“Red China’s sub fleet can prove a major
threat to American ships,” wrote Albert Ravenholt for the Chicago Daily News
Service in 1964, referring to Mao’s underwater menace to American naval forces
assembling in the South China Sea off the coast of Vietnam.
The
communist submarines, supplied by the Russians, were stationed on Hainan
Island, at the southernmost tip of the Chinese mainland, across the Gulf of
Tonkin. At the time, China was estimated to have between 30 and 40 in
operation, the fourth largest fleet after the U.S.S.R, the United States and
Great Britain.
Nearly
48 years on, much has changed and yet much continues on the same trajectory.
When Ravenholt, who set about becoming a reporter in Shanghai in the 1940s
during the Second Sino-Japanese war, died at the age of 90 in 2010, China
remained Red, even though its ideological hue had turned arguably more
nationalistic after three decades of rising prosperity.
China
has modernized its military in tandem with its economic growth. It has
committed itself to significant military spending, endeavouring to catch up to
the West’s technological prowess by building advanced precision-guided
munitions, anti-satellite and cyber-warfare capabilities. Last year, it
unveiled the Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter jet, which is expected to go into
service in 2017-19. It has also set up a land-based anti-ship missile system to
limit the ability of other nations to navigate freely in regional waters,
including those around the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands, which it
estimates may contain the world’s fourth largest reserve of oil and natural
gas.
In
addition to augmenting its fleet of diesel subs to more than 50, China has
introduced four or five nuclear-powered Jin-class (Type 094) ballistic-missile
subs or “boomers”. And, in 2007, it completed construction of a modern
underground base on Hainan, affording its vessels easier access to the Strait
of Malacca, the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, vital shipping lanes that
carry a large portion of the world’s trade and supply China with oil from the
Persian Gulf. Beijing’s long-term goal is to establish a fully fledged
blue-water navy, over the course of several more decades, enabling it to
project power beyond regional waters, both westward and eastward.
To
round out its power-projection capabilities, China has undertaken to build a
small fleet of “at least three” aircraft carriers. In 1998, after the Soviet
Union dissolved, it purchased a decommissioned carrier from Ukraine specially
designed for anti-submarine warfare. The Varyag was originally destined to
become a floating hotel and casino off Macau, but last year the People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) announced that the ship has been refitted for
“scientific research, experimentation and training”. In other words, it is most
likely being used to reverse-engineer a future Chinese-built carrier. It is
expected to be commissioned into service sometime later this year, carrying 30
J-15 fighters, helicopters and a crew compliment of 2,000.
Having
grown at an average annual rate of more than 10 percent since the 1990s,
China’s military spending is now poised to outstrip Europe’s for the first time
in centuries.
According
to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a London-based
think tank which recently released its 2012 assessment of the global military
balance, China’s defense budget has kept up a robust, if not alarming, pace
since the 2008 financial crisis, while American and European budgets have
declined. The institute expects Chinese spending to overtake that of NATO’s
largest European members combined by 2015, prompting renewed calls for the
alliance to move forward with its “smart defense” initiative. Proposed by
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “smart defense” would see NATO pooling
and sharing its members’ capabilities to achieve synergies in times of fiscal
restraint.
Beijing’s
military expenditure is, by far, the largest in the region if you exclude
Australia and New Zealand. The National People’s Congress, which approves
budgetary proposals, recently announced that the nation’s official defense
spending—now second only to that of the United States in absolute terms, though
still well behind it on a per capita basis—will increase this year by 11.2
percent to 670 billion yuan (about $106 billion). While smaller than the 12.7
percent allocated in 2011, the figure may not represent actual spending. Some
analysts reckon it could be as much as double because the official number
excludes outlays on nuclear and space weapons programs.
China
is understandably anxious to safeguard its sovereignty, national security and
territorial integrity. The memory of nineteenth-century European and
twentieth-century Japanese invasions has heightened its sense of vulnerability
to the modern military alliances formed by its neighbours, such as Japan,
Taiwan and South Korea, with the United States. In recent years it has
conducted large-scale drills intended to improve littoral defense, rapid
mobilisation and command-and-control flexibility. These have been unambiguously
calibrated to the presence of U.S. underwater, surface and air assets.
But
China’s experimentation with long-range force projection represents something
of a sea-change in its implications. It goes beyond attempting to achieve the
capabilities required to establish a defensive ring around its territorial
waters.
To
allay international concerns, the PLA has stepped up its campaign of military
diplomacy to improve bilateral and multilateral relationships in the
Asia-Pacific and to de-escalate territorial disputes. It has also participated
in global security initiatives, such as U.N.-mandated peace-keeping activities
and co-operative missions with NATO to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa.
Exploring ways to work together more closely and transparently was a major
topic of discussion between leaders of the PLA and delegates from the
International Military Staff (IMS) when they met in Beijing in February. NATO,
which seeks a strengthened dialogue with the PLA, is attempting to build upon
the regular, high-level meetings it quietly holds with China twice a year, as well
as to broaden the communications channels it has established through Beijing’s
ambassadors to Belgium.
In
response to China’s strengthening naval capabilities, the Pentagon, which faces
cuts of $485 billion over the next decade, has begun a major “pivot” of its
strategic priorities. Adm. Sam Locklear, who took charge of U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM) in March after leading American naval forces in Europe and
coordinating NATO’s operations in Libya, has been tasked with transforming
PACOM into the vanguard of America’s new defense strategy. In large measure,
this means solidifying the U.S. presence in the Pacific to contain China.
Diplomatically, the State Department has been reaffirming its security
commitments to various countries in the region and bolstering ties with
longstanding allies like Japan, the Philippines and Australia. It is also
deepening its relations with ASEAN nations. PACOM itself has been negotiating
bilateral security agreements with Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, and
the Philippines. While some policy analysts see a future NATO-ASEAN partnership
as critical to stability in the region, others feel that PACOM is sufficiently
large and free from the encumbrance of a multinational bureaucracy to succeed
in securing American strategic interests in the Pacific where NATO is felt to
have failed it in the Middle East.
From
the Chinese perspective, NATO’s continued existence since the end of the Cold
War, its raison d’être, and its broadening scope and theatre of operations
beyond the North Atlantic reveal its true colours. The general perception in
China is that NATO is largely a medium for American global hegemony and
military dominance. Beijing is particularly concerned about the roles it has
played in toppling undesirable regimes in Afghanistan and Libya. It views these
as setting a dangerous precedent for potentially supporting Taiwan should the
“renegade” island declare political independence from the mainland; or,
perhaps, one day to force political transformation in China should the present
regime decidedly challenge the American liberal imperium.
China
also recognizes, however, the desirability of normalizing and deepening
relations with NATO if it is to meet its stated goal of achieving “a peaceful
rise” and harmonious integration into the global system. It remains open to a
multilateral and “respectful” approach to matters of mutual interest,
especially those from which the CCP can garner international political capital,
such as non-traditional security threats like global piracy, terrorism and arms
proliferation.
As
PLAN’s assertiveness escalates in the Asia-Pacific, drawing American attention
away from the Atlantic, so too does Beijing’s program of indirect economic and
political influence over Europe by way of increased trade and investment.
China’s
lack of clarity respecting its strategic intentions was discussed in detail
during Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States in
February. Xi, who has closer ties to the Chinese military than Hu Jintao and is
expected to succeed him to the presidency later this year, pledged to move
forward in restoring and expanding Sino-American military-to-military dialogue.
The Defense Consultative Talks, held annually between senior Chinese and
American civilian and military officials, have chilled in recent years with the
United States’ continued large arms sales to Taiwan. Xi emphasized that China’s
military modernization and expansion is entirely defensive in nature, its rapid
pace simply reflecting the necessity to bring its forces up to a level
commensurate with the nation’s economic growth, large population and heightened
international stature.
It is
hoped that an improving dialogue will bring greater clarity. China may, indeed,
be seeking chiefly to secure its territory and safeguard sea-lanes for the
transport of energy and other natural resources from the Middle East and
Africa. Or it may be hardening its economic and territorial claims over the
entire South China Sea. It may be developing its capacity to support multinational
missions to promote world and regional peace and stability. Or it may, as some
observers contend, be intent upon weakening NATO and bringing about a new
trilateral balance of power, a strategic equilibrium more conducive to managing
global risks to its broadening economic portfolio in Africa and elsewhere.
In any
event, one thing is already becoming clearer—that China’s mounting
assertiveness and PACOM’s mandate to reassert itself in the Asia Pacific are
setting the stage for a possible new Cold War.
Paul Nash
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