In
the wake of a major maritime ruckus last spring, hopes of a deal between China
and Vietnam are rising in the South China Sea.
Chinese patrol boats provoked incidents last
May and June that rattled foreign ministries throughout Southeast Asia and as
far away as New Delhi, Canberra, Tokyo and Washington. The provocations indicated
to some that hardline peripheral elements were dictating Beijing’s policy on
the contested waters.
Egged on by highly slanted accounts of
Philippine and Vietnamese infringement of Beijing's supposedly indisputable
sovereignty over the South China Sea, Chinese public opinion seemed eager to
"teach a lesson" to both perceived as insubordinate neighbors.
Over the summer, a flurry of diplomatic
activity by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) drew forth
renewed promises by China that it would seek peaceful resolution of overlapping
claims of maritime sovereignty.
A collective sigh of relief greeted Beijing's
agreement to new "Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration on
Conduct" in the South China Sea. Most countries in the region evidently
see little prospect of actually settling the long-simmering dispute; they just
hope to avoid a shoot-out.
Cynics have speculated that having
demonstrated its readiness to disrupt oil and gas exploration activities just
off the coasts of Vietnam and the Philippines, China was reverting to the
benign phase of a "talk and take" strategy only for the duration of the
South China Sea typhoon season.
These territorial disputes aren't just a
squabble over remote and insignificant reefs and cays: The contested spots of
land lie athwart the world's busiest sea lanes, a significant fishery and, it's
generally believed, big untapped pools of oil and gas.
If not checked, China's insistent promotion of
a flimsy historical claim to "immutable sovereignty" over waters
stretching as far south as Singapore has looked likely to lead to deadly
clashes - not just with the likes of rival claimants Philippines, Brunei,
Malaysia or Vietnam but also with the American navy.
At a recent conference in Hanoi, the invited
American expert pointed to Washington's sharply increased attention to
developments in the South China Sea. China has bumbled, he said, and the US
"can only benefit from upholding the principles of freedom of navigation
and the peaceful settlement of disputes ... providing ample reason for
Southeast Asian countries to improve bilateral relations with the US".
If ASEAN's diplomacy is feckless and the US
and regional allies are being drawn into the region's quarrels, where then is
the ray of hope? It comes from recent indications that Vietnam and China may be
working out a bilateral deal, or at least towards a modus vivendi.
Eight months after trading threats, China and
Vietnam are now huddled in negotiations over the northern section of the South
China Sea, an expanse that no other nations claim. It's a high stakes game for
both countries' Communist leaders.
At issue is sovereignty over the Paracel
Islands and adjacent waters. The Paracels consist of islets, sandbanks and
reefs to the south of China's Hainan Island and east of Vietnam's south-central
coast. Fishermen from littoral countries have frequented the archipelago for
many centuries, activity that forms the basis of historic claims to sovereignty
by both Vietnam and China.
According to international law, Vietnam's
historic claim is stronger inasmuch as imperial Vietnam, then France (which
colonized Vietnam in the 1800's), and then the Republic of Vietnam ("South
Vietnam") exercised sovereignty without a break from the 16th century
until 1974, when a South Vietnamese garrison was overrun by Chinese forces.
Since then, though Hanoi has clung to its
claim, China has extended the islets' fortifications and built port facilities
and airstrips. Vietnamese boats have been harassed and sometimes held for
ransom when they attempted to fish in nearby waters.
It is thus surprising that Beijing, secure in
its de facto possession of the Paracels and with considerably more powerful air
and naval forces, agreed in mid-October "to speed up the demarcation of
territorial waters off the Tonkin Gulf and ... actively discuss cooperation for
the mutual development of these waters".
Even more surprising is that while "legal
evidence" would be considered based on a legal regime and principles
defined by international law, including the UN Convention on Law of the Sea”
(UNCLOS), Vietnam and China also agreed to "make efforts to seek basic and
long term-solutions acceptable to both sides for sea-related disputes".
Pending definitive agreement on a territorial
settlement, both sides would "actively discuss co-operation for mutual
development". Taken at face value, this would seem to indicate that China
has backed away from its claim of "immutable jurisdiction" over the
entire area within its notorious nine-dash U-shaped line, a claim that takes in
more than 80% of the South China Sea.
Legal experts say that the Paracels aren't substantial
enough to generate much of an "exclusive economic zone", no matter
who controls them. Thus a division of the bilaterally contested area according
to UNCLOS rules would be roughly along the midline between China's Hainan
Island and Vietnam's central coast. It would divide the sea area in roughly
equal portions.
If China is seriously interested in cutting a
bilateral deal, it might also concede to Vietnam's control of reefs and islets
at the western end of the Paracel archipelago, the section to the west of the
midline.
Bilateral
preference
Would China actually agree to such a
demarcation? There are at least four good reasons why it might.
First, there's a precedent. In 2000, after
seven years of haggling, China and Vietnam managed to agree on demarcation of
their sea border in the Tonkin Gulf - the finger of the South China Sea that
lies between Vietnam's northern provinces and Hainan's west coast. In addition,
they instituted joint patrols and resources (fisheries) management. As a
consequence, a tenth dash was erased from the "U-shaped line map"
that China uses to illustrate its claim to the southern waters.
Second, China has insisted that territorial
claims must be addressed bilaterally. In other words, it says it will not
negotiate the overlapping claims in the southern part of the South China Sea
with all or a collective subset of ASEAN countries. Cutting a fair deal
bilaterally with Vietnam in a part of the sea where only two countries' claims
are at stake would enhance Beijing's credibility considerably.
Third, sustaining a civil relationship with
Vietnam's leaders is important to China. The regime in Hanoi is the world's
only other regime committed to building "market socialism" under the
exclusive leadership of a communist party. Under the aegis of a bilateral
Steering Committee for Vietnam-China cooperation, there is a huge two-way
traffic in visits aiming to build friendly links between ministries, adjacent
provinces, functional organizations, the armed forces and, of course, party
institutions.
Fourth, it would support the theory that the
provocations last spring were the work of lower level actors, eg China's coast
guard and its oil companies, whose understanding of China's broader aims in the
region was lacking. To the extent that ASEAN members believe that's true,
they'll go back to believing also in Beijing's "peaceful rise"
scenario and lose interest in casting America, Japan and Australia as actors in
the unfolding South China Sea drama.
For the politburo in Hanoi, the stakes are
extremely high. Since time immemorial, managing an unequal relationship with
its enormous neighbor to the north has been a core concern of Vietnam's rulers.
That has meant convincing China that Vietnam will fight if its territorial
integrity is at stake, while also knowing when to show deference and to
negotiate.
There are many in Vietnam, including
‘liberals' within the ruling party itself, who are ready to pounce on present
leaders if they seem soft vis-a-vis China. And, the politburo certainly must
worry that Chinese ultra-patriots, in particular jingoes in China's navy, are
spoiling for a fight.
Thus Vietnam's strategy has been to yield nothing
until Beijing tabled a proposal pragmatic enough for it to consider. In the
meantime Hanoi has been building up its defenses, incrementally putting matters
important to China on hold, ostentatiously cultivating closer ties with the US,
India, Japan and Australia, and allowing the public to express patriotic
sentiments in the vicinity of the Chinese Embassy.
Now, however, it seems that the elements of a
perhaps acceptable deal are on the table, and the full prestige of both
politburos has been engaged. During Vietnamese Communist Party leader Nguyen
Phu Trong's high-profile trip to Beijing in October, and again during Chinese
heir-apparent Yi Jinping's visit to Hanoi in December, it was stressed that
negotiators had been instructed to implement "the common perception of the
two countries' leaders".
As China has acquired the military capability
to support its sweeping claims in the South China Sea, a shooting war has
seemed increasingly possible, either by accident or design. Until now, Beijing
has seemed uninterested in working toward a deal that would clear the way for
littoral states to invest their energies in joint exploitation of fisheries and
energy resources.
As the US disengages from Iraq and
Afghanistan, Washington's disposition to intervene in the conflict is
increasingly evident. But there are now hopes that Vietnam and China are moving
towards resolving at least part of the problem.
David Brown
Asia Times
David Brown is a retired American diplomat who
writes on contemporary Vietnam. He may be reached at nworbd@gmail.com.
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