With Shinzo Abe's return in Japan, expect Tokyo and Delhi's already
strong ties to reach new heights.
I recently spoke to a
high-ranking Indian diplomat about the future of Indo-Japan relations in light
of Shinzo Abe’s return to the premiership. The response was unwavering: India
places “great importance” on its relationship with Japan and wants it to go
“higher and higher.” With Abe at the helm, the time is ripe for this
relationship to advance.
Abe is known to be staunchly
pro-Indian. Not only did he describe strengthening bilateral ties as extremely
important to Japan’s interests in his 2006 book Utsukushii Kuni E (Towards a
Beautiful Country), but one of his major foreign policy initiatives during his
previous tenure as PM was establishing a new vision for bilateral ties with
India. To that end, he advocated emphasizing India and Japan’s shared values
and overlapping security interests. He has also argued that both countries have
a responsibility to work together in the Indo-Pacific region, which he refers
to as “broader Asia.” In the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) recent campaign
pledge, India was listed as a country with which Japan should enhance
cooperation with on issues of national security and energy. With such support,
it can be expected that Abe will look to India as a partner for greater
Japanese activism in the region.
None of this should be a problem
because the two already cooperate on a wide array of issues. Economically,
relations have never been better. Over the past five years, bilateral trade has
doubled. Things moved forward rapidly after the Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement (CEPA) went into effect in August 2011, removing duties on 94% of
products over the next ten years and ensuring greater movement of goods,
services, capital, and people between the two countries. Japan offers India a
wealthy, sophisticated market for Delhi’s textiles, seafood, IT,
pharmaceuticals and services. Japan, on the other hand, looks to India as an
export market for its auto components, high-end technology, and capital goods.
Indeed, within a week of Japan’s tsunami and nuclear disaster in March 2011,
India’s auto industry was expressing concern that an anticipated disruption in
Japanese manufacturing would significantly hurt its business.
Additionally, Japanese companies
have been investing in Indian IT and other technology projects, and the
Japanese government has been sending India significant amounts of Official
Development Assistance (ODA). In fact, India was the first country Japan ever
extended an ODA loan to back in 1958; and since FY 2003-2004 India has been the
single largest recipient of Japanese ODA. Japan also exempted India from the
cuts it made in ODA following the March 2011 disasters.
Japan and India work together
diplomatically to promote common interests. At the UN, they actively champion
reforming the Security Council. Additionally, they cooperate in promoting the
G-20 and East Asia Summit as the primary venues for international economic
cooperation and regional multilateralism, respectively. Within these
institutions, Tokyo and Delhi cooperate on a number of issues including nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation, counterterrorism, and climate change and
energy security.
Japan and India’s security
cooperation over the last six years has been greater than in the previous sixty
years combined. This cooperation includes: building naval capacity through port
calls, naval and coast guard exchanges, joint naval and coast guard exercises,
and greater cooperation in information sharing and technical assistance; the
protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and anti-piracy efforts in the
Gulf of Aden; and extending patrol boats and capacity building training to the
littoral states in the Strait of Malacca. Along with their strategic dialogue,
the two sides have launched a bilateral Shipping Policy Forum, a Maritime Security
Dialogue, and a Cybersecurity Dialogue.
While this is a strong record of
cooperation, there are still many areas for further enhancement. Economically,
the CEPA means greater economic connectivity, which is especially beneficial
given the complimentary nature of their economies. For instance, continued
Japanese growth will require more workers and greater engagement with growing
markets. India can therefore play a vital role with its booming economy, lower
production costs, and an expanding middle class that is creating greater demand
for high-end products. India’s growth, on the other hand, requires investments
in 21st century infrastructure and technological expertise, both of which Tokyo
can help provide. For example, Delhi intends to spend $1 trillion on
infrastructure projects over the next five years, and hopes to finance 40
percent of this with private capital. Similarly, India will require Japan’s
technology and investment to help close technological gaps and an
infrastructure deficit.
Diplomatically, both countries
want international institutions to reflect today’s multi-polarity. They also
advocate nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and hope to prevent the
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destructions and the means to deliver them. Similarly,
Tokyo and Delhi share a strong and growing interest in preserving freedom of
navigation in the maritime commons, which both are heavily reliant on for their
energy imports and trade. They also share an enduring interest in preventing
any country from establishing hegemony over the Indo-Pacific region, with China
a growing concern for both countries.
Although there are plenty of
reasons for optimism, there are still a number of barriers to advancing
Indo-Japanese ties. For example, despite the rapid growth of economic ties in
recent years, Japanese investors are not completely sold on India’s business
climate. Not only do they find it difficult to work through the labyrinthine
Indian bureaucracy, but they are also concerned about India’s poor infrastructure,
opaque legal and taxation systems, and official corruption. Similarly, civilian
nuclear cooperation remains stalled due to India’s refusal to join the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. This is where
Abe’s victory becomes important. Having a pro-India premier in Japan may
convince investors who are wary of doing business in India. Likewise, Abe’s LDP
victory came at the expense of the anti-nuclear parties, and Abe can be
expected to push for a civilian nuclear agreement with India, much as countries
like the U.S., Russia, Canada, and South Korea have done, and others like
Australia are now in the process of doing.
Perhaps security will encounter
the fewest impediments. Both countries share concerns over China’s maritime
behavior and freedom of navigation. While both have powerful navies, neither is
strong enough alone to secure the maritime commons and thus has an interest in
reliable partners. India’s navy and coast guard cannot monitor all the Sea
Lines of Communication (SLOC) traffic that transits the Strait of Malacca
through to the Persian Gulf, so it requires interstate cooperation to handle
challenges in waters near India as well as SLOCs farther away. While Japan’s
navy does not operate in Indian waters (it’s legally able to defend up to 1,000
nautical miles from Japan), under special legislation it participates in
limited anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. They benefit from each
other’s surveillance, and have begun holding joint naval exercises. Greater
cooperation in these efforts do not face any great constraints, which is
important given that cooperation will help them hedge against unpredictable
futures.
Because of his enthusiasm for
stronger relations with Japan in India, Abe’s win provides a unique opportunity
for the two great powers to expand their cooperation. With few obstacles standing in the way, we
soon could be witnessing a flourishing of Indo-Japan bilateral ties.
Jeffrey W. Hornung
Jeffrey W. Hornung is an Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center
for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI and an Adjunct Fellow with the Office of
the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are his alone.
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