On May 29, exactly one week after General
Prayuth Chan-ocha and the Thai military announced a coup, I travelled to
Bangkok to observe the situation on the ground.
Passing
through the Don Muang and Suvarnabhumi international airports, roaming the
traffic-burdened streets of the Siam Square district, and cruising along the
Chao Phraya River in Asia’s “City of Angels,” I hardly noticed any troop presence
in the Thai capital.
Indeed,
there was little fear or tension in the air, even near the usual demonstration
sites. Local Thais looked relaxed and composed as they sat at the Starbucks
cafes that litter the urban sprawl. Above ground level, the BTS SkyTrain hummed
along smoothly, and commuters went about their business as they would on any
normal day. And despite the imposition of a curfew – which the junta kept in
place until mid-June – hundreds of patrons were bustling in and out of night
markets, bars, and clubs, revelling in the streets of the notorious Patpong
red-light district, as if oblivious to the country’s political situation.
A
Bangkok local I spoke to said of the situation: “Things are normal. Things are
safe. This has happened many times before; coups are just business-as-usual in
Thailand.”
For a
country that has already been through 11 other coups d’état (and several more
coup attempts) since 1932, this year’s military takeover may appear to be
“business-as-usual” – or “déjà-coup”, as some have dubbed it. But in reality,
the consequences of the May 2014 coup cannot be underestimated. Beneath the
surface, a crisis is brewing – and it could pose serious problems for the 67
million-strong South-east Asian nation.
Take,
for example, the recent crackdowns. In just over one month, the military junta
has arbitrarily detained over 500 peaceful political activists, journalists,
academics, and critics. Censorship of the Internet and media is rampant, all
criticism of the coup is banned, and Thailand’s long-standing lèse-majesté
prosecutions are now on the rise. Thousands of migrant workers from
neighbouring countries, such as Cambodia, are fleeing. (It is, unfortunately,
easy to miss much of this when visiting Bangkok).
“The
raft of repressive measures in place in Thailand paints a grim picture of the
state of human rights under martial law,” Richard Bennett, the Asia-Pacific
director of Amnesty International, stated recently. “The military authorities
must immediately revoke these restrictions…”
Under
the pretext of economic reforms, “anti-corruption” measures, “moral cleansing,”
and nationwide “happiness” campaigns (free broadcasting of World Cup matches,
for example), the junta has justified its indefinite suspension of democracy.
It will be at least another year until elections are held, and any
constitutional democracy that does emerge will undoubtedly be formed on the
junta’s terms.
Analysts
have predicted that any new, junta-backed “democratic” framework will likely
lead to the domination of powerful, appointed institutions over the Thaksinites
– populists who have won every election since 2001. Former Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra (ousted in the 2006 coup) and his sister, former Prime
Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (ousted earlier this year), hold a strong
coalition of support among rural and poor voters in Thailand. (This may be
surprising, considering the fact that Thaksin himself is a billionaire).
On the
other hand, wealthy, traditional Bangkok elites – as well as the military
establishment – have little in common with the rural poor. They have also
always viewed the Thaksinites with great suspicion and resentment, accusing
them of being corrupt and insufficiently supportive of the Thai monarchy.
Hence, the military junta will seize the opportunity provided by the coup to
alter the makeup of Thailand’s parliamentary democracy, limiting the ability of
the Thaksinites and other opposition groups to stage a comeback.
The
crisis is further complicated by the fact that King Bhumibol Adulyadej, also
known as Rama IX, has not been able to play the much-needed role of arbitrator
between the junta and its dissenters. Though he is revered all across the
country, King Bhumibol is now 86 years old and quite frail. He has, in fact,
quietly endorsed the junta.
The
crisis is further complicated by the fact that King Bhumibol Adulyadej, also
known as Rama IX, has not been able to play the much-needed role of arbitrator
between the junta and its dissenters. Though he is revered all across the
country, King Bhumibol is now 86 years old and quite frail. He has, in fact,
quietly endorsed the junta.
Relative
to previous coups, this year’s turmoil – including the lead-up to the late May military
announcement – has already taken an unprecedented toll on the economy. Private
investment fell by 6.1 per cent year-on-year in the first quarter. In the same
period, manufacturing output was down by 7.9 per cent, and the country’s auto
production plunged by a whopping 26.2 per cent. Exports are stalling, and
household debt is at an all-time high (80 per cent of GDP). Not surprisingly,
the economy contracted by 2.1 per cent in the first three months, chalking up a
trade deficit of US$1.45 billion, more than twice the forecast $600 million.
In
other words, it may no longer be “business-as-usual” for Thailand. Indeed, it
could be the proverbial “straw that breaks the camel’s back.” Given the
explosive factors at play, the country could descend into mass chaos, violence,
and economic collapse – unless something is done to prevent such an outcome.
Before
it is too late, the Thai people must come together to develop a long-term
strategy to revamp their domestic politics.
In
September 2010, Milton Osborne wrote in Southeast Asia: An Introductory
History: “As Thailand enters the second decade of the twenty-first century it
seems fair to judge that it still has not settled on a political system that
fully matches the undoubted vigour of its people.”
Clearly,
that statement remains true today. The Thai citizenry should use this moment to
reflect upon the fundamental social, economic, and political divides that have
sowed such discord. Almost everyone sees the inevitable need for this type of
rethinking, whether it is those in the junta or those who protest it.
However,
this process of rethinking must be carried out in a genuinely democratic
fashion. Thais must reject the political culture that prioritises unilateral
military action and ruthless expediency instead of long-lasting and fundamental
reforms brought about by popular, elected governments.
No
matter what their political differences may be, surely most can agree that
decisions made at the ballot box are superior to those formed while staring
down the barrel of a gun.
Could
this realisation help the Thai elites reconcile with the rural poor and the
Thaksinites? Could it give rise to a better selection of electoral candidates
compared to the usual suspects? And could it eventually coup-proof the most coup-prone
country in contemporary history?
Or will
Thailand’s crisis just continue to deepen? Only time will tell. For the sake of
67 million people – and many beyond Thailand’s borders, as well – we must hope
for the best.
Madhu
Narasimhan
Madhu
Narasimhan is an American Fulbright Scholar based in Malaysia – An earlier version of this article appeared
in The Straits Times
Business & Investment Opportunities
Saigon Business Corporation Pte Ltd (SBC) is incorporated
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