Ever since Beijing lodged its nine-dash line
with the United Nations five years ago, the countries that live around the
South China Sea have been on a diplomatic roller-coaster, with the Philippines
and Vietnam leading attempts to counter China’s reassertion of ancient claims.
Ancient
claims have no standing in international law, hence China has relied on its
military muscle in trying to force other parties – that includes Indonesia,
Malaysia and Brunei – into negotiating on a bilateral basis.
That
option is an anathema in Hanoi and Manila, where frustrated officials want
negotiations to be handled on a multilateral level through the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
But
ASEAN is far from united, even among countries whose territorial integrity has
also been challenged by Beijing's claim over 90 per cent of the South China
Sea, reaching deep inside the 200 nautical mile limit that defines each
nation's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
In
Cambodia, which is not directly involved in the dispute, the two main political
parties have backed Chinese claims. But the realities are slightly more
complicated given Prime Minister’s Hun Sen’s tight relationship with the
Vietnamese. Cambodia’s dependence on Chinese aid and investment – worth more
than $11 billion during the last two decades – had Phnom Penh backing Beijing.
This caused a split within ASEAN while Cambodia held the chair in 2012, a major
embarrassment for the trading bloc and its 10 members.
Equally,
opposition leader Sam Rainsy has also said his Cambodia National Rescue Party
(CNRP) would back Beijing’s maritime claims but he has not explained his
reasoning. His deputy Kem Sokha has since contradicted Rainsy’s Beijing pledge.
Analysts
have also noted the CNRP does not hold regular party meetings in the
traditional sense, where policy is put forward for approval. Instead it tends
to write policy on the run and it has also pushed a nationalistic agenda that
plays on anti-Vietnamese sentiment.
“It’s a
shabby way of doing business and making deals but that’s the reality of
Cambodian politics,” one analyst, who declined to be named, said. “If, and it’s
a big if, they ever win government, seeing whether they can actually govern and
formulate a coherent foreign policy will become something of a national sport.”
In
Malaysia, attitudes are similar and appeasement of China is nothing new. The
Beijing leadership is persistently annoyed by laws that favour indigenous
Malays over ethnic Chinese in Malaysian life. Relations were also tested by the
disappearance of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 with 239 people on board,
mostly Chinese. Fears of unnecessarily antagonising the big neighbour to the
north are paramount. Carl Thayer, Emeritus Professor at the University of New
South Wales, said Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak held a tight reign over
such issues, suppressing any attempt to publicise maritime incidents in the
South China Sea. “Malaysia delivers its protest through diplomatic channels,”
he said.
That
stands in sharp contrast to the brash tactics deployed by China and Vietnam
around the Paracel Islands and the Philippines in the Spratlys. Malaysia’s
softly, softly approach has enabled it to start developing oil and gas blocks
at James Shoal while remaining aloof from ASEAN.
“Malaysia
has taken a relatively low key role in public on the two occasions Chinese
warships have passed by James Shoal to claim it as part of China’s territory,”
said Thayer. “Malaysia has been concerned over these visits, as well as
concerned about the types of pressure China has exerted against the Philippines
and Vietnam.”
James
Shoal sits just 80 kilometres off the West Malaysian coast and 1,800km south of
China. Yet, Beijing has argued, what it calls Zengmu Reef, which also lies 22
metres underwater, is the most southern part of China.
Prospects
of a united ASEAN front on the maritime dispute, which some policy wonks in
Washington have said is potentially more dangerous than conflicts in the Middle
East, have not been helped by politics elsewhere in the region.
Brunei
is following the Malaysian lead after being internationally rebuked for
introducing Sharia law. In Thailand, the coup d’etat appears to have ended
Bangkok’s role as chair in formulating a coherent ASEAN policy on the issue.
The
great unknown is Indonesia. Beijing’s claims in its waters were deliberately
obscured until Jakarta sought clarifications from visiting Chinese generals
earlier this year.
They
confirmed China was claiming the Natuna Sea, angering Indonesia but pending
elections, held last week, put on hold any diplomatic comeback by out-going
president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Those claims are also perilously close to
Singapore.
If
Kuala Lumpur feels its $62bn worth of annual trade ties are being jeopardised
by Vietnamese and Filipino actions in the South China Sea then it might go it
alone and negotiate with China on a bilateral basis.
Cambodia
could follow suit and that would further undermine ASEAN unity and give Beijing
what it wants most – a dysfunctional trading bloc incapable of negotiating for
itself.
Luke
Hunt
Luke Hunt is a journalist based in Phnom
Penh, covering Southeast Asia
Business & Investment Opportunities
Saigon Business Corporation Pte Ltd (SBC) is incorporated
in Singapore since 1994.
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