SINGAPORE - The US's "pivot" strategy towards the Asia-Pacific aims to
reinvigorate security alliances with its established partners in the region. In
Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Thailand have long been US treaty allies,
affording them privileged access to US armaments and in the case of the
Philippines a mutual defense guarantee if attacked by a third party.
The Philippines and Thailand,
however, have had decidedly different responses to the US's renewed security
engagement with the region. While Manila has warmly welcomed the US's military presence,
Bangkok has adopted a hedging strategy to preserve its vibrant ties with China.
Washington's ties with Bangkok and Manila are now influenced by two crucial
factors: (1) the perception of an existential threat and (2) domestic political
and economic interests.
A key strategic hub for American
forces, the Philippines has offered the US greater access to its military
facilities in exchange for assistance in the modernization of its military. The
Philippine government announced on August 24 that it welcomed America's plan to
deploy "X-band", a powerful new early warning radar, in Japan and the
Philippines. The plan is seen by some as the centerpiece of the US's defense
build-up in Asia to counter threats from nuclear North Korea and to contain
China's rising military power.
As tensions mount in the South
China Sea, there is now a new facet to the US-Philippines alliance, ie China's
emergence as an existential threat. The mutual defense treaty, which dates back
to 1951, is perceived as a deterrent to China's creeping assertiveness in
nearby maritime areas, including the contested Spratly Islands.
Following a naval stand-off
between Manila and Beijing in April this year, Washington pledged to triple its
military assistance to Manila, deployed two US nuclear-armed submarines to make
symbolic port calls at Subic, and sent thousands of American troops and
American warships for joint military exercises with their Filipino
counterparts.
Thailand has been a US treaty ally
since 1954, a designation that was upgraded to major non-NATO ally in 2003 as a
reward for Bangkok's cooperation in Washington's global war on terror. Now,
with enhanced commercial and defense ties with China, Bangkok is less willing
to open its territory to facilitate US strategic rebalancing.
Most notably, Thai Prime Minister
Yingluck Shinawatra's cabinet decided in June to allow parliament to scrutinize
a US NASA request to use U-tapao airbase for atmospheric studies. After
opposition lawmakers argued that approval of the request could jeopardize
Thailand's vibrant trade ties with China, NASA withdrew its request after the
Thais missed a June 26 deadline to respond.
Since the Vietnam War, U-tapao
has been used by US aircraft to support military operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq as well as humanitarian interventions, including in the aftermath of the
2004 tsunami. US troops also have special access to U-tapao through the annual
Cobra Gold war games held in Thailand and staged with various international
actors. NASA initially planned to use the airbase for a six-week climate study
but the request was viewed in some quarters as a veiled attempt to spy on
China.
Unlike the 1960s and 1970s when
China backed communist guerillas in Thailand, Washington and Bangkok no longer
have a common security threat to motivate a significant enhancement of their
existing alliance. This "threat deficit" has significantly affected
US-Thai cooperation in recent years. Though Thailand may be wary of China's
perceived growing assertiveness, it nonetheless highly values its robust
political and economic relations with Beijing.
While US-Thai strategic relations
have arguably stalled, Thailand and China upgraded their ties to a
"comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership" during Yingluck's
visit with a high level military delegation to Beijing in April. One reason why
Sino-Thai relations are strong is the absence of contentious territorial
disputes. (Unlike Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam, Thailand has
no claim to contested areas in the South China Sea.)
Strategic economics
Thailand's recent strategic
behavior has been driven clearly by economic interests. Bangkok has benefitted
enormously from China's economic rise. Although the US remains a major investor
in Thailand, China is now Thailand's largest export market. Sino-Thai trade was
valued at US$64.7 billion in 2011, overshadowing US-Thai trade of $35 billion
in the same period.
China has also pledged strong
assistance in Thailand's reconstruction and water management projects in the
wake of last year's devastating floods. As Thailand benefits from China's soft
power diplomacy, it is not surprising that Bangkok has adopted a hedging
strategy.
In the Philippines, the US is the
largest source of foreign direct investment and second-largest trade partner.
In 2011, US-Philippines bilateral trade reached $13.6 billion, slightly higher
than the $12.1 billion value of China-Philippines commerce. China's economic
muscle flexing has in instances pushed the Philippines closer to the US. When
Beijing recently tried to sanction Manila by banning Philippine banana imports,
a move that threatened to hit come 200,000 Filipino farmers and weaken exports,
the US offered to buy the surplus bananas.
The stagnation of US-Thai defense
ties is likewise tied to Thailand's turbulent domestic politics. Since the 2006
military ouster of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a focus on domestic
politics has come up at the expense of foreign relations. The opposition
Democrat Party claimed that Yingluck would approve the NASA proposal in
exchange for granting her exiled, criminally convicted brother Thaksin a visa
to travel to the US. While the NASA project was cancelled, Thaksin was
nonetheless given a visa, with the caveat that he not travel to Washington,
according to press reports.
In the Philippines, domestic
politics under Benigno Aquino's administration have been conducive to a vibrant
US-Philippines alliance. Most political leaders, apart from left-leaning
nationalistic parties, have backed Aquino's efforts to bolster ties with the US
to counterbalance China's rising assertiveness in the South China Sea. He has
notably made a number of trips to Washington to request stronger strategic
cooperation and arms transfers.
Unlike his predecessor Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Aquino has appeared to be less receptive to Beijing's dangled
commercial incentives. Elected on an anti-corruption platform, Aquino has
cancelled certain Chinese-funded projects which were marred by irregularities.
His diplomatic balancing is reflective of the national mood: a Social Weather
Station survey conducted in the second quarter showed that 55% of Filipinos
have little trust in China, representing a record low, while the US notched a
public trust rating of 62%.
The convergence and divergence of
threat perceptions has determined the depth of US defense cooperation with the
Philippines and Thailand as Washington attempts to implement its
"pivot" policy in Asia. Local political and economic concerns have
dictated how both countries have received Washington's strategic overtures.
Whether the split among two of the US's top traditional allies will undermine
the "pivot" policy's overall effectiveness will be closely watched
and aggravated as much as possible by China.
Julius Cesar I Trajano
Julius Cesar I Trajano is a Senior Analyst at the S Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
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