Is this a necessary irritant between the US and China?
The South China Sea territorial
dispute increasingly looks like a point of strategic friction between the
United States and China after a recent nasty exchange between the two
governments. The US Department of State criticized China for its plan to base a
new military garrison in the Paracel Islands, saying this would increase
international tensions. Beijing shot back that the United States should mind
its own business.
Many observers wonder why
Washington and Beijing are allowing a new irritant to emerge in the
incalculably important US-China relationship. Unfortunately, there is
widespread misunderstanding about the US rationale for America’s diplomatic
intervention in a territorial dispute to which the United States is not a
party.
Although US officials have named
several specific US concerns about China’s policies and activities in the South
China Sea, the US concern most widely understood and repeated is the potential
threat to “freedom of navigation”: the PRC might be moving toward imposing
restrictions on foreign ships sailing in the South China Sea. This, however, is
not the real issue. It is really about bullying.
To be sure, the United States is
a strong proponent of freedom of navigation in international waters. This
stance reflects not only America’s commitment to the general principle of
liberty but also the interests of a trading nation with the world’s most capable
navy. There should be no doubt that if freedom of navigation was in jeopardy in
the South China Sea, the United States would spring to its defense. At present,
however, freedom of navigation is not at issue.
The Chinese say they do not
interfere with international navigation in the South China Sea and do not
intend to in the future. Their position has some merit.
China has a particular beef with
surveillance by US ships and aircraft near the Chinese coast. This has resulted
in Chinese harassment, with several incidents reported in the press. The UN Law
of the Sea Treaty allows for spying in the region between a country’s internal
waters limit—12 nautical miles—and its exclusive economic zone limit which is
usually 200 nautical miles.
The Chinese argue that spying is
not “innocent passage” and should not be allowed within the EEZ. It is not an
unreasonable argument. So this situation has resulted in some interference with
the “free navigation” of the US Navy, but this is a very limited and special
case.
The other circumstance in which
Chinese vessels have interfered with non-Chinese ships is when the latter are
engaged in activities that involve taking resources—fishing or preparing to
drill for hydrocarbons—or when foreigners are attempting to arrest Chinese
fishermen. These as well are special cases. Otherwise, the Chinese have not
interfered with the passage of cargo ships of any flag or of US Navy vessels
passing through the waterway.
Consequently, the Chinese assert
that the freedom of navigation argument is bogus, an assertion that is
persuasive to many neutral onlookers. From here the Chinese charge that the
Americans are using freedom of the seas as a pretext to extend the alleged
“containment” strategy to Southeast Asia, limiting Chinese influence and
recruiting new allies to join in the military encirclement of China.
Instead of providing fodder for
Chinese rhetoric, the freedom of navigation argument should remain in the
background. Rather, what the US government should be talking about is making
the world safe from unlawful international coercion. Ironically, the Chinese
have begun practicing what Beijing’s diplomats have for decades condemned as
“hegemonism” or “power politics”—strong countries forcing their self-interested
preferences onto smaller countries.
Six governments claim ownership
of parts of the South China Sea. None has a slam-dunk case. China is not the
only claimant that has moved unilaterally to strengthen its control over South
China Sea territory and resources in recent years. China, however, has
distinguished itself in two important and negative ways.
First, China’s claims are both
unusually expansive and intentionally vague. Beijing has stubbornly refused to
clarify its claims based on the guidelines in the international Law of the Sea
treaty, to which the PRC is a signatory. This is part of a strategy of
ambiguity by which the PRC tries to minimize global concern and to avoid being
constrained by the Law of the Sea guidelines while taking actions aimed at intimidating
individual rival claimants.
Second, the actions China has
taken to assert ownership over the South China Sea and its tiny “islands” are
stronger than those taken by the other claimants. These acts include
threatening and damaging foreign ships, declaring a fishing ban for part of the
year in half of the South China Sea and arresting foreign fisherman who do not
comply. There is also the recent announcement of increased Chinese
militarization of the region—not only the new garrison, but the statement by
military spokesman Geng Yansheng in June that China has begun “regular,
combat-ready patrols” in the South China Sea.
China’s actions are threatening
because China is big. No other state in Southeast Asia can match the military
power China is able to project into the South China Sea. China’s massive
economic weight, rapid growth rate, and commitment to strengthening its
military forces ensure that the gap will only grow larger in the future. To
make the contest even more lopsided, the Chinese government recently announced
plans to greatly increase the number of quasi-military patrol ships—operated by
the PRC Coast Guard and other agencies—it will deploy in the South China Sea.
In effect, this is a struggle
between two visions of international order for Asia. The US vision includes a
system of norms and international laws that ensure, among other things, that
small states are protected from predation by larger states and that dispute
resolution procedures should be fair. China, on the other hand, appears to
favor restoring a Chinese sphere of influence in East and Southeast Asia such
as the Middle Kingdom enjoyed anciently.
Under this arrangement, the rules
of international interaction would reflect basic Chinese interests. Beijing
would expect regional governments not to take major decisions that run contrary
to Chinese preferences. Beijing’s current unwillingness to base Chinese claims
in the Law of the Sea treaty may reflect the sentiment that this mostly
Western-written body of law will not be needed when China resumes its
historical position of regional dominance.
Some observers see the China-US
contention over the South China Sea as simply a squabble between two great
powers that are both seeking regional domination, with each acting in its respective
hegemonic self-interest rather than in defense of some higher principle. In
this case, however, US intervention is clearly aligned with the interests of
the Southeast Asian countries, which seek to avoid domination by China or any
other great power. China is trying to implement a might-makes-right order,
while the United States is trying to ensure that smaller countries do not get
steamrolled. This is the real issue, and US officials should make it clear.
Denny Roy
Denny Roy is a Senior Research Fellow at the East-West Center in
Honolulu.
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