An alliance of
convenience becomes a strategic relationship
Particularly in this American election year, human rights issues will
test the durability of the rapprochement between Vietnam and the United States
– former enemies now seemingly the best of friends.
Officials from Hanoi and Washington get together frequently these days.
An eavesdropper on the bilateral contacts might conclude that the
unpleasantness of two generations ago, what Vietnamese refer to as “the
American war,” was just a speed bump on the road to intimacy.
Indeed, the officials have plenty to talk about. They are tending a
lengthening list of shared interests that include booming two-way trade, the
elaboration of a military partnership, US support for public health, education
and environmental protection initiatives and a pact that could clear the way
for transfers of American nuclear technology.
When the toasting begins after a day of negotiations, there are
euphoric references to the ‘remarkable development’ of cooperation between
Hanoi and Washington.
What’s remarkable isn’t that old enemies are now friends, but that an
alliance of convenience has been dressed up and presented as a ‘strategic
relationship.’
Two objectives have guided Hanoi’s re-engagement with the US:
§ The
regime’s ability to deliver sustained economic growth to Vietnam’s citizenry
depends importantly on easy access to the American market and investment
capital, and
§ US
military cooperation will cause China to think twice about pursuing
expansionist ambitions in the South China Sea.
The bilateral economic relationship has been under development since
the early1990’s, when the collapse of the USSR knocked the props out from under
Vietnam’s increasingly shaky ‘socialist’ economy. Diplomatic relations with the
US were established in 1996, and a bilateral trade agreement was negotiated by
mid-1999.
That trade pact wasn’t approved by the Politburo until more than a year
later, however. First conservatives had to be persuaded to shelve their
suspicions of American motives – in particular purported support for Vietnam’s
of ‘peaceful political evolution’ on the Eastern European model. That hurdle
passed. By 2007, with American mentoring and with reformists dominant in the
party and government, Hanoi negotiated its admission to the World Trade
Organization.
The WTO, however, has not had the tonic effect that reformers
predicted. At the insistence of conservatives within its all-powerful Communist
Party, Hanoi has continued to coddle a bloated and underperforming state
sector. The resultant distortions have sapped the benefits the Vietnamese
expected from economic globalization.
The policy stalemate over reform of its state enterprises may explain
the Vietnamese government’s otherwise surprising decision to follow the US into
negotiations over a ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership.’ Other partners to the TPP negotiation
are Singapore, New Zealand, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, Australia and Peru and,
very soon, also Japan, Korea, Canada, Mexico and Taiwan – but conspicuously not
China. Vietnam is much the least developed of the group.
The TPP has been variously described as a springboard to an
Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement and a ‘21st century paradigm’ that would
require adherents to free up agricultural trade and trade in services, remove
quotas and enhance intellectual property protection (IPR).
As the TPP agreement is shaping up, Hanoi would surely benefit from
better access to developed-country markets for its exports. In turn, however,
it would also be compelled to end policy-induced distortions of its internal
market in favor of the state enterprise sector and to address labor rights and
IPR concerns. That may be precisely reformers’ intention, that is, they may
hope to use the market-opening pact to force a policy consensus on structural
reform at home.
US-Vietnam security cooperation is a much more recent phenomenon, the
linchpin of Vietnam’s defense globalization strategy. Hanoi has also pursued
stronger military ties with its Asean neighbors, Australia, Japan, India,
France and Russia. Hanoi hopes these 0relationships will buttress its ability
to withstand Chinese encroachments on disputed sea areas. Not that it wants to
fight, of course. Hanoi’s leaders respect China’s strength and – on a party to
party basis – value China’s friendship as long as it stops short of bullying.
Vietnam’s determination not to yield on maritime sovereignty issues
dovetails nicely with US determination to prevent any curbs on freedom of
navigation through the Malacca Straits/South China sea shipping lanes. The
Pentagon has eagerly multiplied military-to-military training exercises with
Vietnam, addressing search and rescue, maritime security and disaster relief.
There have been well-publicized ship visits and quiet exchanges of military
intelligence. To Hanoi’s chagrin, however, Washington has waved off its
requests to buy lethal military hardware.
The Vietnamese regime’s posture on human rights will remain a weighty
burden on the US-Vietnam relationship. There’s a new generation of politically
savvy Vietnamese-Americans who not only care about such things but can swing
quite a few votes. Particularly in this American election year, Hanoi’s
repression of domestic dissidents can lob a spanner into the bilateral security
and trade dialogues.
That shouldn’t be a surprise to Hanoi. US officials from Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton on down have emphasized that Vietnamese curbs on
“universal human rights standards” are an impediment to closer ties. Sens. John
McCain and Joseph Lieberman were explicit when they visited Hanoi in February:
Vietnam “has a long laundry list of defense items it desires, [but] . . . it’s
not going to happen unless they improve their human rights record.”
The connection between human rights performance and Vietnam’s access to
the US market isn’t so direct. Whereas weapons sales to Vietnam would require
Congress’s specific approval, it’s unlikely that the Congress would refuse to
cooperate if a TPP is concluded. Still, Vietnam’s exports remain vulnerable to
any number of riders and resolutions that the Congress can attach to
prospective legislation, which includes a bilateral investment treaty and an
agreement governing transfer of nuclear power technology.
There are plenty of ways human rights issues can condition the American
stance. On March 20, for example, Vietnam was thumped by a commission
established by the US Congress to monitor how other nations deal with issues of
religious freedom. The commission recommended that Vietnam be designated a
“Country of Particular Concern,” lumping it with the likes of North Korea,
China, Iran and Sudan. Citing specifics, it accused Vietnam of “systematic and
egregious violations of freedom of religion and belief” in 2011.
Vietnam’s been off America’s religious freedom blacklist since 2006.
Reinstating it there doesn’t require the US administration to sanction Vietnam
-- but it is yet another handy justification for Congressional opposition to
things Hanoi wants from the US.
Will the commission’s condemnation induce Vietnam to change its
behavior? Surely not in any obvious way – Hanoi typically digs in when it’s
pressured. Chances are very slim to zero that the Communist regime is going to
show more tolerance for people who advocate multiparty democracy or who insist
on the right to establish religious, professional or labor organizations
unsanctioned by the state. These are bedrock “social stability” issues for the
regime. Whether reformist or conservative, Hanoi’s leaders consider maintaining
the Party’s absolute monopoly of power to be more important to the regime’s
survival than any strategic relationship or trade pact.
China could be a problem, too. The other threat to the ripening
friendship between Washington and Hanoi is more Chinese interference with oil
and gas exploration off Vietnam’s long coast. Twice last spring, Chinese coast
guard vessels harassed survey vessels working for PetroVietnam and for a
Philippine oil company. The incidents triggered a surge of patriotic protest in
Vietnam and gave new urgency to Hanoi’s pursuit of strategic relationships with
other regional actors.
Sinologists argue that the provocations last spring may have been
unsanctioned initiatives by elements intent on defending China’s dubious claim
to sovereignty over the South China Sea almost as far as Singapore. True or
not, there is at the least a substantial faction in Beijing that doesn’t want
other nations tapping (still undiscovered) oil and gas that they regard as
China’s own.
Big oil companies have been put on notice that if they want a piece of
the action in China, they’d better get out of Vietnam. Britain’s BP divested
its Vietnam properties in 2010, and early this year the second-biggest American
oil company, Conoco-Phillips, sold its US$1 billion stake in Vietnam to a
French firm. Exxon-Mobil, however, says it’s intent on developing a recent
strike offshore central Vietnam.
Exploration activity picks up in the spring. More incidents like last
year’s could put pressure on Washington to intervene. Inevitably they would
play into US domestic politics.
It’s the job of diplomats not just to understand what their foreign
counterparts are saying but also why, to maintain a clear-headed sense of the
possible and, above all, not to oversell what’s on offer when they report to
their political masters. Provided their diplomats have done that, both Hanoi
and Washington ought to see merit in banking the fires under their courtship
for a while -- at least till the end of the year. Neither side is in a position
to move much further forward. The immediate challenge will be to sustain what
has been achieved, withstand stresses, and not succumb to disillusionment
and/or recrimination.
David Brown
Asia Sentinel
Business & Investment Opportunities
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