Civil Society Networks in China and Vietnam: Informal Pathbreakers in
Health and the Environment. By Andrew Wells-Dang. Palgrave Macmillan. Hardback,
248 pp. £57.50.
Where an authoritarian regime
monopolizes decision-making, influencing decisions and even turning them around
may seem like a tall order for ordinary citizens. Intrinsically suspect of
serving a foreign agenda, Vietnam's Western-style civil society organizations
hardly even try.
That's not the whole picture,
argues Dr. Andrew Wells-Dang in an important new book. Drawing on trail-blazing
research in both Vietnam and China, Wells-Dang demonstrates that the ordinary
citizens of these two nations can indeed mobilize in support of a cause,
stepping in to advocate successfully where government has either abdicated or
failed to respond. The difference is that these advocacy groups aren't adopting
Western 'civil society' models, but instead relying on forms of organization
and tactics appropriate to their own societies.
Events like the Eastern European
"color revolutions" some two decades ago, the Arab Spring and the red
shirt demonstrations in 2010 in Bangkok bring Vietnam's registered
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) no joy. Unlike private businessmen, these
exemplars of civil society in Vietnam are on a tight leash. Dependent on grants
and contracts from foreign embassies or foundations, suspected of ulterior
purposes, they work under the skeptical eye of the nation's internal security
agencies.
A few weeks ago, Nhan Dan, the
organ of Vietnam's brook-no-rivals ruling party, printed an op-ed that sent a
tremor through the local NGO community. Its author, Police Colonel Duong Van
Cu, maintained that calls for expanding the civil society sphere in Vietnam are
a stalking horse for foreign-funded political upheaval.
Though little noted by the public
at large or even by the Communist Party members who read Nhan Dan for clues as
to which way the political winds are blowing, Cu's article hit a raw nerve for
the several thousand Vietnamese who staff local NGOs established on the Western
model.
Typically but not always foreign
funded, Vietnam's Western-style NGOs aim mainly to uplift poor and marginalized
social groups or limit environmental depredations. They operate under permits
granted by the central government and stay scrupulously clear of opposition
politics. In marked contrast to civil society organizations in the Philippines,
Thailand or even Cambodia, Vietnam's NGOs aren't found marching for any cause
edgier than, say, traffic safety or gay and lesbian rights.
Vietnam's voluntary organizations
operate in a legal limbo, the consequence of the government's decision in 2008
to suspend efforts to reach consensus on a Law on Associations. It proved impossible
to bridge the gap between Western experts and their local proteges, who
insisted on guarantees of the right to organize and associate freely, and
conservative elements within the Vietnamese regime. The latter saw no need to
tinker with the established system of mass organizations which, though they in
theory represent the interests of peasants, women, youth, workers, etc., in
fact have functioned as organs of state supervision.
Does that mean that the growth of
Vietnam's civil society sector is intrinsically stunted, characterized by
dependence on foreign models and patrons and practically constrained from
efforts to mobilize like-minded citizens in support of local or national
causes? Unhappily for NGOs formed on the Western model, that's probably so.
Analysis of a huge volume of
internet censorship in China -- the only other Leninist state espousing 'market
socialism' -- has shown that Beijing's internal security agencies are
relatively relaxed when bloggers criticize the state or its leaders. They react
sharply and swiftly, however, to "any comments that represent, reinforce,
or spur social mobilization, regardless of content. Censorship is oriented
toward attempting to forestall collective activities that are occurring now or
may occur in the future."
What goes for China goes for
Vietnam, too. Notwithstanding festering bilateral disputes over ownership of
adjacent seas, Vietnam's party and police organizations maintain robust
collaboration with counterparts in the colossus to the north. They find plenty
of common ground when they contemplate the possibility that political movements
may spring up outside regime control.
Andrew Wells-Dang, however,
describes a successful networking approach that bears scant resemblance to the
forms of public advocacy-oriented political activism dominant in the West. He
is both a practitioner and a scholar, and the rare analyst who's done his field
research in both countries.
Civil Society Networks in China
and Vietnam, explores how citizens can come together around a shared objective
and then "work the system" to build support for their goal. The cases
that Wells-Dang studied concern quality of life issues: mobilization to
forestall the condemnation of a beloved Hanoi park to make room for a five-star
hotel complex, advocacy by and behalf of people with physical disabilities,
peer support groups for women with AIDS, and a campaign against dam-building on
China's "last wild river."
The common thread is what did not
happen: in each case, a handful of volunteer activists managed to achieve
public policy goals without triggering a reflexive, negative response by
conservatives in the party/state structure. These activists were loosely
organized; in no case did they seek official recognition. Nor were these cases
us-against-them situations; the activists built on childhood and school
friendships with each other, with people within the state and party structure
and with reporters and editors. Many of the people Wells-Dang interviewed were
simultaneously members of the establishment (officials, state scientists,
registered journalists) and activists.
Unlike many analysts, Wells-Dang
sees "civil society" as broader than formal organizations alone: it
includes individual analysts, bloggers, religious groups and so on. These
informal groups are not "tamed," he says; they can and do engage in
policy advocacy within (or in spite of) the limits set by the Party/State. Nor,
he emphasizes, is civil society necessarily oppositional.
Wells-Dang found that in a
restrictive environment like contemporary China or Vietnam, informal,
decentralized, independent, ad hoc networks are more effective than
"hard" and foreign-funded organizations" like NGOs. The
conclusion might be different if NGOs were able to raise ample operating funds
from domestic sources, but that's almost unheard of in either nation.
"Network effectiveness," Wells-Dang concludes, is "based on the
presence of influential allies, a balance between inside and outside ties,
support from public opinion, and leadership from . . . a committed core
group" and, he adds a bit later, limited goals and not being perceived as
a "troublemaker."
Achieving public goals in a
practical way, according to Wells-Dang's research, doesn't seem to be a process
that's much different in Hanoi or Beijing than in Fresno or Wagga Wagga or
Newcastle. Get together. Work out a plan. Push the plan with officials who are
also friends. Talk to reporters and editors. Enlist the help of people who know
decision-makers. Don't give up, stick to the script, build consensus and avoid
getting entangled with larger and essentially extraneous causes -- the sort
that set off alarm bells at the Ministry of Security.
Wells-Dang's research is
important not least because it recalibrates our expectations of how policy change
can come about in authoritarian states like Vietnam or China. By emphasizing
informal networking that's focused squarely on a problem that the authorities
can't or won't manage, he provides a powerful lens for analysis of citizen
activism.
Take, for example, a controversy
that's not discussed in Wells-Dang's book but validates his approach, the Vedan
affair. It erupted in September 2008 when Vietnamese environmental police
discovered that a Taiwanese maker of MSG was discharging huge quantities of industrial
waste into a river near Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC). Follow-up investigation
revealed that the discharges had been going on for a dozen years, unnoticed by
local authorities. After confirming breaches of anti-pollution law, government
agencies proposed to let the Vedan Corporation off with token fines. Vedam was,
after all, a big employer with close ties to provincial leaders.
Atypically, things didn't end
there. Several HCMC newspapers took up the cause of the several thousand fish
farmer families whose livelihoods had been systematically destroyed. Lawyers
stepped in to organize a massive claims-filing campaign. Bucked up by the show
of public support, Environment Ministry officials arranged for a research
institute to calculate total damages. Consumer advocates organized a boycott of
Vedan products that spread to supermarket chains throughout Vietnam's southern
region. The Prime Minister let slip that he expected an appropriate outcome. At
last in August 2010, facing defeat in court and hammered by bad publicity,
Vedan capitulated and compensated farmers at hitherto unimagined levels.
A Wells-Dangian analysis can also
be applied to the controversy that erupted in 2009 over plans to allow Chinese
firms to mine bauxite in Vietnam's central highlands. Again, an ad hoc
coalition formed on a foundation of long-established friendships and
professional ties and skilful management of a new propaganda medium, on-line
blogging. It engaged environmentalists, soldiers and, ultimately, anti-regime
dissidents who sought to exploit the fracas to erode trust in the regime. The
movement failed to stop the bauxite project because of the conspicuous entry of
the dissidents, which gave security agencies an excuse to crack down.
In neither the Vedan nor the
bauxite affairs, nor in any of Wells-Dang's four case studies (two in Vietnam
and two in China), did Western model NGOs play a significant role. In all
cases, there was space for a civil society coalition to form and find common
ground with some elements of the regime. In all cases, a handful of individuals
stepped up to the problem and provided consistent, responsible leadership.
It's an effective model of civil
society activism that's likely to be seen more and more in both countries.
David Brown
Business & Investment Opportunities
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