"Congagement" would not
be mentioned. Congagement, or the idea of combining engagement and containment,
seems to make Indonesian strategic thinkers uneasy. The engagement part seems
to pose no problem - Jakarta is deepening economic and political ties with
Beijing. The idea of containment, however, still conjures up images of the Cold
War when the US embarked on a policy of preventing the spread of communist
ideology.
Yet, "congagement" does
not solely advocate pursuing a policy of engagement in congruence with a policy
of containment. Rather, it asks policymakers to transcend both.
"Congagement" seeks to offer strategic flexibility in an opaque
period of Chinese transition. In essence, it would yoke Beijing and Jakarta
together, enmeshing China within the current international system, while giving
equal consideration to deterrence. It would prepare for potential Chinese
provocations within Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), while also
notifying the Chinese leadership that such adventurism could prove to be
hazardous.
Indonesian policy makers,
although they may be unaware, are already pursuing the beginnings of a
"congagement" strategy. Jakarta has been building an economic and
political web between itself in Beijing, while also in some ways hedging
against China's uncertain rise.
Indeed, economically, China is
Indonesia's second-largest trading partner. Trade reached US$60 billion in
2011, with expectations that it will reach $80 billion by 2015. Beijing has
been heavily investing in Indonesia's infrastructure with $19 billion of
investment credit pledged and another $9 billion in infrastructure loans
offered. China also recently offered to build a coastal surveillance system to
complement the existing US funded Integrated Maritime Surveillance System
(IMSS).
Politically, Jakarta and Beijing
entered into a Strategic Partnership in 2005, with plans to boost cultural
exchanges and people to people cooperation in the coming year. Both Indonesia
and China have sought to maximize bilateral ties, while keeping political disputes
as modest as possible: Jakarta has embraced Beijing's "One China"
policy, while Beijing remained fairly mum after the 1998 riots in Jakarta
against Indonesians of Chinese dissent.
Indonesia, as de-facto leader of
the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has encouraged
the inclusion of China in various regional forums from ASEAN+3, the broader
ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). Jakarta and
Beijing have also enhanced military-to-military cooperation through joint naval
missile developments, joint exercises, maritime security, national defense
industry exchanges and cooperation in non-traditional security fields.
Yet, despite increased
engagement, Jakarta has attempted to curb against potential incursions within
its maritime backyard through military modernization and multilateral
initiatives. The Ministry of Defense's strategic planning objective of
achieving "minimum essential forces" by 2024 envisions a naval force
with "green water" capabilities, with the capacity to protect key
sea-lanes and choke points against potential conventional or non-conventional
threats.
Acquisition plans include diesel
electric submarines, missile-guided destroyers, fast attack missile boats,
torpedo boats and minesweepers. Additionally, Jakarta, by supporting the
inclusion of key extra-regional actors, such as the United States and Russia in
forums such as the East Asia Summit, while also discreetly encouraging the
United States to remain actively involved in the region is providing a
diplomatic hedge to possible Chinese expansionism.
Indonesia's current policy,
despite showing signs of a "congagement" strategy, falls short of
credibly responding to the various destabilizing trends that are currently
rippling through the South China Sea. Notwithstanding certain forward thinking
acquisition plans, Jakarta's current strategy revolves primarily around a
"diplomatic security perspective" - with diplomacy construed as the
first line of defense - through regional and international cooperation. If
diplomacy failed to prevent a conventional military strike on Indonesia's
territory, then Indonesia would revert to a seemingly archaic "Total
People's War" strategy to protect its territorial integrity.
However, as last month's ASEAN
Summit in Cambodia demonstrated, utilizing diplomacy as the main mechanism for
forward protection may not be sound. ASEAN's July 2012 summit witnessed the
first time in 45 years that ASEAN was unable to produce a joint communique, as
the group was split over the South China Sea. With the ASEAN member states
fracturing, concerns are arising that the organization will no longer be able
to effectively respond to overlapping territorial claims amongst themselves and
China.
Indonesia's strategy coupled with
ASEAN's recent failure appears all the more disconcerting as China more
aggressively flexes its muscles in the South China Sea. The infamous 2009
Impeccable incident, the illegal detainment of over 700 Vietnamese fisherman,
the Scarborough Shoal faceoff, and the 2009 and 2010 fishery standoffs in
Indonesian waters, when taken together, seem indicative of a larger trend by
the Chinese to assert control of its historic claims to the South China Sea.
China's "9 dotted line"
(delineating its claim of much of the South China Sea) overlaps with
Indonesia's EEZ, adjacent to the Natuna Islands: Indonesia's energy rich sea
bed with Asia's largest concentration of natural gas reserves. An interview
with a key Indonesian strategic thinker, Andi Widjajanto, in Jakarta early last
month revealed that the Indonesian government is beginning to view the Natuna
Islands and their surrounding waters as a potential major flashpoint with the
Chinese. Indeed, after a visit to the Natuna Island this past May, Major
General Paul Lodewijk asserted that its surrounding waters were highly
vulnerable to foreign incursions, both Chinese and Malaysian, because of its
resource wealth and made plans to add additional troops.
Building on Indonesia's current
policies and instigating a full "congagment" strategy will provide
Indonesia with the versatility it currently needs. If China in the future were
to cooperate and respect territorial delineations outlined by Article 56 of the
United Nations Council on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) treaty, of which China
is a signatory, Jakarta's policy could move it towards enhanced mutual
accommodation with Beijing. However, if China continues to pursue expansionist
policies, flexing its muscles in a bid to gain access to key Indonesian
resources and sea-lanes, Jakarta's posture could revert into classic
containment and hard balancing through other extra-regional powers.
What can be done to expand on
Indonesia's current policies in order to flesh out a more substantive policy of
"congagement" towards China?
1. First of all, work towards
enhancing economic, political and cultural ties with Beijing. Focus on
addressing key economic stumbling blocs between both states, particularly
difficulties faced by Indonesian local industries due to flood of Chinese
imports from the passing of ACFTA.
2. Secondly, Indonesia should
encourage ASEAN members to delineate areas of conflict and seek to resolve
territorial disputes within the group allowing it to present a united front
when engaging China. After the breakdown on the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh,
Indonesia's efforts, creating common ground among member states and releasing a
six-point statement asserting the "ASEAN way", was a step in the
right direction. However, as the Philippines and Vietnam did not entirely agree
with the statement, more must be done.
3. Third, Indonesia should work
towards developing and building upon current military to military interactions
and exchanges. Military contact will help China's military understand
Indonesia's militaries capabilities, concerns and intentions should it feel
threatened. More importantly, it will also allow the Indonesian military to
better understand China's capabilities and potential weaknesses. When engaging
in defense cooperation, Indonesia should explicitly state the nature of the
defense relationship to quell concerns among ASEAN member states. Jakarta
should continue to pursue trust building military measures such as the proposed
trilateral military initiative between China, Indonesia, and the United States
outside Darwin.
4. Finally, Indonesia needs to
strengthen its own capabilities in order to deter potential Chinese
expansionism. Indonesia's military must develop an effective offensive sea
denial capability utilizing key asymmetric capabilities: mines, submarines and
missile armed fast attack crafts. Indonesia currently does have an area-access/
area denial (A2/AD) concept, which emphasizes the deployment of naval mines and
submarines in Indonesian waters, however it remains tactically defensive. In
this field as in others, it may prove useful for Indonesian strategists to take
a leaf out of China's book - and adopt a posture that is more tactically
offensive, while remaining strategically defensive.
Jennifer McArdle
Jennifer McArdle is a Washington based Asia security analyst and a
Non-Resident Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi
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