As the world changes so too must U.S. foreign policy. The Diplomat asks
Zbigniew Brzezinski about America's role in the 'Asian Century.'
The Diplomat's Assistant Editor
Zachary Keck sat down with former U.S. National Security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
to discuss America's role in world affairs, the shifting geopolitics of the
Asia-Pacific, the feasibility of eliminating nuclear weapons, and rising powers
growing involvement in America's backdoor.
In Strategic Vision you argue
that in today’s world no one power will ever be capable of dominating Eurasia
in the way Harold Mackinder famously envisioned. Taking that argument at its
face, this represents a tectonic shift for U.S. foreign policy given that, long
before Washington was able to meaningfully affect the balance of power in
Eurasia, its leaders saw preventing a hegemon from dominating it as a key
strategic necessity. If the U.S. no longer has to concern itself with
safeguarding Mackinder’s “world-island” from a potential hegemon(s), what should
be the main objective of U.S. engagement in Europe and Asia going forward?
The main objective of U.S.
engagement in Europe and in Asia should be to support an equilibrium that
discourages any one power from acting in an excessively assertive fashion towards
its neighbors. In the foreseeable
future, it is, in any case, unlikely that any single power will have the
military superiority that would enable it to assert itself in a hegemonic
fashion on as a diverse, complex, and complicated mega-continent such as
Eurasia. Having a close relationship
with Europe, though maintaining a complex partnership with China and an
alliance with Japan, will provide the United States with sufficient foci for a
strategic engagement designed to maintain a relatively stable even if delicate
equilibrium on the so-called “world island.”
In the book you state that the
U.S. should act as a neutral arbitrator between Asia’s major powers, with the
possible exception of Japan. The Obama administration has usually heeded this
advice but recently diverged from it by issuing a harsh statement about the
South China Sea that singled out China. What do you see as the reasoning behind
doing this and do you think it was a mistake?
I think the United States’
position on freedom of navigation is generally correct, but it has been pursued
lately in a clumsy fashion. It is to be
regretted that it was announced in the context of a so-called “strategic
pivot,” implying in the process that it involves an augmentation of American
military power in Asia as a necessary response to the newly emerging
geopolitical realities in the Far East.
In brief, it is not surprising that the Chinese understood it to mean
that the United States is beginning to fashion a coalition against China,
something which at this stage at least is premature and runs the risk of
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In Strategic Vision you come out
strongly against an Indo-U.S. formal alliance, criticize the 2006 nuclear deal,
and note many of the internal challenges that New Delhi faces. You have been
remarkably consistent on these points over time, yet seem to be at odds with
much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment that sees a stronger relation
with India as undeniably in the national interest. Why are they wrong?
I disagree with much of the
foreign policy establishment in regard to the need for a strong relationship
with India which, prima facie, would be directed at China. I think American interests, as well as
stability in the Far East would be better served by America staying free of any
binding ties with competing powers on the Asian mainland. Last, but not least, the future stability,
not to mention power potential, of India is problematic and in my view too many
people have been mesmerized simply by the fact that India is as massively
populated as China.
In August Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton took a 10-day trip to Africa (with many arguing) to counter
China’s growing influence there. In Strategic Vision you discuss in relation to
Mexico, but which could reasonably be extended elsewhere in the Western
Hemisphere, how growing ties with China and other emerging powers could combine
with other issues to create an increasingly tense U.S.-Mexican relationship.
Given that U.S. hegemony over the Western Hemisphere has been the overarching
goal of U.S. foreign policy since at least as far back as 1823, and a reality
since 1898, is the U.S. doing enough to counter China and other rising powers’
penetration of its traditional sphere of influence? If not, what should it be
doing?
I do not think the U.S. needs to
do “enough to counter China and other rising powers’ penetration of its sphere
of influence” in South America because the countries of South America are
obviously intent at this stage on becoming more autonomous in their relations
with the United States. A policy
predicated on the premise which I have just quoted would force the Latin
American countries to line up either with or against the United States, and
that would hardly be in the U.S. interest, especially given the prevailing and
changing public mood in a number of Latin American countries.
You have long advocated
negotiating seriously with Iran, something the Obama administration at least
came into office intent on doing. Before talks got underway, however, street
protests broke out in Tehran following the 2009 Presidential election. While the
administration claimed this came as a complete shock to them, I imagine it was
less so for you given that in 2007 you stated that Iran “is a country that may
be confronting serious internal problems once Iranians don’t feel that the
outside world, and particularly the United States, is subjecting them to a
siege.” You also have personal experience with handling street demonstrations
in Tehran. How did the Obama administration do in responding to the 2009 Iran
protests in your opinion? What about the uprising that latter swept through
much of the Arab world?
I do not feel that the United
States had much freedom of action insofar as a response to the upheavals in
Iran and more generally in the Middle East is concerned. These processes are inherently connected with
social change within the region, and especially so in regards to the phenomenon
of massive political awakening of their younger populations. The rhetoric that is used in that connection
by many of the spokesmen involved in the upheavals tends to be democratic, but
democracy is not necessarily the real object of mass political
aspirations. The aspirations are rooted
in historical resentments, social discrimination, financial envy, and sheer
frustration. The result tends to be
assertive populism which is not to be confused with imminent
institutionalization of democratic processes.
Many of the U.S.’s most
celebrated diplomats, including many of your contemporaries, have strongly
endorsed abolishing nuclear weapons. In Strategic Vision you discuss at length
the potential dangers of horizontal proliferation-particularly from
quasi-nuclear weapon states like Japan, South Korea, and Germany- as well as
the vertical proliferation threat from countries like Russia, China, and India.
At the same time it seems to me that you were somewhat less enthusiast about
the global zero movement, although more recently you have on occasion
cautiously endorsed it. I am therefore wondering if you could elaborate a bit
on your thinking on this issue. For instance, do you see other more viable
alternatives for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons?
I have no problem with the global
nuclear zero movement but I think that it is an objective that will be achieved
only slowly, with a gradual settling down of the current era of turmoil, and
perhaps in a context in which the major powers of the world will find it more
feasible and productive to engage in a genuinely serious cooperation. The
prospects for that in the short run are relatively tenuous and not very
hopeful, and as a result I do not see much point in becoming very actively
involved in what I view otherwise as a positive aspiration.
With Hillary Clinton repeatedly
saying she would not stay on as Secretary of State in a second Obama
administration, the U.S. is likely to get a new top diplomat regardless of the
outcome of the election in November. Who are some of the people you’d recommend
the President-elect interview for this position? If you are unwilling to name
names, perhaps you could at least say what characteristics you think are most
important for the candidates.
I do not want to engage in
advocacy of particular names because I suspect that such advocacy by me could
even be counterproductive. There are a number of people on the scene, including
some from the Senate, as well as in public life, who would make very competent
Secretaries of State. However, a great
deal depends also on what role the next President envisages for his Secretary
of State: is the nominee to be in fact the prime shaper of American foreign
policy, or is the nominee expected more to be the foreign minister for external
relations, with the word “relations” all important. I have recently seen some detailed but silly
analyses of how many miles respective Secretaries of State have traveled in recent
years, and that to me indicates precisely the need to differentiate between
foreign policy shaping and engaging in active foreign policy relationships.
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