Russia's South China Sea Exploration
complicates matters even more
Speculation
that the South China Sea disputes will lead to conflict are not beyond the
realm of possibility, given the numerous military clashes between several
countries in the region over the past 40 years. The primary belligerents are
familiar: China, the Philippines, and Vietnam have at one point exchanged
punches against the other; although as of late the latter two have united by
mutual agreement in their opposition against China.
A
dispute between China and the Philippines has dragged on this week, beginning
when Manila's biggest warship attempted to arrest Chinese fishermen accused of
illegal entry to Scarborough Shoal off the Northwestern Philippine coast. Three
Chinese warships responded, ordering the Filipino vessel to leave and claiming
Chinese sovereignty. Chinese and Filipino diplomats have been attempting to
resolve the dispute peacefully.
As
these disputes grow beyond territorial possessions to include the vast,
untapped natural resources of the sea, so too do the parties involved. Last
year India ventured into the South China Sea to explore resources alongside
Vietnam, much to the chagrin of China. Now Russia has joined the fray, adding
to Beijing’s growing headache despite China's best efforts to limit the number
of nations involved in the region. OAO Gazprom, the world’s biggest natural-gas
producer, plans to develop two blocks with PetroVietnam, which takes 49 percent
of a joint venture project while PetroVietnam holds the majority share,
according to Bloomberg, which reported that PetroVietnam and Gazprom are
already exploring for oil and gas together offshore.
With
the inclusion of India, Russia, and, of course, the United States, it therefore
seems unlikely that the South China Sea disputes will lead to conflict—at least
with not any of these countries listed. China will not so recklessly engage in
armed conflict with countries whose arsenal includes nuclear deterrence
capabilities, never mind that they are not claimant states in the maritime and
territorial disputes themselves. They are simply not worth the effort. China
may, however, flex its muscles with a less capable nation.
Vietnam most likely to be targeted
With
Vietnam and the Philippines most opposed to China, should military conflict
arise from the disputes, Vietnam is the most likely to bear the brunt of
China’s ire.
Despite
the escalating rhetoric and displays of force on the part of the Philippines,
China is unlikely to do more against the country than it has already done in
the past. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and Philippines makes any
engagement between China and the latter unwise, as it would probably invite
American intervention. As China wishes to keep the US out of the South China
Sea, an attack on the Philippines would be unappealing. Similarly, as military
conflict is far from the desires of the US, Washington has perhaps stressed to
Manila the need to restrain itself.
With
the Philippines out of the question, China has but only one foe in reach.
Vietnam
has neither a defense treaty with the US nor the open sea for a natural
barrier. It shares a border with China, which has in the past served as the
frontlines of skirmishes and the Sino-Vietnamese War. There is little love lost
between these two neighbors; and if Vietnam and China had ever shared good
relations, they have now surely deteriorated.
Neither
India nor Russia, an ally during the Soviet era, will rush blindly to defend
Vietnam if it is attacked, risking unnecessary confrontation with China.
Although India has been public in their partnership with Vietnam for resource
exploration, Russia’s recent involvement has raised questions concerning its
motives.
While
Vietnam may be able to count on material support from their new friends if
necessary, but they cannot expect help in the way the US would intervene for
the Philippines. The sobering and grim reality for Hanoi is that, of all the
claimant states involved in the disputes, it is the most exposed to China.
Vietnam must therefore walk a fine line between appeasing nationalist
sentiments and maintaining a working relationship with China.
Indonesia: A mediating role
Divergent
interests of claimant states and third parties (such as the US and India) in
the South China Sea make difficult a peaceful resolution. However, if the sea
can be pacified, it requires a neutral third party acceptable to all states
involved.
It is
unlikely that the United States would play such a role, if any, in resolving
these disputes given China’s insistence on not internationalizing the issue,
and its misgivings over any American presence in the region. It is also
unlikely that the United Nations would be able to assist for the same reasons.
As such, a “neutral” third party may not be entirely neutral; however, its word
must carry weight, and it must been seen to be impartial enough by all those
involved.
Indonesia,
a claimant state, has so far remained somewhat above the fray. It has not
engaged in the same heated rhetoric against China as the Philippines or
Vietnam. Of all the claimant states, it is the most populous and possesses the
largest economy after China; and, as with China, its demand for energy will
only increase over time. It is a founding member of ASEAN and the most recent
host of the ASEAN Summit and East Asian Summit.
Indonesia
has thus far refused to openly support China or the Philippines and Vietnam,
which has allowed it to remain fairly neutral. Although Indonesia has claims to
waters around its Natuna Islands, which are also claimed by China and Taiwan,
it does not have a stake in the more contentious Spratlys. Furthermore,
Indonesia has strong ties with China and the US, both of which are important
commercial and economic partners.
Indonesia
is ideally suited to play a mediating role if required; however, it remains to
be seen if China wishes to step away from its insistence on bilateral
resolutions.
Chinese
influence over states like the Philippines and Vietnam is minimal; and as
tensions in the region continue to rise, China may and should privately seek
outside assistance. China has much to lose in any sort of conflict, if only
because any war is an unnecessary burden on a burgeoning economy. While Beijing
is unlikely to choose a course of action in which it risks losing face, it
would not overlook the benefits of stabilizing the South China Sea, even if
stabilization is simply maintaining the status quo—India and Russia included.
(Khanh
Vu Duc
Asia
Sentinel
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