Although keen to show a united front, Asean’s feckless attempt to forge
a united statement on the South China Sea issue reflects deep divisions in the
regional group and the influence of China and the United States on some of its
members.
The post-mortems of the failure by Asean to agree on a hitherto routine
joint statement after their 45th Ministerial Meeting are coming in thick and
heavy. Recriminations and acrimony are crisscrossing the region, the shockwaves
being felt and analysed across the Pacific and to the Atlantic.
The annual ministerial joint communiques
are as old as Asean itself. Its unprecedented absence is thus a serious setback
for the 10-member organisation, a crucial blow to its credibility and coherence
in the lead-up to its much-vaunted Asean Community by 2015. While the
diplomatic damage incurred in Phnom Penh will be glossed over in Asean
capitals, serious and effective efforts beyond damage-control are needed before
the Asean summit and its related top-level meetings with other major partners
are held in November.
What transpired in the Cambodian
capital on July 13 is still not completely clear and confirmed. But it is
widely accepted that Asean's inability to stand jointly on even a diluted
position was attributable to Cambodia's disagreement with the Philippines and
Vietnam. As the rotating chair of Asean for 2012, Cambodia refused to include
specific references to the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, which is
being hotly disputed by the Philippines and China. Vietnam also wanted to
include wording on its right to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as sanctioned
by the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea. In other words, both
Manila and Hanoi have rejected and challenged Beijing's claims over practically
the entire South China Sea, through which more than half of global shipping
passes. Apart from the Philippines and Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia also are
Asean claimants of parts of the sea vis-a-vis China.
The broader backdrop to this
controversy is the set of rules that need to be formulated and implemented by
China and the Asean claimants. Such rules, known as the Code of Conduct (COC)
in the South China Sea, would deter military solutions, address territorial
disputes and provide dispute-settlement mechanisms in view of international
law. As a tentative understanding, Asean and China a decade ago came up with a
Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Under the
Cambodian chairmanship, the DOC is supposed to be elevated, finalised and
codified into a COC. Asean's debacle in Phnom Penh means the COC remains
elusive.
An even broader regional canvass
indicates the chief challenge for Southeast Asia as a region, as opposed to a
regional organisation under Asean. The future of this neighbourhood shines
brightly. It is likely to be prosperous and dynamic, notwithstanding its
assortment of developmental problems ranging from wealth gaps and middle-income
traps to rights abuses and environmental degradation. But its past is
problematic, riven by enmity and conflict.
Achieving prosperity and securing
peace requires rules and institutions to manage regional dilemmas, challenges
and conflicts. The South China Sea is thus a key test for Southeast Asia's
future.
Following the Phnom Penh
controversy, China's role and strategic intentions have come into fuller focus
but they cannot be viewed in separation from the United States' highly-touted
strategic rebalancing of its resources and assets increasingly towards East
Asia and the Pacific.
As Asean chair, Cambodia will
have a difficult time avoiding blame for not being able to come up with a mild
Asean statement, even agreeing to disagree in writing, which Asean has been an
expert in doing in the past. This time Asean disagreed and disagreed and proved
it without a written document.
The Cambodian leadership would
not have risked so much of its credibility, had it not been so beholden to
Beijing. China has become an open patron state of Phnom Penh, having poured in
more than US$10 billion (316 billion baht) of aid and investment in as many
years. As many have noted the proof and irony, even the Peace Palace in Phnom
Penh where the Asean ministers met was built by Chinese funds and adorned by
Chinese art.
But neither can Manila shirk
responsibility for insisting on its Scarborough Shoal dispute with Beijing to
be mentioned in writing. Here is where the US rebalancing comes into view.
As a treaty ally of Washington,
Manila may have been less assertive and more measured in its posture without
America's Pacific rebalancing. Although it is hard to imagine Washington's
willingness to go to war with Beijing over some Manila-claimed rocks in the
South China Sea, it is plausible that Washington's re-engaged focus, commitment
and resolve have emboldened the Philippines to stand up to China so
vociferously.
Vietnam's role in Phnom Penh is
as yet unclear. Its insistence on referring to the EEZ in the joint statement
may be attributable to opportunism. If Manila can have Scarborough Shoal
mentioned, why not Hanoi's EEZ?
Both Cambodia's and the
Philippines' performances raise doubts at the diplomatic level. If seasoned
diplomats were present on both sides, they would have been able to hammer out a
joint position without all of the unnecessary acrimony. In Cambodia's case,
such doubts on its diplomats would be heightened if it is true, as has been
reported, that the Cambodians shared the draft version of the joint statement
with the Chinese, who then vetoed it.
The aftermath of Asean's
collectively impotent and individually insistent ways in Phnom Penh suggests a
regional mix that is structurally different from the recent past. Asean has
always had diverse and disparate interests, and the organisation has been
granted much latitude in its region-building efforts.
The differences now are at least
threefold. First, China's posture is much more assertive and less hedged, as
evident on South China Sea issues and beyond. This point reflects China's
jilted imperial pride, internal imperatives for growth, the transition of new
leadership (which cannot afford to appear weak), inroads into its Asean
relationships, particularly Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand to a lesser
extent. China knows that its pressure on and clout over certain Asean members
would prevent key common Asean positions, such as the Philippine push for COC
implementation. China thus wins for now on its bilateral approach.
Second, the US is more engaged as
opposed to the previous decade. Its rebalancing means certain Asean members can
rely on the US's new posture to hedge and leverage vis-a-vis China. The
Philippines is at the forefront here but to a lesser extent also Vietnam,
Malaysia and Brunei. In other words, current internal Asean rifts are
attributable not just to China's assertive rise but also to the US's vigorous
re-engagement.
Third, Asean's internal coherence
is not what it used to be. On one hand, the Asean Charter codifies more
cooperation and connectivity. On the other, the interests of Asean member
states are more divergent. The Community objectives of 2015 can neither be
taken at face value nor for granted. At a minimum, the Asean Political-Security
Community (APSC) _ one of the three main pillars of the charter _ now appears
challenged in view of what happened in Phnom Penh. This raises the question
whether the potentially vigorous Asean Economic Community and the evidently
weak Asean Socio-Cultural Community can shore up the APSC.
The states of maritime and
mainland Asean appear to be increasingly preoccupied with different sets of
interests. To rectify Asean's recent misstep and regain the momentum towards
2015, the organisation's leadership in all member states have much homework
until November. The silver lining amidst adversity in Cambodia was Indonesian
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa's last-ditch effort to come up with a
six-point statement, which merely reaffirmed principles of the DOC. Read by
Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, it saved Asean's face and salvaged what
would have otherwise been a complete disaster. Such leadership will need to be
broadened and shared by other Asean member states in the coming months.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is Director of the Institute of Security and
International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.
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