U Wirathu, have played a significant role in expanding the ethnic
cleansing of the Rohingya into generalized anti-Muslim violence across the
country. U Wirathu has traveled across Myanmar giving anti-Muslim speeches
without restriction and expanded an extremist network known as the Race and
Faith Defense League, (Ma Ba Tha).
Bigoted boycotts
The
biased judiciary, meanwhile, systematically grants impunity to the hate
instigators, encouraging further attacks on Muslims. In return, these
extremists promote the ruling party as a defender of Buddhism and Buddhist
interests. Ma Ba Tha also largely opposes the amendment of the 2008
constitution, particularly the section 59(F) that bars Suu Kyi from becoming
president because she was married to a now deceased foreigner.
A
public declaration of anti-Muslim persecution was made on September 10, 2012
after a meeting between monks from all Buddhist sects in Karen State organized
by the Alliance of Buddhism Custodians at Mae Baung Monastery in the state
capital Hpa-an.
The
declaration was mainly intended to segregate Muslims from social and economic
activities, including a drive to boycott Muslim-owned shops. In December 2012,
the alliance declared it would fine anyone who breached the order and members
of Ma Ba Tha began monitoring Muslim shops to implement the order.
The
declaration openly challenges the rule of law and yet in spite of this there
has not been a single response from Thein Sein's government. The President did
not fail, however, to swiftly issue a statement defending U Wirathu when Time
magazine published an edition with the monk on the front cover calling him 'the
face of Buddhist terror'.
Tolerance
of anti-Muslim violence was also apparent during the Meiktila pogroms in March
2013. Victims said that when police were requested to protect Muslims from
deadly attacks they responded that orders were not given to stop the violent
mobs. The mystery in that instance is who held the authority to give the orders
and why these officials would allow the mobs to target Muslims.
At the
same time, the organized manner in which the mobs targeted Muslims reveals that
at least some among them were well-trained to carry out heinous crimes against
humanity, such as the chopping and burning alive of 28 small children at an
Islamic orphanage.
So far
anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim campaigns have successfully diverted public
attention from many issues: Chinese projects, land grabbing, the civil war in
Kachin State, corruption, dubious multi-billion dollar property holdings by
high-ranking generals, and calls to amend the controversial 2008 constitution.
Undoubtedly,
the military will plan their every strategy carefully and execute every move
deliberately. The result of the 2012 by-election could be used as a parameter
to measure the USDP's chance of victory in 2015. The stakes are high, raising
the potential for more distractive anti-Muslim mobilization, persecution and
violence in the run-up to the polls.
While
the international community invests millions in government institutions such as
the Myanmar Peace Center, more must be done to hold the government accountable
for the role it has played in supporting organizations and movements
responsible for inciting hatred and violence. Allowing these deadly and
divisive trends to continue is morally wrong and threatens to unleash new
cycles of fear, violence and vengeance that will undermine the prospects of all
of Myanmar's people and jeopardize stability across the wider region.
Kyaw
Win
Kyaw Win is a Burmese Muslim scholar and
human rights activist living in London.
Business & Investment Opportunities
Saigon Business Corporation Pte Ltd (SBC) is incorporated
in Singapore since 1994.
No comments:
Post a Comment