The failure of ASEAN to issue a joint communiqué at the 45th ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Phnom Penh, the first such failure in the group’s
history, might have served as a reminder about the challenge facing ASEAN in
maintaining and consolidating its unity.
The failure, resulting from a
disagreement on the question of the South China Sea, naturally raised questions
about the future of ASEAN’s diplomatic centrality and ability to manage the
most the crucial issue in its own backyard.
Within a week, however, that
diplomatic debacle — or glitch, depending on how one looks at it — was somehow
rectified. Indonesia, as a founding member of ASEAN and also the only member
state
that declares ASEAN as the
cornerstone of its foreign policy, felt obliged to restore ASEAN’s unity and
cohesiveness.
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa
immediately embarked on what he called “a 36-hour effort, shuttle diplomacy,
visits and working the phones” in order to forge a common ASEAN position on the
South China Sea.
That diplomatic effort paid off,
with all ASEAN members giving their approval and support to Marty’s six
principles under the “ASEAN Common Position on the South China Sea”.
Although the principles
essentially reiterate what has been ASEAN’s long-standing position on the
issue, the agreement does bring ASEAN back onto the path of consensus.
While the effects of the
diplomatic hiccup at the 45th AMM might still be felt in the months ahead, ASEAN
now has a strong reason to move forward.
It should demonstrate that
ASEAN’s Six Principles on the South China Sea are not just another diplomatic
façade or smoke-screen to cover ASEAN’s earlier failure.
ASEAN should and can capitalize
on the most important objective of Marty’s charm diplomacy, namely, the need to
manage the potential conflict in the South China Sea.
Indeed, one of the six principles
calls on ASEAN to “conclude early a regional code of conduct [CoC] on the South
China Sea”. Two developments are important in this regard.
First, ASEAN has agreed on key
elements of the CoC that will serve as the basis for further discussion and
negotiation with China.
Second, China itself, following
Marty’s initiative, has reiterated that Beijing “is open to consultation with
ASEAN on the conclusion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea”. (The
Jakarta Post, July 23).
In order to move forward, ASEAN
and China need to start the process sooner rather than later. Apart from
several tensions over the last few months, there are now signs that the
military dimension of the problem, if not handled properly, would complicate
the seascape in the region.
In response to other claimants’
moves, for example, China has announced that it would station a military
garrison in the Paracel Islands.
Therefore, an early start in the
discussion on the CoC between ASEAN and China would benefit both sides. For
ASEAN, entering a formal discussion with China would restore the international
community’s hope and confidence in the group’s ability to work closely with its
giant neighbour in managing the South China Sea dispute.
It will also restore ASEAN’s
credibility as the manager of regional order and demonstrate that ASEAN’s
diplomatic centrality is still an important element of regional relations. For
China, entering a formal discussion on the CoC with ASEAN countries would
dispel whatever suspicions there are about Beijing’s intentions not only toward
ASEAN but also in the South China Sea and the wider Asia-Pacific region.
However, it is unrealistic to
expect that the CoC will be concluded by November this year. In fact, there is
no need for ASEAN and China to rush into the formal signing of an agreement.
As Indonesia has suggested, the
CoC should have a practical utility, rather than just a general statement of
principles.
The CoC should function as a
detailed mechanism for conflict prevention and crisis management. In short, in
the words of Marty, the CoC should function like “traffic signs” regulating the
behavior of parties at sea. In order to have such a document with practical
utility, ASEAN and China should give themselves at least one full year to work
on the draft.
To ensure continuity and focus,
ASEAN might want to appoint “focal points” among themselves to coordinate the
process. For example, ASEAN could assign Indonesia and Singapore to undertake
that task. The fact that the two countries are not claimants would bring a
degree of “neutrality” to the process.
Rizal Sukma
http://www.thejakartapost.com/
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