There are strong arguments to suggest they
should, if only the political hang-ups could be overcome.
Amidst
a relationship that is expected to define international relations in this
century, efforts are underway to find ways for the United States and the
People’s Republic of China to cooperate on counterterrorism. As powerful states
that thrive in part because of their entanglement within the global economic
system, both the U.S. and China are disproportionately threatened by the
emergence of instability within that same system.
While
it is true that the U.S. and China have different methodologies through which
they interact with the larger world – the U.S. prefers multinational
partnerships backed by American security guarantees while China favors a system
of bilateral relations and the pursuit of regional hegemony in East Asia – both
recognize that terrorism is a trans-border threat. Moreover, as both countries
are potential targets of terrorist organizations and both are economically tied
to regions regularly destabilized by terror, it follows that the U.S. and China
would have a shared interest in combatting global terrorism. However, they have
yet to cooperate. The reason for this is political, not strategic.
A Shared Threat
In an
age of globalization, the non-state actor is more important than ever before.
One reason for this is that states in today’s world partially thrive because of
an international commercial network that, once disrupted, has immediate and
substantial effects. Thus, while a group like Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines is
not a direct threat to the U.S., or even the government of the Philippines, its
violence can disrupt the political stability of a specific locality, creating a
safe haven for a host of illicit groups. These groups, involved in drug
smuggling, kidnapping and piracy, among other activities, become a regional
problem that can disrupt the interests of states as far away as the U.S.. This
was, in part, the lesson learned by the U.S. after 9/11 and one currently
resonating in China in the wake of a series of attacks by radical groups.
The
domino effect that terrorism creates is of particular importance in two
regions: the Middle East and South Asia. The Middle East, a region beset by
economic stagnation and sectarian tension, has begat a variety of radical
groups with a penchant for violence and unforgiving ideologies. These groups,
using the cleavages wrought by political and economic failings, emerge
alongside other criminal forces, further weaken regional states, and disrupt
international commerce. Particular cases include Yemen, where al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has used a weak state to further destabilize the
country; Syria, where the civil war features Assad-allied Hezbollah fighting
against, among others, the al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Nusra front; and Iraq, where
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), which now calls itself simply
the Islamic State (IS), operates within the context of the Syrian civil war to
lead successful attacks against the Iraqi state.
Like
the Middle East, South Asia is a region where most states underperform
economically and where sectarian differences often define both domestic and
regional politics. Terrorist organizations have used this environment to their
benefit in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, and even the region’s powerhouse,
India. Yet, it is the Afghanistan-Pakistan region where the most powerful and
violent terrorist organizations operate. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
operates along the northern Afghan border regions and is continuing its pattern
of violence supplemented by the narcotics trade. After the Taliban, the former
government of Afghanistan, was dislodged from power in 2001, it was
transmogrified into a full-fledged insurgency. While al-Qaeda’s footprint has
largely disappeared from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, other groups have
emerged, such as the Taliban-affiliated Haqqani Network. Each of these violent
organizations have used the absence of strong governments on one or both sides
of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to facilitate their activities and in many
cases, etch out autonomous territory from which they can base their operations.
Since
September 11, 2001, combatting terrorism has been a core objective of U.S.
foreign policy. That objective led to the invasion of Afghanistan, the removal
of the Taliban from power, and a global campaign against al-Qaeda. It remains a
priority today, with the Obama administration reaffirming the danger of terror,
seeking to combat the growing influence of ISIS, and working to mitigate the
influence of violent extremism throughout the Middle East and South Asia.
Combatting
terrorism has only recently become a core national priority in China. Tensions
have long existed between the People’s Republic and ethnic minorities,
particularly Tibetans and Uyghurs, but these tensions primarily took the form
of peaceful political movements challenging the policies and power of Beijing.
With an attack in Tiananmen Square last year and the Kunming railway attack in
March, radical elements within China who identify with the Uyghur cause for
autonomy have taken to violence and targeted areas in or near metropolises.
Beijing has made combatting this radicalism a national priority and for the
first time is prominently indicating that terror in China is affiliated with
terror organizations operating outside Chinese boundaries.
No to Cooperation
Both
the U.S. and China view combatting terror as an essential duty. Thus, should
not the 21st century’s two dominant powers use this shared interest as a
platform for cooperation when possible? Quite simply, they should – but quite
honestly, they won’t.
For
starters, the People’s Republic is not transparent when it comes to law
enforcement or military affairs and there is a fear within the U.S. that
counterterrorism efforts with China would put American security personnel in a
scenario where they help to target dissidents, not terrorists. China can object
to this characterization, but this is a real fear among American security
professionals, and not without cause given both China’s record on political
dissent and a general unwillingness to share specific information on terrorism.
On the
other hand, the U.S. has been inconsistent with classifying attacks in China as
evidence of terrorism. Concerns over human rights abuses and the general status
of ethnic minorities in China led to waffling statements that offended Chinese
security personnel and inflamed sentiment against the U.S.. The label of
terrorism must not be haphazardly cast around in any context, but when evidence
shows terrorism then it should be called terrorism (though this absolutely
requires the Chinese government to be more transparent when it comes to
evidence).
Another
consideration is that neither China nor the U.S. can separate the issue of
counterterrorism from the overarching bilateral relationship. Tensions between
Beijing and Washington have increased over the past several years, particularly
in relation to territorial claims made by Beijing in the East and South China
Seas. Beijing’s provocative maritime acts has pitted it against U..S allies in
East Asia and further complicated relations with Washington. Added to
territorial disputes in East Asia, cyber security has become a major source of
friction between the two countries. These are but two examples from a large and
extremely complex relationship that does not feature substantial mutual trust.
To take steps towards joint counterterrorism efforts, both countries will have
to recognize that trust is not necessary when interests align and that a
relationship so large and complex will have elements of cooperation and contestation.
However,
the single most powerful element keeping joint counterterrorism operations from
developing are the views surrounding China’s role as an international
stakeholder. Within Beijing, Chinese foreign policy has long subscribed to the
ideas of non-interference in the affairs of foreign states and a respect for
the sovereignty of foreign states. These principles have been the cornerstone
of Chinese foreign policy for sixty years. Yet, China’s growing importance
within the international system and the increasing number of disputes it has
with foreign countries has strained the continued power of these principles.
Additionally, China has been able to use the current international system to
its great benefit without contributing to the maintenance of that system. In
short, China has been and remains a free-rider. Cooperating with the U.S. on
counterterrorism activities, particularly within the Afghanistan-Pakistan
region, would force Beijing to at least partially abandon some core principles
and to open the door to more responsibility within the international system.
Many within China’s diplomatic and security sectors do not wish to walk down
this road, even if the journey is inevitable. Thus, China proposes confidence
building measures and cooperative economic development with the argument that
such steps will lead to cooperation on a larger scale. It has not worked so
far.
From
the American perspective, cooperating with China on counterterrorism is seen by
some within the foreign policy community as a signal of approval for China to
increase its sphere of influence. Given China’s expansionist moves in the East
and South China Sea and its long-term strategy of a continental trade and
energy corridor, concerns about a rising China are not misplaced. Yet, China’s
rise is in part the result of it not being a stakeholder, which means it does
not incur the costs others do. By cooperating when possible in the realm of
counterterrorism, China takes on the role of a responsible power – a country
invested in the enhancement of international security that brings new benefits
and costs. Through cooperation, the U.S. gets China to selectively share in the
burden of mitigating a threat and China, by being more firmly invested in
regional security, better understands both the perspective of the U.S. and the
limits of its own power.
Power of Politics
Taken
altogether, the factors surrounding counterterrorism cooperation between the
U.S. and China make the likelihood of cooperation unlikely. Cooperation could
help weaken international terrorist organizations and the networks they
sustain. It could enhance regional security in South Asia and the Middle East.
Yet, political hang-ups will sabotage efforts at cooperation. China will remain
a free-rider, content to criticize the U.S. without investing its own blood and
treasure. The U.S., concerned with China’s intentions, will go on shouldering
much of the burden of counterterrorism alone.
Jeffrey
Payne
Jeffrey Payne is Manager of Academic Affairs
at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC. The
views expressed in this article are his alone and do not represent the official
policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of
Defense, or the U.S. government.
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