America needs to take a critical look at the repressive tactics of
Thailand's old elites
The newly re-elected US President
Barack Obama kicks off his second term with his first foreign visit to
Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand from 17-20 November.
While much attention is paid to
his role at the East Asia Summit in Phnom Penh and his first visit to
Myanmar—indeed the first ever visit by a US President—his trip to Bangkok has
so far gained little interest from either Washington or the world of media.
Perhaps it is because the two
countries have long enjoyed intimate relations. Thailand is the US’s oldest
ally in the Asia-Pacific, and was offered the status of a major non-NATO ally
in 2004. Both have engaged in the biggest and longest running military exercise
in the region, called “Cobra Gold.” Bilateral ties are generally strong, so
strong that Thailand may have been taken for granted.
In the meantime, the US has been
rather quiet even when the Thai domestic situation turned violent, particularly
in the past few years. Why has the US failed to promote democratization in
Thailand?
The answer is that the American
perception of the current power struggle in Thailand is strictly constrained by
an old, obsolete structure in which Thai-US relations have been shaped and
dominated by the effective military-monarchy partnership and the various
American interests in the maintenance of such a partnership. As a result, the
US has appeared to adopt a stance of support for establishment forces at the
expense of a serious advocacy of the pro-democracy agenda of the Red Shirt
movement, known principally as the United Front for Democracy against
Dictatorship, or UDD.
Self-interest alone does not
sufficiently explain unfailing American support for Thailand’s traditional
elites and its seeming disapproval of the Red Shirts’ political activities.
Based on extensive interviews with a number of Thai and American diplomats, I
can conclude that the obstinate attitude of the US derives fundamentally from a
lack of understanding of and genuine interest in Thai political development on
the part of the Department of State and the American Embassy in Bangkok.
The end of the Cold War and the
gradual American disengagement with Southeast Asia, including Thailand, during
the 1990s and into the period of Thaksin Shinawatra’s 2001-2006 administration
created a huge vacuum of information on political evolution in the country.
This vacuum has conveniently prevented the US from modifying its policy even as
the Thai domestic and international environments have changed significantly.
Washington continues to operate
in its relationship with Bangkok on the basis of its conventional perception of
Thailand, even as it endlessly pays lip service to the promotion of Thai
democracy. The American policy of safeguarding the Thai political status quo,
which has benefitted the rich and powerful elites in the kingdom, has severely
narrowed the perspective of the US, and indeed its policy options, as it tries
to keep up with Thailand’s unfolding political situation.
What has transpired has been the
crude construction of a binary image of Thailand’s leading political actors.
Whereas the ruling elites are “trusted friends”, the Red Shirt demonstrators,
along with Thaksin Shinawatra, are “threats” to the traditional form of Thai
democracy.
Throughout the Obama
administration’s first term, it made several failed attempts to balance between
its support for the traditional elites and its sympathy towards the Red-Shirts.
The botched intervention in Thai politics of US Assistant Secretary of State
Kurt Campbell to hold talk with both leaders of the Red-Shirts and
representatives of the Thai elite in early 2010 threatened the supposedly
perfect relations between the two countries. Following Campbell’s attempt,
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, backed by the elite, sent his special envoy
Kiat Sitthi-amon to Washington to condemn the US attempts to mediate in the
conflict.
But Campbell’s intention to reach
out to the Red Shirts seemed to reflect more his own goals, rather than any
policy at the national level. In reality, the tactic of painting an image of
the Red-Shirts as a challenge to the status quo is continuing both in the old
establishment camp and in the US; it was exacerbated by the previous Abhisit government’s
allegation that radical elements within the Red Shirt movement are indeed
terrorists who burned down a departmental store in Bangkok.
From this view, the battle
between the traditional Thai elite and the Thaksin network is no longer
confined within Thailand’s borders. The US has become directly involved in this
power game. Unfortunately for Thaksin, he is not Aung San Suu Kyi, a figure who
has long dictated US policy and swayed Congress because of her struggle for
democracy. Thaksin has too much baggage and is a threat to the old power
structure.
The current Yingluck Shinawatra
government has an uphill task not only to change the American attitude towards
the traditional Thai elites but also to refashion Thaksin into a figure more
acceptable to the US government. As for the Red Shirt movement, its fight for
democracy is still a “boutique issue”, one that appeals to a relatively small
clientele in the American capital, compared to the major foreign and domestic
issues facing the Obama administration.
The supposed terrorist acts
committed by some of the Red Shirt members and rumors of their “underground”
network and plot to subvert the monarchy have further deepened America’s
suspicion of the Reds and cemented its favorable position toward the old elite.
After all, it is easy and convenient for Washington policy-makers to look at
the Thai situation from their archaic perspective, and not seriously take into
account new factors which have emerged in a changed environment.
President Obama could take this
opportunity, during his visit to Bangkok, to get to know an alternative force
in Thai politics. It is not too late for the US to come to terms with a new
reality in Thailand, a reality in which the US will need to readjust its
position vis-à-vis its old friends in the Thai establishment.
Pavin Chachavalpongpun
Business & Investment Opportunities
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