Indonesia's Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa recently conducted an
intense round of shuttle diplomacy, visiting Cambodia, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia in order to secure agreement on the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) Six-Point Principles on the South China
Sea.
When asked by the Australian
Broadcasting Corporation to sum up the results of his efforts he replied it was
"back to business as usual".
Natalegawa meant that he had
managed to overcome the appearance of ASEAN disarray when the grouping's
foreign ministers were unable to reach agreement on four paragraphs on the
South China Sea to be included in a draft joint communique to summarize the
results of their meeting. The Cambodia-hosted event represented the first time
in the bloc's 45-year history that an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) failed to
agree on a joint statement.
Natalegawa stood alongside
Cambodia's Foreign Minister Hor Namhong when he issued ASEAN's six-point
statement. Hor Namhong, however, could not resist laying the blame for ASEAN's
failure to issue a joint communique on Vietnam and the Philippines, the two
ASEAN countries that have clashed most openly with China on contested claims to
the South China Sea. Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia also have disputes with
China over particular bits of the maritime area.
The record of the ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) Retreat, however, tells a different story. According
to notes of the discussions drawn up by a participant which this author has
reviewed, Cambodia twice rejected attempts by the Philippines, Vietnam and
other ASEAN members to include a reference to recent developments in the South
China Sea. Each time Cambodia threatened that it would withhold the joint
communique.
The South China Sea issue was
discussed during the plenary session of the AMM Retreat. The Philippines spoke
first and was followed by Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Laos,
Myanmar, Singapore and Cambodia.
Philippine Foreign Minister
Albert Del Rosario described past and current examples of Chinese
"expansion and aggression" that prevented "the Philippines from
enforcing its laws and forcing the Philippines to retreat from its own
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)."
Del Rosario asked rhetorically,
"what would be the real value of the Code of Conduct (COC) if we could not
uphold the DOC [Declaration on Conduct of Parties]?", which was first
agreed to with China in 2002. Del Rosario ended his intervention stating it was
"important that ASEAN's collective commitment to the [DOC] be reflected in
the joint communique of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting."
Four other countries directly
addressed this point. Vietnam described China's recent creation of Sansha City
over contested South China Sea islands and China National Offshore Oil
Company's invitation for foreign exploration bids in other contested maritime
areas as "serious violations of Vietnam's sovereignty and jurisdiction
over its EEZ and Continental Shelf".
Vietnam argued that the joint
communique should reflect this. Indonesia underscored the importance of ASEAN
acting with one voice and noted that recent developments were of concern to all
ASEAN members. Indonesia endorsed concluding a Code of Conduct and promised to
"circulate a non-paper on possible and additional elements of the
COC".
Malaysia endorsed the comments by
Indonesia and stressed "We must talk with a single voice; ASEAN must show
[its] united voice; [otherwise] our credibility will be undermined."
Malaysia concluded, "We must refer to the situation in the South China
Sea, particularly any acts that contravene the international law on EEZ and
continental shelves. It is totally unacceptable that we can't have it in the
joint communique. It is important that ASEAN has a clear expression of our
concerns on the South China Sea in the joint communique."
Singapore noted that "recent
developments were of special concern" because they raised "novel
interpretations of international law that could undermine the entire UNCLOS
regime." Singapore concluded by arguing "it is important that ASEAN
has a clear expression of our concerns on the South China Sea in the joint
communique ... [It would be] damaging to us if we don't say anything."
Broken consensus
Until Cambodia spoke, no country
took exception to the interventions by the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore. When it was Cambodia's turn to speak its foreign
minister queried why it was necessary to mention Scarborough Shoal, where China
and the Philippines were recently engaged in a two-month stand-off.
He then abruptly declared,
"I need to be frank with you, in case we cannot find the way out, Cambodia
has no more recourse to deal with this issue. Then, there will be no text at
all. We should not try to impose national positions; we should try to reflect
the common views in the spirit of compromise."
At this point the discussion
became heated, with both the Philippines and Vietnam continuing to argue their
cases. Additional interventions were made by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.
The AMM Retreat was brought to an end by Hor Namhong, who declared, "We
can never achieve [agreement] even though we stay here for the next four or
five hours ... If you cannot agree on the text of the joint communique; we have
no more recourse to deal with this issue as the Chair of ASEAN."
Natalegawa correctly pointed out
that although no joint communique was issued, ASEAN foreign ministers did reach
agreement on the "key elements" of a Code of Conduct in the South
China Sea. As a result of his shuttle diplomacy, he said ASEAN foreign
ministers agreed to "the early conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct in
the South China Sea".
Cambodia, in its capacity as
ASEAN chair, hosted two informal meetings between ASEAN and Chinese senior
officials to discuss the way forward on the COC. China publicly announced that
it was ready to enter into formal discussions with ASEAN "when conditions
were ripe."
If all goes to plan, ASEAN and
Chinese senior officials will discuss the modalities of their forthcoming
discussions. They still need to determine at what level they will meet, how
often, and to whom they will report. Formal discussions are scheduled to
commence in September and ASEAN officials hope to complete negotiations by
November.
Natalegawa's shuttle diplomacy
provided a much-needed boost to ASEAN's morale. His efforts also helped to
dispel the perception outside of Southeast Asia that there was disunity among
ASEAN members on how to deal with the South China Sea issue.
More importantly, Indonesia's
intervention served notice to Cambodia that as ASEAN's chair for 2012 it could
not unilaterally control ASEAN's agenda. Natalegawa's intervention was
unprecedented in taking a leadership role that normally would fall to the ASEAN
chair and signaled that Indonesia is willing to play a more proactive role in
regional affairs. This is in contrast to the Suharto years when Indonesia,
viewed as the natural leader of Southeast Asia, played a more low-key
"softly, softly" role.
There could, however, be another
meaning behind Natalegawa's expression that ASEAN is "back to business as
usual". This second meaning could be a vague reference to China's renewed
assertiveness in seeking to exercise its jurisdiction over the South China Sea.
This has taken three forms.
First, China has raised Sansha from county to prefecture level and given it
administrative responsibility over the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank and
Spratly Islands. Indeed, Hainan provincial authorities rushed to appoint local
officials to this new unit, and elections will be held to select
representatives to the National People's Congress.
Second, China's southern Hainan
province soon thereafter dispatched 30 trawlers and four escort vessels to fish
in the waters in the Spratly Islands. The fleet first fished off Fiery Cross
Reef before moving to Johnson South Reef, both contested areas.
Third, and most significantly,
China's Central Military Commission issued a directive establishing a military
garrison in Sansha prefecture. This garrison, with its headquarters based at
Woody Island, will have responsibility for national defense of an area covering
two million square miles of water.
Business as usual, in the second
sense, thus could mean that while ASEAN negotiates a COC with Beijing, China
can be expected to simultaneously continue to apply pressure and intimidation
on both the Philippines and Vietnam and seek other ways to sow discord among
the grouping's 10 members.
Carlyle Thayer
Asia Times
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