The
release of more than 200 political prisoners and a tentative ceasefire with the
rebel Karen National Union represent the latest of steps taken by Myanmar
president Thein Sein's government to improve its international image and
assuage its many critics at home and abroad.
The cosmetic change in the traditionally
military-run country is unmistakable. In recent months, it has become easier
for ordinary citizens to access the Internet and local magazines and journals
are able to publish articles on topics that would have been unthinkable only a
year ago. Pictures of pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, who spent 15 of the
past 21 years under house arrest, are now for sale in markets not only in the
former capital Yangon but also in small upcountry towns.
The United States government, for more than
two decades the fiercest critic of successive military-dominated regimes in Myanmar,
promised enhanced engagement in exchange for "further reforms"
immediately after Friday's prison release. As a first step, the US is going to
send an ambassador to its embassy in Yangon, which has been headed by a charge
d'affaires since Washington decided to downgrade relations with Myanmar in 1990
in response to a brutal crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators.
Many Myanmar citizens undoubtedly welcome the
easing of the extreme authoritarian pressure they have lived under as long as
they can remember. But critics maintain the loosening is not tantamount to a
"reform process", which would require changes in the country's
fundamental power structure, and that the US may have other diplomatic
objectives in mind over concerns for human rights and democracy.
Meanwhile, some Myanmar dissidents are
beginning to ask, albeit in hushed tones, the hitherto unthinkable: is Suu Kyi
being used by the Thein Sein's military-backed, civilianized government as a
pawn in its efforts to break the country's long isolation from the West? And,
has she come under pressure from the US and possibly other Western powers with
a stake in Myanmar's future geopolitical role to strike a deal with her former
military adversaries?
Less than a year ago, Suu Kyi was known to
have said to visiting foreign diplomats that she was apprehensive about talking
to the new government that assumed office after a blatantly rigged November
2010 election. At the time, she reportedly said that the main problem was the
new constitution, which was adopted after an equally fraudulent referendum in
May 2008 and guarantees the military 25% of the seats in parliament.
For instance, the charter's Chapter 12 lays
out the complicated rules for constitutional amendments, which effectively give
the military veto power over any proposed changes. The upper house currently
consists of 168 elected representatives with a quarter, or 56 delegates,
directly representing the defense services; the lower house is made up of 330
elected MPs and 110 appointed to represent the military. The ruling Union
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), meanwhile, is widely viewed as a
vehicle for the military's political interests.
Minor constitutional changes may be considered
by the bicameral parliament if 20% of MPs submit a bill. However, a tangle of
104 clauses mean that major charter changes can not be made without the prior
approval of more than 75% of all MPs, after which a nationwide referendum must
be held where more than half of all eligible voters cast ballots.
This complicated procedure, coupled with
Myanmar's record of holding bogus referendums - the first in 1973 for the 1974
constitution was as lacking in credibility as the one held in 2008 - make is
virtually impossible to change those clauses, which in various ways and means
legally safeguard the military's now indirect hold on power.
For instance, one of the first sections of the
constitution guarantees the military's "national political leadership role
of the State" and, in case of an "emergency", the
"Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services has the right to take over and
exercise State sovereign power" after consulting the president. "No
legal action" can be taken against the military for what it does while
exercising such emergency powers, according to the constitution.
Another clause bars anyone whose parents,
spouse or children who "owe allegiance to a foreign power" from
becoming president. Suu Kyi's late husband, Michael Aris, was a British
citizen, as are their two sons. The military's right to appoint a quarter of
all seats in what is otherwise an elected parliament is also guaranteed, as is
military control of one-third of all seats in local assemblies.
In 2008, Myanmar's generals got the
constitution they wanted and through rigged elections now controls a solid
majority of all seats in the parliament. Consequently, they can now afford to
make some minor political concessions in response to international pressure.
Allowing MPs from Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) to take part in
a by-election on April 1 for 40 seats in the lower house and six in the upper
chamber left vacant by the appointment of ministers, will not affect Myanmar's
fundamental power structure with the military at its apex.
Reversible
reform
The semblance of reform, however, has improved
Myanmar's standing in the international community, as are other steps expected
to be taken by Thein Sein's government, including new laws allowing for limited
public protests and the creation of labor unions.
Since the constitution bars Suu Kyi from
becoming president, some observers speculate that if she wins a seat in
parliament she will be appointed minister of health or education, two positions
which she would consider important but will not give her substantial political
power and certainly no influence over the military.
"She would be an excellent choice for a
person to be sent abroad to solicit aid for health and education programs and
to attend international AIDS conferences and the like," says a veteran
Myanmar politician who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Few would doubt that Suu Kyi remains Myanmar's
most popular politician - and for many the country's main hope for a better
future. But for the first time critical voices of her role are also being
heard. In an unusually candid interview with The Australian on January 6, Win
Tin, one of the original founders of the NLD in 1988 who was imprisoned for 19
years for his beliefs, said that the "reforms" taking place in
Myanmar "are a ploy by the country's dictatorship to seduce foreign
governments and neutralize Aung San Suu Kyi".
Other dissidents - former political prisoners
and leaders of local civil society groups - complain that Suu Kyi meets readily
with one foreign visitor after another but has no time to see them. "One
comment I hear frequently is, 'what was the NLD fighting for if Daw Suu [Aung
San Suu Kyi] will run for the by-elections and by that accepting the 2008 constitution'?"
lamented one non-governmental organization worker in Yangon.
Ongoing fighting between ethnic rebels and
government forces are another point of division. "In particular the Kachin
are disillusioned that there is no compassionate speech or letter [from Suu
Kyi] to their community, although some of the Catholic Bishops have explicitly
asked Daw Suu to send such a message," said one civil society activist.
Since June last year, heavy fighting has been raging between government troops
and the rebel Kachin Independence Army in the country's far north.
Tens of thousands of civilians have fled the
fighting to the Chinese border, or taken refuge in churches and community halls
in towns in the predominantly Christian state of the Union. Farmers have been
forced to abandon their crops and most refugees are living as destitutes in
border areas under constant threat of being pushed back by unsympathetic
Chinese authorities.
Some critics argue that Suu Kyi has grown old
and tired - she will turn 67 this year - and the present, slight opening,
however flawed, may be her last chance to achieve her vision of a more
democratic Myanmar. But it is equally plausible that Myanmar's close
relationship with China, and, more menacingly, its military partnership with
North Korea, have prompted Western powers to push her into accepting some kind
of accommodation with Thein Sein's government. Without her engagement with the
new regime, it would be hard for the US and European Union to justify a
dramatic change in policy towards Myanmar.
When US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met
Thein Sein during her historic visit to Myanmar last December - the first by
such a high-ranking US official in half a century - China was tellingly high on
her diplomatic agenda. The first agenda item raised by Thein Sein during the
meeting was the importance of Myanmar's relationship with China, which Clinton
apparently did not object to. However, she emphasized that relations with the
US would "if reforms maintain momentum" - thus leaving the door open
for Myanmar to diversify its foreign relations.
After Washington decided in mid-January to
establish full diplomatic ties with Myanmar, Clinton said the US "will
further embrace" Myanmar if "the government releases all remaining
political prisoners, ends violence against minorities and cuts military ties
with North Korea". After her December visit, she said that the US would
agree to and support assessment missions to Myanmar by the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, a first step toward renewed multilateral lending
for badly needed infrastructure.
Myanmar's staunchly nationalistic military may
be willing to lessen its dependence on China, and even cut its ties with North
Korea, provided the US and its allies can offer something substantial in
return, including an eventual removal of economic sanctions. However, if one
reads the 2008 constitution carefully, Myanmar will not become a genuine
democracy any time soon, but rather a thinly disguised authoritarian state that
the US and the West can cynically live with to counterbalance China's influence.
That is not what many pro-democracy activists,
both at home and in exile, have been fighting for since the bloody, nationwide
uprising against military-dominated rule in 1988, when thousands of protesters
were mowed down by the military, and when they overwhelmingly voted for the NLD
in the 1990 election, a democratic result that the military refused to honor.
In the case of any future "emergency", the limited new freedoms that
Myanmar's people are now enjoying can also be curtailed, perhaps next time by
constitutional means rather than the barrel of a gun.
Bertil Lintner
Asia Times
is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern
Economic Review and author of several books on Burma/Myanmar, including Aung
San Suu Kyi and Burma's Struggle for Democracy (Published in 2011). He is
currently a writer with Asia-Pacific Media Services.
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