The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) suffered a major loss
of face, at least in the perceptions of some international media and academic
experts, owing to its failure to issue its customary joint communique at its
last ministerial meeting (ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, or the AMM) in Cambodia
held during July 9-13.
The reason, as has been widely
reported, was the refusal of Cambodia as the ASEAN chair to incorporate the
positions of Philippines and Vietnam regarding their dispute with China over
the South China Sea. As a result, the idea of ASEAN centrality, which assumes
that ASEAN, rather than the great powers like China, Japan, the US or India,
should be the building bloc and hub of developing a wider Asian or Asia-Pacific
regional architecture, is facing a severe test. But there may be some silver
linings and useful lessons which, if acted upon, can put ASEAN in a better
position to move forward.
Much has been made of the
infighting and putdowns inside the AMM deliberations, based on leaked accounts,
that led to the impasse in Phnom Penh. Many observers have noted that this was
the first time ASEAN had failed to issue a joint communique in its 45 years
history.
But ASEAN's rise to regional and
international prominence has never been smooth. The ASEAN process ground to a
virtual halt in 1968-1969 over the Philippines' claim to Sabah. Moreover, the
expansion of its membership and functions has its costs and consequences.
ASEAN now not only includes all
10 countries of Southeast Asia, it has taken on the additional role of being in
the "driver's seat" of larger regional bodies like the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), bodies that include all the great
powers of the world today.
In particular, the crisis brings
to the fore one of the concerns that some of us had highlighted about ASEAN's
expansion to include the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) in the
1990s.[1] These included the possibility that the entry of Vietnam would make
the South China Sea issue even more of a "frontline" issue for ASEAN,
as Hanoi was surely to seek ASEAN's diplomatic backing over the dispute with
Beijing, and that the new members may not always obey the traditional norms of
ASEAN like the consensus principle.
The crisis also puts a spotlight
on the role of Cambodia in ASEAN, which has been a major part of the ASEAN
story.
It is ironic that the ASEAN's
recent discomfiture occurred in Cambodia, and was the result of Cambodia's own
action in blocking the joint declaration. Without ASEAN's role in seeking a
negotiated solution to the decade long Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia that
ousted the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime, there might not be a sovereign
Cambodia to day. Cambodia may still be languishing under foreign occupation (under
Vietnam's occupation) or as an international pariah (under Khmer Rouge rule).
Moreover, this is not the first
time that Cambodia's engagement with ASEAN has been problematic. In July 1997,
Hun Sen's "coup" against co-premier Norodom Ranarridh led ASEAN to
postpone Cambodia's imminent accession to ASEAN.
Hun Sen also alarmed fellow ASEAN
members, especially his Thai neighbor, by hosting fugitive former Thai Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and even appointing him as a personal advisor in
November 2009. This went against the established ASEAN principle that granting
support to a fugitive from a member state would constitute an act of
interference in the internal affairs of that member state.
Will Cambodia go all the way in
deferring to China, as American political scientist Donald Emmerson has
speculated in an Stanford University article in which he referred to Cambodia's
"spoiler's role as a proxy for Beijing?" Many hope that Cambodia will
put its ASEAN interests first. If Cambodia does pander to China this way, it
would incur serious costs. Such an action would severely isolate it from its
neighbors. As Norodom Sihanouk, when he was still the king of Cambodia, once
told this author, Cambodia does not want to be a supplicant to a great power
and that his country would always need to be watchful about China's intentions
because of China's size and proximity to Cambodia. I have every reason to
believe that Cambodia will always seek to retain its autonomy and not be a
sidekick to another power.
But it should show more deference
to the ASEAN spirit. In justifying its decision to block the communique,
Cambodia has since clarified (in a July 26 note) that "The AMM is not a
court that could rule against or in favor of anybody, in relation to bilateral
disputes."[2] But the Joint Communique of the 44th AMM hosted by Indonesia
did specifically refer to the Thai-Cambodia border dispute (Part IV, Para
103).[3] Also, China is not an ASEAN member. It has never been an official
ASEAN policy to specifically exclude discussion or mention of bilateral
disputes involving non-ASEAN members or between an ASEAN member and an outside
party. And whether the South China Sea dispute is really a purely bilateral
dispute can be questioned, and Cambodia's stance is inconsistent with ASEAN's
own policy of talking to China multilaterally over this issue.
Cambodia can ill afford to weaken
ASEAN. Membership in ASEAN has been about the best thing that happened to
Cambodia's national interest and foreign policy (or for that matter to the
foreign policy of other CLMV countries). Only through ASEAN that Cambodia can
realistically hope to have any real voice and role in international and
regional affairs than what it can manage on its own. Cambodia should learn its
own lesson from the crisis and not hold the whole organization to its own
interpretation of ASEAN's interests.
What is more significant that
other ASEAN members, including original members Singapore and Malaysia, had
supported the ministerial statement that Cambodia managed to scuttle. Indeed, a
few years ago, some analysts had believed that Malaysia might defect and
support China's claims in the South China Sea in support for concessions from
China, including recognition of its own claims in the disputed area. Yet, this
time, Malaysia showed little sign of any special understanding with China on
the dispute.
Even if ASEAN foreign ministers
do not manage to issue the formal communique that was withheld in Phnom Penh,
the six-point statement issued by the Cambodian foreign minister will help
ASEAN to regain some of its lost image. But it is too much to call this as the
end of ASEAN.
There is little question that Hun
Sen's refusal to accommodate Philippines and Vietnam resulted at least partly
from Chinese pressure. According to a highly placed source, the Chinese
specifically reminded the Cambodians that Sihanouk, as the leader of the
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), had accepted the Chinese
claims on the South China Sea. The CGDK was the resistance coalition of
Cambodian factions had fought the Vietnamese occupiers (and the Hanoi-installed
Heng Samarin regime of which Hun Sen was a young member) of Cambodia in exile
with Chinese, ASEAN and Western assistance. Even if this is true, one should
keep in mind that Sihanouk's stance was made under duress, when he needed
Chinese help to fight the Vietnamese occupation.
In the meantime, the mood on
ASEAN has soured in Beijing. Chinese officials, after developing a close and
positive relationship with ASEAN for decades, increasingly view it (and
regional multilateral cooperation more generally) as a threat, rather than a
prop, to its great power ambitions. Yet Beijing needs to remind itself, if one
was needed, that its soft power and influence in the region depends on working
with and supporting ASEAN, not undermining it. Rising power does not equate to
rising influence or respect in the absence of a policy of restraint towards
smaller neighbors, something Indonesia has preached and practiced towards its
ASEAN neighbors since the fall of Sukarno. Hence, it is appropriate that it was
the Indonesian Foreign Minister, who undertook the damage control mission on
behalf of ASEAN after the Cambodia setback
The crisis may have some silver
linings. It will be a useful wake-up call for ASEAN.
One of the most critical
challenges facing ASEAN is the need to strengthen the ASEAN secretariat.
Apparently, three officials from the secretariat, including two Cambodians,
were sent to Phnom Penh to spend weeks there before the ministerial meeting.
But they provided no forewarning of the coming crisis. This suggests either
that the secretariat staff lacked the necessary analytic skills, or that
valuable information was deliberately withheld for the sake of parochial
national interests. It shows that ASEAN as an institution is yet to develop a
mindset that rises above national positions and serves the common interest of
the organization when the situation demands. It is noteworthy that none other
than the current ASEAN Secretary-General, Dr Surin Pitsuwan, had provided a
detailed account (entitled "ASEAN's Challenges") of his secretariat's
shortcomings with recommendations for improving its efficiency. These steps
need to be urgently implemented.
Cambodia's handling of its ASEAN
chairmanship in 2012 should be a warning to Myanmar, which assumes the
chairmanship in 2014. While not all new members have handled leadership
positions badly, and Cambodia itself organized a very successful AMM and ARF
meeting in 2003, Myanmar should strive its best to restore and advance ASEAN's
image.
ASEAN also should be careful in being
perceived as pursuing an overtly pro-US agenda at the expense of China.
America's role at the most recent ASEAN meetings (especially the ARF) has
received less media attention in the region that Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton's intervention at the 2010 Hanoi ARF meeting where she drew the ire of
his Chinese counterpart by drawing attention to the South China Sea conflict.
Many Chinese officials believe that America's "interference" has
internationalized the South China Sea conflict and harmed China's national
interests. This perception is of course in correct, but ASEAN, including
Indonesian Foreign Minister Nataleawa, should convey to Beijing that ASEAN is
acting on its own interests, not America's no matter how much the two coincide.
Next, ASEAN's original members
have a special responsibility to rise up to the occasion and guide ASEAN at
this critical juncture. Indonesia has done that, but Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, Philippines and Brunei (which joined ASEAN in 1984) also need to
enhance their role to prevent future setbacks such as that happened in Phnom
Penh.
Some of the recent commentaries
on the Cambodia AMM have missed the fact that the Phnom Penh, ASEAN adopted the
terms of reference for the ASEAN Institute of Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR).
Even more important, just after the Cambodia AMM, Thailand and Cambodia pulled
out their troops (to be replaced by their border police pending an
International Court of Justice verdict on the dispute next year) from the
disputed Preah Vihear temple area, thereby diffusing a major point of
intra-ASEAN conflict for the past years.
Finally, the degree of cohesion
expected of ASEAN, including by experts who had suddenly taken an interest in
the organization because of its growing prominence during the past few years,
is unrealistic. It is useful to keep in mind what regional organizations can
and cannot do. ASEAN is an intergovernmental organization of sovereign states.
Witness the current disarray within MERCOSUR, another prominent subregional group
in the world which is often compared with ASEAN, over the suspension of
Paraguay (over the legal impeachment of its President) and its induction of
Venezuela as a member. And after three years, the European Union the "role
model" of regional organizations is still struggling to contain an
deteriorating economic crisis with a show of unity and efficiency.
To conclude, the idea of ASEAN
centrality is under challenge, but it is too early to pronounce it as dead.
Critics are right to question whether ASEAN has the ability to shoulder such a
responsibility and ASEAN should draw lessons from the Phnom Penh AMM. But one
should not jump to conclusions about ASEAN's future on the basis of the
embarrassment it suffered in Phnom Penh.
Amitav Acharya
Amitav Acharya is Professor of International Relations at American
University and Chair of its ASEAN Studies Center. These comments are strictly
in his personal capacity. A longer version of this article will appear in his
blog asiansecurityoutlook.org
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