Actions by the People's Republic -- intentional or not -- have created
the worst regional environment for China since Tiananmen.
One of the elementary rules of
foreign policy is when you are in a hole, stop digging. But judging by their recent behavior,
Beijing’s foreign policy mandarins and national security establishment are
clearly in violation of this rule. Despite the diplomat heat China has received
for its tough stance on territorial disputes in recent months, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry apparently seemed to believe that it could strengthen Chinese
claims symbolically by issuing a new passport containing a map that claims the
disputed maritime areas in the South China Sea and the contested territories
along the Sino-Indian border. The
reaction was predictable. Southeast
Asian countries, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines, protested
loudly. India retaliated by promising to
stamp visas containing its own map on Chinese passports.
At around the same time as the
diplomatic uproar over the new Chinese passport design, the People’s Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) conducted its first successful landing and take-off operations
from its retrofitted aircraft carrier.
The televised test might have boosted the Chinese military’s image and
self-confidence, but the message this event sent around the region, given
China’s hardline position on territorial disputes and its neighbors’ fears of
the PLA’s growing military capabilities, cannot be very reassuring.
But that is not the end of the
actions taken by China recently that are likely to cost Beijing’s new
government dearly. A few days before Japan’s
Diet elections on December 16, which are expected to produce a right-wing
government with deep antipathy toward Beijing, the Chinese government escalated
its challenge to Japan’s territorial claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands by
flying an official, albeit unarmed, maritime surveillance plane over the
airspace of the disputed islands. As
expected, the move incensed Tokyo and can only be expected to bolster the
Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) chances and lend more credence to their call
for a tougher policy toward China.
Obviously, it is inconceivable
that Chinese policymakers intentionally desired such boomerangs with these
recent moves. One possible explanation
is that this is simply a case of the left hand not knowing what the right hand
is doing. Given the fragmentation and
stove-piped decision-making process inside the Chinese national security
establishment, lack of policy coordination is certainly a systemic
weakness. However, internal disarray is
no excuse. The damage done to China’s image
and national interests is real and can be long-lasting.
The challenge facing the new
leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping is how to dig China out of its own
geopolitical hole. Because of Beijing’s
foreign policy missteps in the last three years, China today faces the worst
regional environment since Tiananmen.
Its relations with Japan are at a record low; China-ASEAN ties have
similarly deteriorated due to the South China Sea disputes and China’s heavy-handed
use of its clout to divide ASEAN. The
Sino-American relationship is increasingly turning into one of strategic
rivalry. Even South Korea, which has
sought to strengthen Seoul-Beijing ties for two decades, has distanced itself
from China because of China’s reluctance or inability to restrain North Korea’s
aggressive acts (its latest missile test is but one example).
It is hard to know whether
Beijing’s foreign policy establishment sees things the same way. But if they happen to agree with this
assessment, they must act quickly to reverse a self-defeating strategy.
The most urgent action item is to
stabilize Beijing-Tokyo ties. The
actions taken by Beijing to contest Tokyo’s claims to the disputed islands in
the East China Sea are fraught with risks of escalation. While they may be designed to force the
Japanese to the negotiating table, the Chinese government needs to take extra
precaution to avoid dangerous confrontations and escalations. Under current circumstances, the smarter way
is not to escalate, but deescalate, so that Beijing can give Tokyo an
opportunity to respond. With anti-China
sentiments high among a broad segment of Japan’s population and elites, it is
unwise to expect Tokyo to meet Chinese escalations with concessions.
Clearly, Beijing may have to wait
for the outcome of the Diet elections on December 16. Should the LDP win, the Chinese government
will be smart to send conciliatory signals to the new Japanese government. Of course, Shinzo Abe, the leader of the LDP,
has taken a hardline on China during the campaign, but he should be given a
chance to show his sensibility and pragmatism.
China will not hurt itself by displaying some flexibility and
willingness to compromise initially. If
Japan rejects such friendly overtures, China will have ample time to play a
game of tit-for-tat.
Parallel to its efforts to
stabilize Sino-Japanese relations, Beijing’s second policy priority is to
defuse its tensions with ASEAN over the South China Sea disputes. Chinese policymakers must first realize that
its stance on the maritime disputes in the South China Sea has painted Beijing
into a corner. The historical claims are
increasingly difficult to defend. The
insistence on bilateral negotiations, not multilateral ones, looks too
self-serving. The use of a proxy such as
Cambodia to undermine ASEAN’s unity on the South China Sea disputes may be a
temporary tactical success, but it comes with long-term strategic costs and
will ultimately be futile.
A bold move for the new Chinese
government to take is to do a U-turn on the South China Sea. It can do so by announcing its willingness to
negotiate in a multilateral setting and adhere to existing international laws,
not historical claims. This dramatic
change of policy will not necessarily produce an outcome totally unfavorable to
China. Because most of Vietnam and the
Philippines’ claims are equally weak under existing international laws,
shifting China’s position will not necessarily strengthen their claims. The practical effect will be prolonged
negotiations that can defuse the tensions – and repair China’s tattered image
as a bully.
Putting U.S.-China ties on a more
solid footing and reversing the dangerous dynamics of strategic competition is
more difficult and requires steps that Mr. Xi may not be able to take
immediately. The factors driving the
U.S. and China toward strategic rivalry are not hard to see: mutual distrust, a
shift in relative balance of power, China's military modernization, and a lack
of transparency in China's domestic political system. It is impossible to
address all these factors, and some of them defy short-term solutions. However, Mr. Xi will find that the immediate
key to improving Sino-American relations will not be found in China’s policy
toward the United States, but in its policy toward its neighbors. It is the fears China has aroused among its
neighbors that have given the United States the strategic leverage to deal with
China and to view China from darker lenses.
So it will be China’s success in reassuring its neighbors and the United
States, not with rhetoric but real policy changes, that will help dig Beijing
out of its current geopolitical hole.
Minxin Pei
Business & Investment Opportunities
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