During the 1990s, massacres such as Rwanda or
Srebrenica - committed in the very presence of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers
- spurred heated debates among civil society, scholars and policy makers.
Opinions
were divergent: how should the world react to mass atrocities committed within
the borders of a sovereign state? As a result of these discussions, the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released
a report in 2001 which attempted to define if, when and how governments or
international organisations should intervene to protect the lives and dignity
of people suffering harm caused by armed violence.
The
core message was that protecting its population is the duty of the sovereign
state; the international "responsibility to protect", or R2P, is to
be called upon only if the state is unwilling or unable to do so.
Over
the years, the concept has been invoked in more than one situation to justify
foreign military intervention by individual countries or groupings. Thus, R2P
has essentially been associated with military action, which has given it a
negative connotation and discredited it in many regions including Southeast
Asia: the concept's application in practice has perhaps become its very
Achilles' heel. R2P, however, does not primarily imply military action, which
is only to be a last resort in case of genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity or ethnic cleansing. Much more important are the non-coercive measures
suggested by the ICISS, such as preventive diplomacy, mediation or monitoring
by third parties.
As a
regional intergovernmental organisation, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (Asean) certainly has a role to play. But is such involvement
compatible with the institution's principles of non-interference, respect of
state sovereignty and consensus? Has Asean, in the past 30 years, lived up to
its responsibility to protect? And how would it react in the future if mass
atrocities were committed in one of its member states? Some positive examples of
Asean involvement in helping Southeast Asian populations recover from conflict
and disaster are worth noting. In Cambodia throughout the 1980s, Asean played
an influential role in the mediation process leading up to the 1991 Paris Peace
Agreement. Nearly two decades later, after Cyclone Nargis struck parts of
Myanmar in 2008, Asean managed to convince the regime to open its borders to
international aid - though admittedly late. Still, the regional body's success
in these two cases needs to be relativised. In the first case, neither Cambodia
nor Vietnam was part of Asean at the time, which removed the sensitivities
attached to interference in members' domestic affairs. Moreover, the final
resolution of the conflict - deployment of a peacekeeping operation and
organisation of elections - was the work of the UN.
As for
Nargis, Asean's influence on the Myanmar junta mainly stemmed from the
proactive diplomacy of individual leaders, Secretary-General Dr Surin Pitsuwan
in particular, rather than from any concerted Asean efforts. In addition, the
Nargis case cannot be considered in the R2P framework which is linked to armed
conflict. Nonetheless, Asean - or at least its secretariat - can be credited
with having assumed its "responsibility to assist" people affected by
a natural disaster insufficiently handled by their government. In this sense,
Nargis has set an important precedent in showing some flexibility in the
interpretation of the regional body's non-interference principle.
Where
Asean took action in favour of Southeast Asian populations, as seen in Cambodia
and after Nargis, its measures were non-coercive and the contexts were not
strictly ones of R2P. This was different in the case of East Timor, where the
post-referendum violence of 1999 forced well over 200,000 people to flee their
homes. While Asean had a responsibility to protect the East Timorese victims,
it neither managed to discuss the issue in due time nor played a part in the
subsequent peacekeeping operations, led instead by Australia and the UN. It was
not until Indonesia asked for an Asian counterbalance that individual Asean
members, notably Thailand and the Philippines, responded by taking up
commanding roles within the peacekeeping force. In hindsight, Asean
collectively should have acted by taking preventive or mediative R2P action. As
in this case, the fear of angering a member state could again impede the
organisation's response in similar situations in the future.
These
limitations may be explained by Asean's institutional principles, rooted in the
careful regional approach. It is thus relatively easy to understand why the
Southeast Asian grouping would not be able to play a role comparable to that of
the Arab League in the present context of Syria. Asean's consensus over
majority rule, non-suspension of members, respect of internal cohesion and face
saving are attributes to the organisation's strength as well as its weakness.
Given
regional sensitivities, it is unrealistic (and perhaps inappropriate) to expect
Asean to take stronger measures, including the use of force, against member
states accused of gross violations of international human rights or
humanitarian law - more so as military intervention remains extremely
controversial throughout the world. Even the less intrusive establishment of a
peacekeeping force has not gained regional consensus so far. Asean does,
however, have a more responsible role to play in the form of diplomatic efforts
aimed at protecting populations from adverse conditions; in serious cases, even
economic or political sanctions can be contemplated. The simple raising of
sensitive issues among Asean leaders should no longer be considered as
interference; in today’s world where most problems do not respect national
frontiers, the lives and dignity of the people must come first.
A
change of thinking within Asean has already started. It can be nudged further
if decision makers accept that state sovereignty is not a right, but rather a
responsibility. Only then can one hope that they will dare to take stronger
action to protect their region's populations - be it from the effects of armed
conflict, environmental degradation or pervasive human rights abuse.
Gabriela
Steinemann
Gabriela
Steinemann is pursuing an MA in Southeast Asian Studies at Chulalongkorn
University.
Business & Investment Opportunities
YourVietnamExpert is a division of Saigon Business Corporation Pte Ltd, Incorporated in Singapore since 1994. As Your Business Companion, we propose a range of services in Strategy, Investment and Management, focusing Healthcare and Life Science with expertise in ASEAN. We also propose Higher Education, as a bridge between educational structures and industries, by supporting international programmes. Many thanks for visiting www.yourvietnamexpert.com and/or contacting us at contact@yourvietnamexpert.com
No comments:
Post a Comment