Nonproliferation agreement between the two countries lapses in 2014.
South wants modifications
Pressure is growing on the part
of conservative pundits and politicians in Seoul to push for expansion of the
range of South Korea’s missiles and to enrich uranium.
South Korea now operates 22
reactors and plans to increase that number to 38 by 2030. These reactors will
produce more than 110,000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel by 2100, but South Korea
is not allowed to reprocess it, according to its nuclear nonproliferation pact
with the United States, which expires in March 2014.
Both the guidelines and the
atomic energy pact have halted the South’s missile and nuclear energy
development technologies, although amid growing arguments that the US now
should stop seeing South Korea only through a nonproliferation prism. The
expiry of the pact is likely to become a major source of friction unless the US
makes concessions.
The right-leaning columnist Kim
Dae-jung of the Korean-language daily Chosun Ilbo and Rep. Chung Mong-joon of
the ruling Senuri Party have expressed qualms about the current policy,
suggesting that the development of a nuclear weapons program or the
re-introduction of tactical nuclear weapons could deter a possible second war
on the peninsula.
In contrast to their hawkish
approach to North Korea’s nuclear threats, South Korean officials know that in
particular, enrichment and reprocessing are only a distant possibility and one
that could stir a diplomatic standoff with Washington, DC.
Pessimism over securing
Washington’s agreement is hardly groundless, since the United Arab Emirates
already promised the US that it would not engage in enrichment activities or
spent fuel reprocessing.
Recent talks have raised serious
doubts about the US’s policy stance. In broader terms, America’s firm
opposition to the spread of weapons of mass destruction has given South Korean
decision-makers a headache. Washington has so far ignored Seoul’s efforts to
win endorsement of new missile and atomic energy policies.
It goes without saying that South
Koreans now feel more frustrated and betrayed than ever, snubbed by the US in
negotiating over matters of missile control and nuclear technology cooperation
and development. It is starting to appear inevitable that relations will
continue to be strained with the US.
As long ago as the 1970s, when
the US hinted that it could pull its troops out of the South, nationalists
asserted that their country’s only protection against North Korea was the
development of a nuclear weapons program. In November 1971, then-President Park
Chung Hee told O Won-chol, then in charge of developing defense-related heavy
and chemical industries: “Our national security is vulnerable because of the
uncertainty surrounding continued U.S.military presence on the Korean
peninsula. To become secure and independent, we need to free ourselves from
dependence on U.S. military protection…Can we develop nuclear weapons?”
Although it unsettled the US,
Park’s nuclear aspiration was based on geopolitical strategy rather than on
national pride, but an answer to the question was buried as Park was
assassinated in 1979. Since then, any approaches to stepping up the South’s sensitive
atomic materials- and missile- related activities have been closely monitored
and banned.
The results were ironic. While
North Korea’s Rodong missiles have a range of 1,300 km and China has ICBMs with
more 2,000 km, South Korea’s missiles cannot fly over more than 300 km because
of ROK-US missile guidelines which also limit the payload to 500 kg. South
Korea may well feel compelled to acquire longer-range rockets that cover the
Korean peninsula.
Unfortunately, the US is using
South Korea as an example of the success of its four-decade-old
nonproliferation regime. A major worry now is that the younger generation now
feels humiliated by America’s unilateralism. The inequalities of the missile
guidelines and the atomic pact in the face of the north’s belligerence have
sparked a tug of war between Seoul and Washington, kicking off a heated
diplomatic row between the two allies.
In particular, junior nuclear
energy and security specialists castigate South Korea’s over-reliance on the US
as dangerous. A Korea-US alliance to amend the missile guidelines and the
atomic pact in a more equal and transparent manner has become a litmus test of
the South’s emphasis on value alliance.
On cue, Chosun Ilbo carried a
series of feature articles reporting on not only the much-debated guidelines
that limit the range of South Korea’s missiles to 300 km and the payload to 500
kg but the controversial atomic energy agreement that specifically prohibits
South Korea from engaging in proliferation-related activities, such as uranium
enrichment and the reprocessing of spent fuel.
The series was based on research
and interviews by a team of the conservative newspaper’s reporters, who
comprehensively covered the highly flammable issues. Many, including myself,
saw the consecutive pieces as the clearest signal that the mainstream is
beginning to doubt whether the set of policies, institutions and norms
recommended to South Korea is the agenda that was universally applied to other
countries. A lot of South Korean nuclear experts have engaged in passionate
debate about so-called US nonproliferation Orientalism, that is, prejudicial
distrust of a loyal ally and disregard of its sovereign national interest.
From their perspective, America
has double standards on nuclear power, as demonstrated in the disputed US-India
atomic deal that took place behind a veil of strategic national interest rather
than nonproliferation.
The comparison is sure to resound
ever louder and South Koreans will not quietly accept a so-called 123 agreement
which forswears uranium and plutonium reprocessing to buy American nuclear
reactors and fuel. An American proposal similar to the 123 agreement is to be
handed down to South Korea, which believes that proliferation of nuclear power
would not lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons.
There are substantial differences
of opinion between South Korea and the U.S. about the fundamental recognition
of the nonproliferation regime and how to address the potential dangers of
global terrorism.
Inevitably, the South Korean
government is in a dilemma. Its embrace of America’s nonproliferation values
and its clumsy attempts to distance itself from America’s principles of
disallowing any kind of nuclear reprocessing and enrichment are more than two
sides of the same coin. In the past, South Korea’s murky behavior in attempting
to do clandestine nuclear research placed it in an uneasy position in the
global nonproliferation system. Thus, the dire-hard claims in favor of the
disputed nuclear weapons program are an unmistakable reminder of the
inappropriate behavior.
An overwhelming number of South
Koreans fully recognize that if the country were to pursue a nuclear
weaponization program, its economic demise would be inevitable. They argue that
the only way to rally the cooperation from the US it needs to resolve strategic
realities is through a clear commitment to the goal of a Korean peninsula
without nuclear weapons. It’s because they are well aware that it would not
only gain nothing but could lose everything.
The larger problem is that South
Korea’s impressive contributions to global nuclear security and safety dialogue
have failed to earn the country trust. There seem to be reasons for the US to
assume that South Koreans are not going to lose their confidence once the US is
keeping the alliance intact. But I’m just not sure that’s the right assumption.
Furthermore, the US goes around the world telling countries that a few more
nuclear warheads are threatening global safety and security, as if thousands of
nuclear weapons of its own don’t matter.
It’s time to think again, not
merely to recalibrate old formulas in order to recharge the 59-year-old
alliance, given that South Korea’s strategy to raise its status of economic and
military self-independence in international trade and regional security is well
and truly underway.
South Korea has invested a lot of
diplomatic capital in strengthening the nonproliferation regime for the US in
the face of domestic opposition from North Korea’s never-ending nuclear
experiments.
It is thus urgent for the US to
do what it can to help South Korea become a cheerleader for nonproliferation,
as clearly evidenced in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. South Korea is a
candidate for behaving as a cheerleader only if the US finds its loyal ally
very different from other countries, such as North Korea and Iran, whose
irrational behavior worries the US. Unlike these countries, which have ignored
UN Security Council resolutions demanding they suspend nuclear experiments and
uranium enrichment, South Korea is neither a nuclear daredevil nor the wolf in
sheep’s clothing.
There is no question that South
Korea’s sound nuclear expansion does not inherently pose a proliferation risk.
With the headquarters of Samsung, Hyundai and LG located on the peninsula,
South Korea feels no need to have a convenient cover for nuclear weapons.
On the contrary, South Korea as a
democratic and transparent country with a perfect record of nonproliferation is
a terrific admirer of the nuclear-free world mantra. The government will likely
move with Americans to deter potential nuclear terrorism across the world. To
this end, it is necessary to convince the US that South Korea’s nuclear
enrichment and reprocessing would not gravely threaten either its regional
security or the global one.
Nevertheless, the conventional
wisdom is that South Korea needs to show more concrete evidence that its
nonproliferation efforts are real and credible. The dominant view in Washington
is that Seoul should be encouraged by giving it tangible signs of
reciprocation.Taken together, confidence-building is going to be a long
process.
Reliable and credible
negotiations would not require the right to reprocess or enrichment immediately
but only the transparent assurance that the two could make the world safe. By
scoffing at nationalistic nuclear thinking, the two allies could enhance
prospects for the nonproliferation regime. It is now up to the decision-makers
of Seoul and Washington to come up with a bold agreement at the allegedly
heyday of the alliance. None of this will simply emerge by itself, though.
Lee Byong-Chul
(Lee Byong-Chul is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace and
Cooperation in Seoul and a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel.)
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