The conflict in Syria and Iraq is now more
serious and has gained traction for the salafi jihadist community in Southeast
Asia.
Two
videos of young Indonesians calling on their countrymen to come to Iraq and
Syria to join ISIS, have recently garnered significant media attention and
raised alarms amongst security officials that the insurgents’ gains will have
repercussions on security across Southeast Asia. While some analysts discount
the threat, it is clearly a growing concern that the conflict will do much to
reverse counter-terrorist successes in the past 12 years. To date, the numbers of Southeast Asians who
have joined ISIS are still low, but the consequences will be disproportionately
greater.
In the
videos, Southeast Asians, in a mixture of Bahasa and Arabic, implored their
compatriots: “Let us fight in the path of Allah because it is our duty to do
jihad in the path of Allah … especially here in Sham [the Syrian region] … and
because, God willing, it will be to this country that our families will do the
holy migration.” Another said, “Brothers
in Indonesia, don’t be afraid because fear is the temptation of Satan.” A third recorded message, a former Indonesian
soldier, attacked Indonesia’s secular ideology of Pancasila.
Who is fighting?
There
are at least 30 Malaysians and 60 Indonesians thought to be in Iraq and Syria
as well as at least one Cambodian, according to one British jihadist who
appeared in a video, “There’s No Life Without Jihad.” The Syrian representative to the UN disclosed
that 15 Malaysians had been killed in fighting but offered little in the way of
evidence.[1] The Malaysian government is investigating the allegation and to
date has been unable to confirm the report.
More recent estimates put the number of Malaysians at roughly 100. The Indonesian police chief confirmed that at
least 56 had gone to fight. Indonesian authorities fear that the number will
soon climb to around 100. The Philippine
government has denied that there are any Bangsamoro fighting with ISIS,
although some unreliable reports claim as many as 200 have gone, which is
highly unlikely. Singapore acknowledges
that a “handful” went to Syria and that one other had been detained under
Singapore’s Internal Security Act, while
two more were under “Restriction Orders.”
This
tally is still a fraction of the
estimated 12,000 foreigners in ISIS according to the Soufan Group. Their June 2014 report cites official
government estimates of Indonesian fighters as 30-60, one from Singapore, and
no official estimates from Malaysia and the Philippines. In addition, the
Australian government estimates that at least 150 of its nationals are fighting
in Iraq and Syria. The United States
government estimates that there are only 7,000 foreign jihadists fighting for
ISIS.
In
early May, Malaysia arrested 11 suspected militants in Selangor and Kedah, en
route to Syria; they were ostensibly going to provide humanitarian
assistance. Security officials believed
that they were part of a 50-person network that emerged in 2013 and had no
previous ties to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).
They were charged with being “responsible for planning terror acts in
and outside the country.” Later in May,
security forces arrested three men and one woman. On June 13, Malaysian police arrested three
more suspected militants that were linked to both Abu Sayyaf and ISIS. Two more have since been detained and
authorities have spoken of the possible need to cancel passports to prevent
people from traveling overseas. On 15 June authorities arrested three men in
Sandakan, Sabah. Alarmingly, one of the
three was a Royal Malaysian Navy sailor.
Naval officials were actively investigating to see if any other
personnel were involved in the cell; the sailor was later released. On 25 June, Special Branch officers arrested
six militants in Sabah and were actively searching for several other members of
the cell. In July 2014, security forces
announced that five Malaysian suspects with ties to ISIS and the Abu Sayyaf
were hiding in Mindanao. This cell was
responsible for dispatching the first five Malaysians, (including the first
suicide bomber) to Syria in March 2014.[2]
Who are they?
Some
information has been released regarding who a number of the suspects are. They come from across Malaysian society, and
include multiple socio-economic classes and backgrounds. The 11 arrested in May include:
Mohd
Khairil Mi, 27, was charged with promoting terrorism.
Muhammad
Armie Fatihah Mohd Hashim, 22, was arrested for encouraging violence at a
public gathering.
Mohammad
Hafiz Zahri Suparyatnoh, 28, was charged with openly supporting ISIS at a
public gathering.
But
surprisingly, and in demonstration of ISIS’ resonance, the group also included
Azizah Md Yusof, a 55-year old housewife who was using two Facebook pages to
recruit and “support terrorist activities.”
Another
wanted militant is Mahmud Ahmad, a lecturer at Universiti Malaya’s Academy of
Islamic Studies.[3] Ahmad Tarmimi
Maliki, Malaysia’s first suicide bomber, was a former factory worker from
Selangor, who pursued religious studies abroad. Muamar Gadaffi Mohamad Shafawi,
a 30-year old plantation owner, was charged with providing militant training
and indoctrination in Perak state. Two
colleagues were also charged with lesser crimes of illegal firearm possession.
The
Singaporean nationals who have traveled to join the jihad include Haja
Fakkurudeen Usman Ali, a naturalized Singapore citizen from India who brought
his wife and three children; a female Singaporean national along with her
foreign husband and two teenage children who are thought to be providing aid to
ISIS. A self-radicalized lawyer, Abdul
Basheer Abdul Kader, was detained under the Internal Security Act, while
Zakaria Rosdan and Khairul Sofri Osman, both Singaporeans, were issued
Restriction Orders and are unable to travel.
This is not the first time
There
have been recent attempts to get Southeast Asians to join conflicts in the
Middle East and South Asia. Between 120
and150 Malaysians, Indonesians, southern Philippine Muslims and Southern Thai
Pattani went to Pakistan and Afghanistan to join the mujihideen in the
1990s. Many of these individuals
returned to Southeast Asia where they established madrassas and indoctrinated
a generation of salafi jihadists and
went on to lead militant organizations around the region, including Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI), the long-defunct Laskar Jihad, the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and Gerakan Mujideen Islamliya
Pattani (GMIP). The influence of the
returnees cannot be overstated.
Returning from Afghanistan, they were put on pedestals in their
communities. Their hagiographies were
embellished as they constructed the narrative that if motivated jihadists could
topple a super power, then regional secular and authoritarian regimes could
also be defeated. Their presence alone
in Syria and Iraq gives them jihadi credibility.
In
2003, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) in Indonesia recruited people to go to
Lebanon to fight Israel. Though some did
go, it was a harder sell among salafi
jihadists since the war was primarily
fought by Hezbollah, a shia movement; the few Southeast Asians who went
were used as cannon fodder and had negligible impact at home. Southeast Asians tend to be more willing to
donate to Palestinian causes than join a movement.
There
were a few Southeast Asians who went to Iraq to fight the United States. The head of the FPI, Habib Rizieq, was
arrested by American’s almost immediately and was quietly sent home; Rizieq was
not arrested upon return and remains free.
The total number of Southeast Asians who previously went to Iraq is
small and their impact at home was never a serious concern for security
officials. They may be viewed more as
publicity stunts.
The resonance of ISIS
The
conflict in Syria and Iraq is now more serious and has gained traction for the
salafi jihadist community in Southeast Asia.
ISIS, founded in 2011, has greater appeal than the al Qaeda-linked
al-Nusra front, which was tarnished by horrific attacks on civilians. ISIS is inspired by al Qaeda (but not linked
to it) and is committed to the re-establishment of the caliphate. Though only a
few Indonesians joined al-Nusra, security officials fear that ISIS will have
more traction in the region. This is no
publicity stunt.
Second,
the conflict is against a shia regime and its allies. In many ways the shia are more reviled by
salafis than non-Muslims. Though there
are few shia in Southeast Asia, antipathy towards them is high.
Third,
the crackdown on militants operating in Southeast Asia has continued and
Southeast Asia is an infertile ground for jihadist operations. So if Southeast Asians choose to engage in
militancy, operating abroad is practical and ISIS has the most draw currently.
Moreover, ISIS is winning, and there is nothing as good as success to attract
more followers.
Fourth,
social media is also a growing attraction factor. This was true in 2006, but it has become even
more ubiquitous in 2014 with the proliferation of 4G smart phones. ISIS has proven extremely adept at exploiting
social media, controlling their message, and using these means to recruit and
indoctrinate. Indeed, one of ISIS’
biggest on-line boosters, a 29-year old Australian convert to Islam, Musa
Cerantonio has been based in the
Philippines until his arrest on 11 July and his likely extradition to
Australia, which has a warrant for his arrest.
According to British researchers, he was one of the most influential
boosters of ISIS in the world with a massive following in social media. The
Indonesian pro-jihadi website www.al-mustaqbal.net is a one stop shop for all
things ISIS. Malaysian jihadists have
also posted videos to show new recruits as well as members already in Syria.
Fifth,
there is a fear of further radicalization.
Three Southeast Asians have become suicide bombers. In May 2014, Ahmad Tarmimi Maliki drove an
SUV filed with explosives into a military base in Anbar province killing 25
elite Iraqi soldiers and becoming the first Malaysian suicide bomber. The
former factory worker from Selangor had preciously fought in Aleppo,
Syria. He had quit his job in March 2013
before traveling to the Middle East for “religious study.” Authorities believe that he received some
military training in Port Dickinson before leaving the country.
There
have been two Indonesian suicide bombers: 19-year-old Wildan Mukhallad blew
himself up in Iraq while Riza Fardi detonated his device in Syria in 2011. Fardi had attended the infamous al Mukmin
(Ngruki) Islamic boarding school in Solo, Indonesia, founded by Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir and also attended by the Bali bombers.
Sixth,
ISIS has significant resources at its disposal – at least $2 billion and
growing with their conquest of more oil and gas facilities and sale of
electricity. ISIS also received sizeable donations. These funds
will help attract new members and supporters.
Finally,
speaking to the resonance of ISIS, there is a Hadith that speaks of the final
battle between good and evil being fought in Syria, and many jihadist recruits
are inspired by the idea of being part of this apocryphal war against the
enemies of Islam.
[1] Clearly the Syrian government is trying
to play up the threat so as to garner more diplomatic support for its
counter-insurgency operation.
[2] The five were identified as Dr. Mahmud
Ahmad, Mohd Najib Husen, Muhammad Joraimee Awang Raimee, Mohd Amin Baco, and
Jeknal Adil.
[3] The other four are Najib Husen, Muhammad
Joraimee Awang Raimee, Amin Baco and Jeknal Adil.
The success of ISIS directly impacts
Southeast Asian security in several ways. ISIS breathe new life into terrorist
networks that have been pulverized in the past decade.
In the
years following the October 2012 Bali bombing, over 400 members of Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI), including much of its leadership, were arrested across
Southeast Asia. Although JI was able to
perpetrate major attacks between 2002 and 2005, it was not able to stage major
attacks again until 2007. JI was riddled
with factionalism and was seriously divided over strategy and tactics. There were two chief camps. First, there
were advocates of the al Qaeda line which established a new organization, al
Qaeda in Indonesia, under the leadership of Noordin Mohammad Mop Top. On the other side were people who argued that
targeting the west had little impact on the movement’s objectives and led to
government crackdowns. This side also articulated a strategy based on waging
sectarian conflict in Sulawesi, the outer islands, in order to create pure
communities governed by sharia from which JI could emanate without provoking a
heavy-handed government response.
However, neither strategy worked particularly well. The pro-al Qaeda group staged suicide
bombings in Jakarta in 2009, but that was it.
Elite Indonesian counter-terrorism forces replaced the clumsy and
thuggish Brimob forces in Central Sulawesi, and helped to neutralize the
advocates of sectarian violence. Other
members of JI simply gave up on the fight and established nominally non-violent
organizations such as Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT).
In
2009-10 there was an attempt to reunify these divisions. JI leaders who had been hiding in Mindanao
returned to Indonesia and established a large training camp in Aceh. This cell, which called itself Al Qaeda on
the Veranda of Mecca (a Koranic reference to Aceh), was influenced by the
Lashkar e-Taiba’s 2008 takeover of the hotel in Mumbai and wanted to replicate
the bold but low cost operation in Jakarta.
The cell was broken up and had more than 125 members. A senior member, Umar Patek, was arrested in
Abottabad, Pakistan shortly before Osama bin Laden’s capture by U.S. Navy
Seals. He was there to solicit al Qaeda support and funding. After 2010, JI was severely crippled and
could only stage small-scale attacks.
JAT was also hurt in the follow-up as its leader Abu Bakar Bashir was
imprisoned for 15 years for his role in funding the camp.
Beyond
factionalism and debates over strategy and tactics, JI also experienced simple
operational impediments. It was very
hard to reconstitute under a dragnet. Various
cells began to operate autonomously, often setting up their own organizations,
such as Abu Umar’s West Indonesia Mujahideen (WIM), or Mujahideen Kompak. Without any leadership, and in particular, a
strong religious leader – an amir – to serve as a unifying figure, it has been
very hard for JI to reconstitute. Today
there is a myriad of jihadist groups in Indonesia. These include WIM, Mujahideen Kompak, other
JI remnants, JAT, and the Hilal al-Ahmar Society. Although there are still regular arrests of
cells and attempts to rekindle the organization through attacks, the network is
disparate. Since mid-2013 there have
been a spate of attacks in Central Sulawesi, but no broad-based sectarian
conflict has re-erupted as a result.
For a
while it appeared that the Myanmar government would be targeted due to their
treatment of Muslim Rohingyas. In May,
two JI members were arrested for plotting to blow up the Myanmar embassy in
Jakarta. Even still, the two defendants
said that after the attack on the Burmese embassy they intended to travel to
join ISIS. In July 2013, two senior Rohingya leaders, members of the Rohingya
Solidarity Organization (RSO, original signatories of al Qaeda’s 1994 fatwah)
traveled from their home in Bangladesh to Indonesia to meet with hardline
groups for support. Muhammad Jibril
Abdul Rahman, the son of a JI founding member Abu Jibril and a member of the
Karachi-based JI cell known as al Guraba, posted media on the JI websites and
social media platforms that he manages.
Since then, however, emphasis has again focused outside of the
region. Local jihadists have little
appetite right now for operations within the region, and that brings ISIS to
the fore.
ISIS
not only inspires people from Southeast Asia to take up arms, it rallies up the
base, which has been demoralized in recent years. And sadly, the Indonesian government is
allowing this to happen: On June 14 in
the Indonesian city of Solo, members of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) marched in
support waving ISIS banners. In Indonesia,
it is still not illegal to raise money for ISIS or other terrorist groups. (Technically it is, as Indonesia is bound by
UN Security Council decisions, but Indonesia does not have domestic
implementing legislation). Groups
regularly and publicly fundraise for ISIS.
ISIS
has also restored JI’s charitable arms and social networks. The Hilal al-Ahmar Society in Indonesia
(HASI), considered the humanitarian wing of JI, has been operating in Syria,
and possibly supporting ISIS rebels.
Indeed, Indonesian authorities believe that many militants have traveled
to Syria via Turkey in the guise of being humanitarian aid workers. MER-C is now active in Palestine, operating
legitimately as a charity despite their very checkered past as abetters in
violent sectarian violence in Sulawesi and the Malukus in the late-1990s and
early 2000s. There are unconfirmed reports that they are also active in Syria
and Iraq.
ISIS is
an opportunity for jihadists to regroup, recruit, gain military experience, and
indoctrinate away from the security force dragnet at home. It creates new networks, alliances and
friendships. It has also given radical
clerics like Aman Abdurrahman and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir new platforms to reach out
to followers, despite the latter’s incarceration. Ba’asyir has instructed his followers to
support ISIS, whose success has rekindled calls for the establishment of the
caliphate.
ISIS’
success is also heartening to the JI members who supported sectarian violence
in places like Poso, Sulawesi or Ambon in the Malukus. The goal of those campaigns was to create
proto-Islamic states governed by sharia.
From there, they could expand outward, demonstrating the success of
Islamic governance. While the
re-establishment of the caliphate may be a pipe-dream, the establishment of
“Islands of Islam,” governed through a strict interpretation of Islam, are all
too real. ISIS’ governance is inspiring.
Southeast
Asians who have joined ISIS have adeptly used social media to recruit new
members and propagandize their exploits.
The most famous of these is Malaysian Mohd Lotfi Ariffin whose Facebook
page with frequent posts was attracting a growing number of followers before
being taken down.
ISIS is
also rekindling transnational networks.
As mentioned above, Malaysian authorities are investigating the link
between the ISIS militants and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). One of the three men arrested on 15 June in
Malaysia, had been trained by the ASG in Sulu.
There is also concern that some ISIS-bound militants have received some
training in southern Thailand, though to date there is little evidence of
this. The transnational nature of the
threat needs to be understood. In the
1990s, when JI was first founded, its cells operated throughout the region, and
in many ways each cell had different functions and responsibilities
(fundraising, military training and weapons, sectarian violence, recruitment,
operations, propaganda). Maybe this was
not the intention, but it was smart as no one security force ever had a full
picture of what JI was doing; and at the time, there was very little
cooperation amongst the JI groups. JI
reached out to other militant organizations for support. Weaponry and military training was provided
by the MILF and ASG in the Philippines or Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani
(GMIP) in Thailand. The RSO helped move
members to South Asia. There was an
attempt in the late 1990s – three meetings – to unify the different organizations. This was known as the Rabitatul Mujihedin.
But history caught up. Post 9/11, there
were no further attempts to unify the command structures of these groups. Yet the networks mattered. For example, post 9/11, JI’s operations chief
Hambali, had safe refuge in southern Thailand. Even if there is no formal
alliance between these various groups, the connections and networks existed.
Perhaps
the greatest threat posed by ISIS is their sheer brutality, including the mass
executions of prisoners and shia civilians. This is a double-edged sword. It’s not that Southeast Asian jihadists have
eschewed extreme mass casualty violence, but their community and base of
support does find it to be anathema to Southeast Asian culture. Egregious attacks often lead to pushback from
the local community. On the other hand,
such extreme violence will force security services to react – and most likely –
over-react, which is what the militants try to provoke.
ISIS’s
brutal attacks against the shia are inspiring similar attacks in
Indonesia. The Setara Institute for
Democracy and Peace has reported a threefold increase in the number of attacks
on shia between 2012 and 2013. This is
coupled with a surge in attacks against the Ahmadiyah sect in recent years,
including a brutal attack in February 2011 in which three Ahmadis were beaten
to death while Indonesian police stood by. In June 2008, the government banned
the Ahmadiyah despite the constitutional protection of freedom of
religion. According to the U.S.
Commission for International Religious Freedom, between 2008 and 2013 some 62
Ahmadiyah mosques were attacked or destroyed, 45 of which were forcibly closed,
and more than 100 displaced after their village in Lombok was attacked. There have been further attacks on suffis.
The government’s 2008 decree on deviant sects has been seen as a green light
for groups like the FPI to engage in sectarian violence.[1]
Is there any good news?
The
potential for blowback in Southeast Asia is real, but it is also limited and
can be mitigated for the following reasons:
1. The numbers of Southeast Asians joining
ISIS are still very small, despite the pervasiveness and effective use of
social media by ISIS. There have
only been several hundred over the past 2-3 years. Though they are expected to
remain steady, they are not expected to surge.
Governments in the region are actively trying to prevent people from
leaving the country, dealing with the problem now rather than upon their
return.
2. Mainstream Muslim organizations such as the
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah have rejected ISIS and the establishment
of the caliphate by force.
3. Southeast Asian militants and Islamists are
still divided over ISIS and al-Nusra, and that competition plays out both
overseas and at home. Indonesian
jihadist websites are strongly divided over ISIS, with some – Albusyro.com –
remaining totally loyal to al-Nusra. In
addition, these ideological schisms can be exploited by security forces. Interestingly, although Abu Bakar Ba’asyir
has instructed his followers to support ISIS, his JAT in the past was
supportive of al-Nusra. As one of his
lieutenants explained, “There seems to be discord between JN and ISIS. That’s
why we’ve chosen to refrain from declaring the ba’iat [an oath of loyalty], but
our position is clear. We support the formation of a caliphate and that the
established territorial control by ISIL has gained traction as acknowledged by
Ustad Abu [Bakar Ba’asyir].”
Beyond
ideological schisms, there are actual organizational schisms. The Malaysian government claims that there
are at least four, if not five, separate groups who are involved in recruiting
individuals, sending them to either southern Thailand or Mindanao or Sulu in
the Philippines, and then trying to exfiltrate members to Iraq or Syria
(usually via Turkey). The divide could
be ideological; it could be based on ego, or it could simply be an inability to
organize in a harsh security environment. Right now, we do not know.
In at
least one case, there is no organizational tie at all back to Southeast
Asia. The Star gained access to one
Malaysian militant who asserts that he is simply a jihadist mercenary, with no
ties to any organization back home.
While these individuals still pose a threat, and the issue of
self-motivating individuals is troubling in of itself, they pose less of a
threat than disciplined organizations with more resources and a greater ability
to mobilize.
Some
groups such as the Islamic Defender’s Front (FPI), are more inwardly focused,
as they have been tied up in the heated Indonesian Presidential election,
trying to push forward their own agenda.
It is possible that after the election, that they will again focus on
external issues, such as Syria and Iraq.
4. The security forces are aware of the threat. In 2001-2002 security forces throughout the region were in denial about
the influence and networks of the Afghan veterans. Today, the security services in Southeast
Asia are all too aware of the threat and are monitoring it closely. These militants are not going to simply
return to Southeast Asia and be able to operate unhindered. The governments are studying travel patterns
and working with partners overseas to identify possible militants. Most governments in the region have stepped
up their border controls (though Malaysia did take hits following the discovery
that Iranians used false documents to board the ill-fated Malaysian
jetliner). They have increased monitoring
of local jihadist networks, forums, and communities to identify recruiters and
potential volunteers. They are intercepting people before they can even leave
the country, which was not the case in the 1980s. Some states could consider France’s strategy of
criminalizing the act of traveling abroad to join militant groups. This time around, the security forces are
being proactive and will not be caught flat-footed. They understand the blowback potential.
It is
interesting that the Malaysian government, usually the most tightlipped and
hyper-sensitive about Islamist terrorism is out front on the issue. This was less the case in Indonesia, but that
had more to do with the extremely tight presidential election between Joko
Widowi and Prabowo Subianto, the latter, whose campaign coalition included all
of the Islamist parties and has allegedly used the support of thuggish groups
such as the FPI as enforcers. Indonesia
could begin to crack down after Jokowi is inaugurated in October 2014.
5. The experience and professionalism of
security forces in Southeast Asia has improved. The experience gained since 2002 is
immeasurable. Moreover, the ability of
security forces across the region to have routine and regular contact with one
another without high-level political interference has never been greater.
6. There is time for the security forces to
react. The conflict in Syria and
Iraq is not going to come to a conclusion anytime soon. It is unlikely that large numbers of
Southeast Asians will start to return to the region in the height of the conflict,
especially when ISIS has been making such significant gains.
The
success of ISIS – now calling itself the Islamic State – poses numerous
security challenges for the world, including Southeast Asia. But the
threat is manageable, and with inter-state cooperation, pro-active
policies, good intelligence and surgical police actions, and effective social
media strategies, the threat can be mitigated.
[1] Because of the erosion of religious
freedoms, protection of minority rights, changing policies, and sectarian
attacks, since 2009 the USCIRF has designated
Indonesian as a Tier II country.
Dr.
Zachary Abuza
Dr. Zachary Abuza is a professor and analyst
of Southeast Asian politics and security.
He has lived and traveled extensively throughout the region. Dr. Abuza
consults widely and is a frequent commentator in the press. He holds an MALD
and PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
Business & Investment Opportunities
Saigon Business Corporation Pte Ltd (SBC) is incorporated
in Singapore since 1994.
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