Europe - EU in Asia: Between a Pivot and a Look East

The security architecture in Asia is changing rapidly, and the EU needs to respond.

One of the most remarked upon developments of the 2013 Shangri-La Dialogue – a Singapore-based meeting for Asia-Pacific leaders organized by the London-based IISS think tank – was presence of Catherine Ashton. Amid much announcement and noise, Catherine Ashton had flown to Singapore to represent the EU, and not just one of its member states. This was a first for the EU, eager as it is to contribute to the coming Asian security architecture.

The high representative delivered a noted speech, calling on her Asian audience to consider the EU a long-term security partner and expanding on the European’s so-called “comprehensive approach.”

Coming on the heels of a number of other initiatives – in 2012, the EU revised its Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia, signed the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership, and acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) – the presence and speech of the High Representative signaled the EU’s own “pivot” towards East Asia. The EU appeared committed to strengthening its presence in East Asia, not just in economic terms, but also in the political and security spheres.

This year, the EU was not present at Shangri-La. This absence is not accidental: it sends a clear though implicit signal to both European and Asian audiences that, in times of crisis, the EU is prioritizing other foreign policy issues closer to home than East Asia’s spiraling security dilemma. While not intrinsically good or bad in itself, this position has to be clear if it is to be positively welcomed. Otherwise, it is destined to weigh on the EU’s credibility and status. Mixed signals can have a utility in international affairs but developments in the South China Sea should compel Brussels to better inform its partners of its perceptions and intentions, and, above all, clarify its own strategy vis-à-vis the changing security architecture in Asia and the world.

Missing in Action?

The May 2014 edition of the Shangri-La Dialogue was the scene of considerable diplomatic trepidation. Much had to be discussed after a year of affirmative action by China, keen to develop – as reiterated in October 2013 by President Xi Jinping at a conference organized by the Beijing-based CICIR – “every window of strategic opportunity.”

The most recent in this series of actions was the deployment of Chinese oil rigs in contested waters of the South China Sea, triggering a major spat between China and Vietnam. Bilateral relations, until then thriving, nosedived, with each side accusing the other of provocations and insisting that their respective position was consistent with international law. Sino-Philippine relations also dipped in the wake of multiplying incidents and mutual accusations of misconduct in the South China Sea. These tensions are not just a matter of conjuncture. They follow, and are part of a series of events signaling major and systemic transformations in the parameters of regional stability.

For the last fifty years, Asia’s path to prosperity relied on a fluid security system centered on the United States, falling short of any kind of “Asian NATO.” To date, this system was upheld not just by the U.S. military presence in East Asia and its network of alliances, but also by more or less tacit agreement by other countries, including through China’s “peaceful rise” policy. But with a changing of the guards in most Asian capitals over the last three years and the emergence of Xi Jinping – giving a new, less conciliatory face to the rise of China – things are changing fast.

In this atmosphere, the European absence at the Shangri-La Dialogue was not neutral. Obviously, Catherine Ashton had good reason not to attend. This spring, many developments – including the Ukrainian crisis, enduring instability in the Middle East, and eruptions of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa – contributed to stretch the attention and resources of European foreign policy institutions. But among a pragmatic Asian audience, the discrepancy between the U.S. (the Secretary of Defense explicitly condemned China for undertaking destabilizing, unilateral actions) and the EU (absorbed in its own neighborhood problems) was sharply felt. The presence of the French and British defense ministers did little to alter that.

A Paradigm Shift

Reacting to events without strategic direction would be a dangerous game for the EU. Therefore, to appear as a credible political and security partner, Brussels should embrace the ongoing changes in regional and global power configuration and security architectures. Bypassing East Asia is assuredly not an option. A sustained – increased even – presence in East Asia is necessary in several respects.

First, picturing itself a “long-term security partner” without a coherent and consistent presence will not help the EU much in raising its political and economic profile in East Asia. Words need to be followed by deeds, especially in times of crisis. Visibility in, and commitments to high-level gatherings and summits are important. Second, volatility in the South China Sea requires careful monitoring and attention from the EU, for Brussels has a considerable interest in maritime security there, where a major share of its trade transits. It also requires an adequate response.

A concise statement of concern, urging all parties to “undertake de-escalating measures and refrain from any unilateral action […]”, has been issued by the Spokesperson of Catherine Ashton and the G7, but this hardly suffices to demonstrate the EU’s commitment and implication in East Asia’s security affairs.

Third and more important, recent events point to a systemic change in the South China Sea, a shift in the parameters of regional stability that provides a perturbing echo to the Ukrainian crisis. In their closing statement, G7 members confirmed how closely related the Ukrainian crisis and South China Sea issue may be in declaring that they opposed “any unilateral attempt by any party to assert its territorial or maritime claims through the use of intimidation, coercion or force” and calling “on all parties to clarify and pursue their territorial and maritime claims in accordance with international law.”

Until recently, a particular modus vivendi had seemed to have crystallized in the South China Sea. All parties found an interest in maintaining a form of “controlled instability” and strategic uncertainty. This did not require them to clarify their claims, their basis, and the actions they would be ready to undertake to defend them. The DoC and CoC negotiation processes, bilateral consultations, and the defense of UNCLOS have since provided useful – while not too constraining – tools to both contain escalation risks and foster a constructive image abroad.

However, current developments hint at China’s determination to curb the evolution of the regional security architecture in its favor, finding in the growing power asymmetry with its neighbors both the means and legitimating tool to assert a Sino-centric order in the region. A politicized history is here central to China picturing this push to prominence as benign, and resistance to it as provocative. Seen from Beijing, this is only part of a “democratization” of the international system, a “return to normal” after centuries of anomalous domination of the region by other powers. China is increasingly vocal in claiming great power status, and its political elites are leaning ever more towards imperial rhetoric and ambitions.

In effect, while the drivers and individuals behind China’s policy in the South China Sea remain ambiguous, its results are tangible. Southeast Asian countries seem increasingly willing to balance China. The U.S. is moving ever closer to its allies, even on slippery slopes such as on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue. And these movements of resistance in turn feed into China’s “siege mentality,” thereby fueling the nationalistic agenda of influent constituencies and government agencies.

What stems from the May 2014 events can be interpreted as nothing less than a new step in a paradigm shift in East Asia. These initiatives pointed to a selective and partial use of international law by parties to the disputes and more worryingly, to the use of national armed forces to ensure that one’s own views prevail. This evolution is explained by the maritime interests and ambitions of parties (and specifically China). For all, stakes are high: the economic resources derived from the sea (hydrocarbons, fisheries, etc.) and those transiting through it are crucial to their economies.

South China Sea sandbanks, reefs and islets have come to embody, in a region bent on fighting the interferences of external powers, the capacity of national governments to stand up for their rights in the face of external aggression, and defend their sovereignty. For China, control of the South China Sea is also a prerequisite to consolidating its access to both the Indian and Pacific oceans and challenge the U.S. Navy. In Kaplan’s words, the South China Sea is for China what the Caribbean is for America: the strategic maritime domain over which they necessarily have to gain control to establish themselves as great powers.

Assets and Options

South China Sea tensions reflect a challenge brought onto norms and conventions underpinnings the regional security architecture. The “rules of the game” that held the region relatively stable up to now have become a divisive issue among regional states. For China, these rules have to change. Xi Jinping even called for a new Asian Security framework at the CICA May 2014 forum (Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia).

To push this ambition forward, Beijing primarily resorts to political pressure, backed by military and economic power. The U.S. has opposed to this a defense of the status quo, relying on political and military resolve, economic integration and diplomatic wooing. The EU is, for its part, largely out of the military equation in the South China Sea, except for its arms exports and some particular initiatives of its members. Nevertheless, it is also an agent of change in the region’s architecture, relying on political dialogue and economic incentives to foster, on the basis of the ASEAN-EU relationship, a rules-based regionalism. This option is, in the European experience and view, the most conducive to both peace and prosperity. In this perspective, it has brought a distinctive input in the security debate.

In other words, what is at stake is whether East Asia’s unfolding new security structure will be forged on an exclusionary (“an Asian security mansion” in Xi’s words) or inclusive basis (with a place for the EU). Even if there is little indication that China’s vision will be realized in the short to medium terms, it is certain that its endgame is to limit U.S. influence in the region and rebalance global security. Very concretely, this would restrict the Asian security dilemma to a Chinese/American face-à-face, implying less room and opportunities for the EU. Europe should thus not remain in the shadow of an uncontrolled power game, but stake out a position with its own assets: a decisive experience in security dialogue and peace-making.

The Shangri-La Dialogue is just one among many forums on politics and security in Asia-Pacific, and certainly not the most important. But it is a comparatively low-risk, highly visible place for policy announcements. A presence would have enabled the EU promote its own added value in the ongoing strategic debate. It would also have been of great help for Brussels to understand the complex dynamics at the core of rising tensions in the South China Sea. There is a price to pay for being a different actor. And this may well be that the EU is little equipped to deal with the challenges inherent to a changing world order, and the realist thinking inherent to Asia’s changing strategic landscape.

It is not too late for the EU to be more involved in understanding and contributing to a changing security architecture in East Asia. Tensions with China may open a door to ASEAN. The Southeast Asian bloc has recently sought to better organize the diverging positions of its members to gain credence as a more united front, the only way to break China’s “salami slicing” strategy (bilaterally deal with each state to avoid a common position among them). In facing the disproportionate military power of China, ASEAN members are simultaneously bolstering their deterrence capabilities, and investing more and more in the legal instrument. On both fronts, the EU has an interest. A former top Vietnamese diplomat recently called on the EU to have a stronger voice and a clearer position on South China Sea tensions. There is room for Brussels to weigh in.

However, what came out of recent developments is also that the EU risks falling between two chairs: a pivot and a look East policy. On the one hand, as Nicola Casarini argued in 2013, “the EU and its member states already began their own rebalancing towards Asia roughly a decade ago. Although this development has gone largely undetected, it could well warrant the label of a European ‘pivot.’”

Certainly, when Europe begun to realize how important the Asia-Pacific theater was poised to become in the twenty-first century, it gradually stepped up its engagement of the region. The 2012-2013 period represented a culminating point in this endeavor. But calling this a European “pivot” inevitably makes EU foreign policy fall prey to comparisons with U.S. policy choices. Brussels has long argued that it was seeking a different kind of partnership with Asia than Washington was, based on its experience in the region and economic relations rather than any military presence. Still, terminology does matter, and an actual pivot would require the EU to alter its resources allocation paradigm, and shift considerably more resources to East Asia than it does today.

On the other hand, the crisis in Ukraine has brought Euro-Russian relations back to the fore of Brussels’ foreign policy agenda, and precipitated the EU reinvestment in its Eastern neighborhood. Adding to continued instability in the Middle East and eruptions of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, this reminded the EU of the volatility of its vicinity. By shifting its attention towards Kiev and Moscow, the EU had not so much rolled back its pivot to Asia as reacted to international developments by prioritizing more proximate and immediate issues. While a pivot to East Asia and an Eastern neighborhood could coexist so far, recent events made this dual approach problematic for the EU. The more Russia tilts towards Asia to compensate for deteriorating relations with Europe, as exemplified by the $400 billion gas deal it just signed with Beijing, the more Europe will have to display a “Eurasian” policy in place of its two disconnected “Eastern” and “East Asia” policies.

In other words, Europe will increasingly have to deal with a geographical and strategic continuum to its East. This “Look East” policy implies the impossibility of actually pivoting to one region or another without prior consolidation of both its neighborhood policies (to its South and East) and transatlantic ties. Either way, there is a choice to make for the EU. And now is a good time.

Sophie Boisseau du Rocher

Sophie Boisseau du Rocher is Senior Research Associate at GRIP and author of “The EU’s strategic offensive with ASEAN: some room left but no time,” Analysis Note, GRIP, January 8, 2014. She has written extensively on security affairs in Southeast Asia for the last 30 years. Bruno Hellendorff is Research Fellow at GRIP’s Asian Desk and author of « Dépenses et transferts militaires en Asie du Sud-Est : Une modernisation qui pose question », Note d’Analyse, GRIP, June 12, 2013 & « Territoires contestés en mer de Chine méridionale ; quels enjeux pour l’Europe ? » , Eclairage, GRIP, June 18 2014 (also published in European Geostrategy here).   

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China - With One Eye on Washington, China Plots Its Own Asia ‘Pivot’

BEIJING — The Silk Road, an obscure Kazakh-inspired security forum and a $50 billion Asian infrastructure bank are just some of the disparate elements in an evolving Chinese strategy to try to counter Washington’s “pivot” to the region.

While Chinese leaders have not given the government’s growing list of initiatives a label or said they had an overall purpose, Chinese experts and diplomats said Beijing appeared set on shaping Asia’s security and financial architecture more to its liking.

“China is trying to work out its own counterbalance strategy,” said Sun Zhe, director of the Centre for U.S.-China Relations at Beijing’s Tsinghua University and who has advised China’s government on its foreign policy.

Added one Beijing-based Western diplomat who follows China’s international relations: “This is all clearly aimed at the United States.”

President Barack Obama’s pivot – as the White House initially dubbed it – represented a strategy to refocus on Asia’s dynamic economies as the United States disentangled itself from costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

China sees the pivot as an attempt to contain its growing influence, especially given the United States is strengthening its ties with Asian security allies such as Japan and the Philippines, which have bitter territorial disputes with Beijing in the region’s waters. Washington denies this.

One key part of China’s diplomatic outreach has been to breathe life into the little-known Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, or CICA, which has languished since Kazakhstan proposed it in 1992 to promote peace and security.

CICA comprises two dozen mostly Asian nations, as well as Russia and some Middle Eastern countries. The United States, Japan and the Philippines are not members.

China took over chairmanship of CICA at a summit in Shanghai in May for three years. There, President Xi Jinping spoke about a new “Asian security concept”, saying China would explore the formulation of a code of conduct for regional security and an Asian security partnership program.

While Xi gave few details and made no direct mention of disputes such as in the South China Sea, he warned Asian nations about strengthening military alliances to counter China, an oblique reference to the U.S. pivot.

“Asian problems must be resolved by Asian people, and Asian security must be protected by Asian people,” Xi said.

A Rival Bank?

Another Chinese initiative is the $50 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which Xi first proposed in October during a visit to Southeast Asia.

Finance Minister Lou Jiwei said this week Beijing would likely have a 50 percent stake in the bank, which diplomats see as a possible rival to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, though China says its role is a complementary one, not competitive.

Washington and Tokyo have the biggest voting rights in both the decades-old institutions.

China sees the infrastructure bank as a way to spread the message of its benign intentions in Asia, where developing countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam accuse Beijing of being the aggressor over territorial claims.

“China upholds a basic guiding principle in regional diplomacy – being friends and partners with our neighbors,” Lou said.

On top of that, China has dangled financial and trade incentives to Central Asia, backing efforts to resurrect the old Silk Road that once carried treasures between China and the Mediterranean.

China is also pushing ahead with various trade pacts in the region, but is not part of negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a 12-nation bloc whose two biggest economies are the United States and Japan.

Not everyone is convinced China’s initiatives will amount to much.

“Some of those things are more about the optics of these issues rather than the realities of a Chinese-led order,” said Matthew Goodman, senior adviser for Asian Economics at the Center for Security and International Studies in Washington.

Washington Watching

China’s foreign policy since the country began economic reforms three decades ago has traditionally followed the maxim of late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping of “hiding ones’ strength and biding ones’ time”, or keeping a low profile.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi earlier this year flagged China’s more assertive regional foreign policy at his annual press conference and in a newspaper article.

“We must accept the role of a responsible major country in international affairs,” Wang wrote.

Asked this week whether China was carrying out its own pivot, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said China was pursuing a policy of good neighborliness.

A senior Obama administration official said Washington was paying close attention to Xi’s approach to Asia.

“We noted his statement at the CICA conference about Asia for Asians, the growing criticism of U.S. alliances and the Asian infrastructure bank,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

“It’s raising serious questions about whether the U.S. vision and the Chinese vision are fully compatible.”

A second senior U.S. official said Washington had not been assured that the infrastructure bank would adopt the high governance and other standards of institutions such as the World Bank and the ADB. He said the administration did not see how such an entity would “add value” for the region and that Washington would be making this point to Asian allies.

While they were not members, the United States and Japan were welcome to join the bank, Lou said.

Top Chinese and U.S. officials will get the chance to discuss the bank and many other issues during annual talks in Beijing on July 9-10, a meeting known as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue.

Forgotten Anniversaries

At the start of the CICA summit, China turned on the pomp, with live television showing Red Flag limousines delivering leaders one by one to a Shanghai conference center where they walked down a red carpet to shake hands with Xi.

Most recently, Xi feted suspicious neighbors India and Burma last Saturday to celebrate the 1954 signing of almost forgotten principles of peaceful coexistence.

He cited Indian Nobel Literature laureate Rabindranath Tagore in a speech to India’s vice president on the 60th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, an early Cold War pledge of peace between China, India and the country then known as Burma.

Xi has gone out of his way to court India, a country which hosts exiled Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama and with which China has a festering border dispute.

Still, China’s messages of peace can come across as ham-fisted to those it’s trying to court.

“China has long engaged in a kind of smile diplomacy in the region but the challenge for China is that many of its neighbors can see the glint of steel beneath the robe,” said Goodman from the CSIS think tank.

Ben Blanchard / Reuters

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ASEAN - China signals its pivot on Asean

When the veteran diplomat, Wang Yi, was appointed the new foreign minister of China recently, there was a sigh of relief within Asean.

His name immediately brought back the good old memories from those who worked closely with Wang, as a senior official, looking after Asia from 1994-2004. When he took over as the deputy chief of Asian Affairs Department in 1994, Asean-China relations were in a shambles and lacked mutual trust due to the dispute in South China Sea over Mischief Reef in early 1995. Their ties plummeted further after Asean jointly deplored China's action in March of that year.

It took a while for Asean to rebuild friendship with China. Beijing's opportunity came during the Asian financial crisis, which began in Thailand and spread to South Korea and Indonesia. With a strong promise not to devalue its currency together with modest financial assistance packages, China has since won friends in Asean and gained stronger economic and political footholds in the region.

Before the current Asean-China tension, there was a high level of goodwill and mutual trust between Asean and China that promoted and deepened their cooperation especially under the various frameworks of Asean Plus Three including the recent concluded the Asean Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Today, China has a total of 43 committees with Asean — the largest number - covering the whole gamut of engagement and cooperation. In contrast, the US has only 33, while India has 23 committees to oversee their cooperation with Asean.

Now, with the new Chinese leaders in place, Beijing's ambivalence during the transition period should be done away. With Wang Yi at the helm, Asean hopes the overall tension with China will subside. In the near future, Asean also wishes that China-Japan relations will improve, as they directly impact on the economic progress and integration in this region. The ambitious Asean Community would never become a reality if the two Asian giants are not on good terms. Indeed, stable and friendly China-Japan relations are a prerequisite for Asean enjoying continued prosperity.

At this juncture, with his diplomatic finesse and discreet negotiating style, Wang seems to be the right person at the right time to push the Asean-China as well as China-Japan ties forward to another level. He was also instrumental in shaping Asean-China relations during the crucial post-Mischief Reef period. An important outcome was the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. As an envoy to Japan during 2004-2007, he helped to improve ties with Tokyo. Before he took over the current position, he served for five years as director of Taiwan Affairs. Relations across the Taiwan Straits have never been better.

Senior officials from Asean and China are scheduled to meet in Beijing on April 2, to consult and discuss overall relations. They may have a chance to pay a courtesy call on the new foreign minister. Although the South China Sea is not on the agenda, both sides are expected to discuss this sensitive issue. A senior Thai official, who is attending the Beijing meeting, has expressed optimism that it would lay the future groundwork for both sides to begin the much awaited process of drafting the code of conduct in the South China Sea. Thailand is the coordinating country for Asean-China relations. Brunei, the Asean chair, has also made clear that one of its top priorities is to reduce the Asean-China tension over the maritime disputes.

Obviously the outcome in Beijing next month will serve as a barometer of China's attitude toward Asean under the new leadership of President Xi Jinping. Wang will work closely with his predecessor Yang Jiechi, who has been promoted to State Councillor responsible for foreign affairs. Together they are considered a foreign policy "dream team" with Yang, who is knowledgeable about the US, focusing on the West, while Wang, who can speak Japanese and is an old Asean hand, is focused on Asia. It is interesting to note that while there is an air of excitement over Wang's appointment in Asean, the newly appointed US State Secretary John Kerry does not stir up any curiosity even though he is a Vietnam veteran. But he has made waves in Europe and the Middle East.

Following the abrupt transformation of Asean-China relations since July 2010 after 15 years of cooperative partnership, China has stepped up its human resources working on Asean, both in Beijing and the Jakarta-based diplomatic mission. With uncertainties lurking ahead over the South China Sea dispute, improving ties with Asean has now become the Middle Kingdom's most urgent foreign policy objective. For decades, China's relations with Asean have been used as an example of how a big and powerful country can coexist with smaller neighbours. Throughout the past three decades of China's modernisation, peaceful coexistence with Southeast Asia has been highlighted as one of China's major foreign policy triumphs. It is incumbent on China to prove that is still valid these days.

By comparison, China has more confidence in handling ties with the US and Japan even though at times they could be very tense and being near the brink of war with the latter over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute. Before the Asean enlargement in 1995, it was easier for China to treat Asean as a group—at the very least there were some like-mindedness. The case in point was China's unwavering support of Asean during the Cambodian conflict. Now the grouping has 10 members, who have different comfort levels with Beijing.

As a result, Beijing is recrafting its relations with individual Asean members —a pivot of sorts, especially towards less hostile members. It remains to be seen how this strategy will play itself out within the overall Asean-China and intra-Asean relations.

Kavi Chongkittavorn

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Japan - Japan pivots south, with eye on China

MANILA - After decades of self-imposed pacifism, Japan is beginning to carve out a new role in regional maritime affairs. Newly elected Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has launched a charm offensive across the Pacific, with Australia, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam among the countries Tokyo is bidding to align against China's rising assertiveness.

Abe has vowed to revisit Japan's pacifist constitution, re-calibrate its security alliance with the United States, and steer the establishment of a so-called "democratic security diamond", a proposed strategic alliance of like-minded Indo-Pacific countries that share similar anxieties about China's growing naval might.

If implemented, Abe's policies will inject Japan into the heart of the intensifying Pacific struggle between Beijing and Washington for maritime regional maritime dominance and stir new concerns, especially in China, over a possible reemergence of Japan's militaristic past.

Japan has already broken with tradition by increasing its defense budget for the first time in 11 years, [1] providing military aid to Cambodia and East Timor, and considering the sale of military equipment such as seaplanes and advanced Soryu submarines to strategic partners such as Vietnam and Australia.

New geopolitics

While Washington is traditionally the first foreign destination for newly elected Japanese leaders, the new Abe administration chose to prioritize southern partners in the Pacific on their international itineraries.

In January, Abe visited Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam, while dispatching Deputy Minister Taro Aso to Myanmar and Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida to Australia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Singapore.

While Japan-China trade has fallen from 18.4% of Tokyo's total exports in 2000 to 11.2% in 2011, exports to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam has risen from 9.7% to 10.9% over the same period, according to a report from the Japan Research Institute. [2]

"Currently, the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region is going through a dynamic change," Abe said in explaining his reasons for choosing Southeast Asia as his first foreign destination. "During this change, having closer relations with ASEAN countries contributes to the region's peace and stability and is in Japan's national interest."

Japan is at the forefront of large-scale industrial investments in liberalizing Myanmar, which is gradually emerging out of China's decades-long patronage through more engagement with the West. Japan's Sumitomo Corporation, Mitsuibishi Corporation, and Marubeni Corporation are set to take a 49% stake in a US$12.6 billion Special Economic Zone (SEZ) situated at Yangon's Thilawa Port, and Japanese companies are heavily involved in other large-scale industrial developments in the country.

Thailand, Japan's regional manufacturing hub with over 8,000 companies situated in the country, is also slated to benefit from a new wave of investments as more small and medium-sized manufacturers look to relocate outside of Japan. The moves come at a time nationalistic protests and spiraling wages threaten and undermine Japan's interests in China.

However, deeper geostrategic considerations are driving Japan's southern pivot, which aims at revitalizing defense relations with old partners to rein in China's assertiveness.

Vietnam, locked in a bitter territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea, is keen to enhance its security ties with major Pacific powers, namely the US, Japan, and Australia. Former Deputy Foreign Minister Le Luong Minh has just taken over as secretary general of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asean Nations, portending a more proactive regional approach to the South China Sea disputes.

Given China's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) vulnerabilities, Vietnam's navy is reportedly considering the purchase of Japan's Soryu stealth diesel-powered submarines, which if procured would dramatically augment Hanoi's ASW capabilities.

Indonesia, ASEAN's informal leader and economic behemoth, has stepped up its bilateral security relations with all major Pacific powers while exploring varying diplomatic means to resolve the disputes in the South China Sea. In recent years, Jakarta has sponsored the establishment of guidelines for a regional code of conduct in the contested areas.

Last year, when ASEAN fell into disarray with China ally Cambodia vigorously blocking efforts at establishing a regional dispute-settlement mechanism in the South China Sea, Indonesia pushed a "Six Point Principles" initiative aimed at diplomatically resolving regional territorial conflicts. In this connection, Abe has found a natural and influential ally in Indonesia, which has also emerged as a major investment destination for Japanese manufacturers.

For Japan, however, the Philippines is perhaps its most like-minded Southeast Asian partner. Similar to Japan, the Philippines is a liberal democratic country and a US treaty ally. Manila has also been at the forefront of regional efforts to deepen US military commitment to the freedom of navigation in the Western Pacific and establish a robust regional approach under the auspices of ASEAN to multilaterally manage the ongoing disputes.

During Kishida's recent trip to the Philippines, Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario said, "We also need to be able to address the possibility that the freedom of navigation would be adversely affected," referring to China's aggressive maneuvering in the disputed territories. His Japanese counterpart agreed, saying, "As the strategic environment is changing, it is necessary for us as foreign ministers to share recognition of the situation."

Along with China, the Philippines bore the brunt of Japanese militarism during World War II, with countless Filipinos falling victim to Japanese cruelty and much of Manila devastated by war. In a telling sign of the Philippines' growing current anxieties with China, Del Rosario said last year he supported a re-armed Japan shorn of its pacifist constitution.

"We are looking for balancing factors in the region, and Japan could be a significant balancing factor," he said last year in an interview with the Financial Times. [3]

In addition to 12 patrol boats promised by the previous Japanese government, [4] Tokyo is finalizing its biggest ever security-related aid package, with 10 cutters worth around $12 million set to be donated to the Philippine Coast Guard. [5]

China counterweight

On the eve of his reemergence as Japan's elected leader, Abe pulled no punches in warning against repeated Chinese incursions in the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

"[Senkakus are Japan's] inherent territory... we don't intend to worsen relations between Japan and China," Abe said in taking a tough line on the ongoing territorial dispute. "China lacks this recognition a little bit. I want them to think anew about mutually beneficial strategic relations." [6]

During his prior premiership in 2006-07, Abe chose China as his first regional destination, underscoring the significance then of booming bilateral economic ties. This time, though, he struck a less sanguine tone on visiting Beijing by stating, "The problem is that harm is being caused to Japanese companies and Japanese nationals in China who are contributing to the Chinese economy and society." [7]

China is likely at the top of Abe's foreign agenda, though not only for economic reasons. Last year, in a controversial essay published before the parliamentary elections, Abe expressed his commitment to forge ahead with a more muscular and assertive foreign policy aimed at containing China and consolidating a regional "democratic security diamond".

"I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the Western Pacific," he wrote. "I am prepared to invest, to the greatest possible extent, Japan's capacities in this security diamond." [8]

During the first round of foreign trips made by Japan's top leaders, Australia was the sole non-ASEAN destination. Canberra's significance lies in its status as the other spoke - together with Japan - in the US-based "hub and spokes" alliance network in the Pacific.

The three Pacific powers - Japan, the US, and Australia - have been in a constant state of interaction and cooperation under the Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD), while the 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation has served as a linchpin in the evolving Japanese-Australian strategic partnership. [9]

Aside from a regular ministerial level (2+2) dialogue, the two countries have signed an intelligence-sharing agreement and Acquisitions and Cross-Serving Agreement in recent years. [10] In terms of enhancing inter-operability, Japan and Australia have conducted joint naval exercises since 2009.

Recognizing India's rising profile in the Pacific, especially given its direct energy investments in Vietnam-controlled disputed waters in the South China Sea, Tokyo has also sought deeper strategic cooperation with New Delhi.

Last year, Japanese and Indian Coast Guards conducted a joint exercise known as "Sahyog Kaijin XI" from India's port of Chennai. The Japanese Coast Guard ship Settsu (PLH-07), two interceptor boats, and eight other coastguard ships participated in the exercise. [11]

Japan's navy is viewed as the main regional counterweight to China, which has rapidly developed its anti-access and blue-water naval capabilities in recent years. Japan has the world's sixth-largest military budget [12], while its navy boasts 48 major surface combatants; two large helicopter-carrying destroyers; an assortment of corvettes, frigates and stealthy diesel-powered submarines (considered best of their kind); and a state-of-the-art Aegis combat system. [13]

The most important country in Abe's "security diamond" is the US. In recent months, the two allies have conducted a series of high-profile joint naval exercises. In November, 47,000 personnel took part in the biennial Keen Sword exercise off Okinawa, originally planned to act out the re-capture of inhabited islands off the southern coast of Japan. [14] This month, Japanese and US fighter jets conducted a five-day air exercise involving six US FA-18 fighters and four Japanese F-4 jets. The exercise took place just days after Japanese jets fended off Chinese aircraft surveying the disputed islands. [15]

In response to the People's Liberation Army's East China Fleet naval exercise last year, which among other things simulated an assault on the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Japan reportedly also conducted a military drill practicing the recapture of similar uninhabited islands. [16]

The Abe administration is not only beginning to assume a larger share of Japan's defense responsibilities, given the US's fiscal woes and strategic prevarications, but is also emerging as a pillar for a broader regional effort to rein in China's territorial assertiveness by reaching out to Pacific partners. It's a strategic pivot that will have profound implications for regional security in the years ahead.

Notes: 
1. Citing China's increasing naval power, Japan seeking closer ties with NATO, Atlantic Council, January 13, 2013.
2. Japan Keeps Its Cool, Foreign Affairs, January 21, 2013.
3. Philippines backs rearming of Japan, Financial Times, December 9, 2012.
4. Philippines to get 12 new patrol boats from Japan, Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 30, 2012.
5. Japan Is Flexing Its Military Muscle to Counter a Rising China, The New York Times, November 26, 2012.
6. Japan election: LDP's Shinzo Abe vows tough China line, BBC News, December 16, 2012.
7. Shinzo Abe's ASEAN Tour Stresses Regional Tension, Atlantic Council, January 16, 2013.
8. Abe advocates 'security diamond' against China, Deutsche Welle, January 21, 2013.
9. Australia and Japan: Allies in the making, EastAsiaForum, July 30, 2011.
10. Two Large Steps for the Australia-Japan Relationship on the Horizon?, Japan Security Watch, September 26, 2012.
11. India-Japan Coast Guards conduct joint exercise, Zeenews.com, January 29, 2012.
12. Japan Is Flexing Its Military Muscle to Counter a Rising China, The New York Times, November 26, 2012.
13. The Sino-Japanese Naval War of 2012, ForeignPolicy.com (subscription only), August 20, 2012.
14.US and Japan begin military drills amid China tension, BBC News, November 5, 2012.
15. Japan, US fighter planes in joint drill: official, Agence-France Presse, January 15, 2013.
16. Japan to hold military drill for recapturing islands, CCTV.Com, January 13, 2013. 

Richard Javad Heydarian

http://www.atimes.com

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Asia - Fool’s Errand: America’s Pivot to Asia

As the U.S. stares down a "fiscal cliff", some are arguing for an increase in defense spending to support America's pivot to Asia. It could however create more problems than it solves.

Turning around a modern naval warship at sea is a slow and difficult process. Turning around whole fleets of warships, aircraft carriers and other air and naval forces, and reorienting defense spending for weapons systems that are typically planned decades in advance, is a lot harder – especially when it’s being done in the context of a widely expected downturn in U.S. military outlays. But that’s what the administration of President Barack Obama is trying to do with the much-touted “pivot” from the Middle East to Asia.

It’s a fool’s errand: far too costly, and politically counterproductive. As an example, already questions are being raised about the $396 billion F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, developed to be the U.S. military’s fighter jet of the future. But the F-35 was designed for a time when the Pentagon was focused on NATO and the Middle East, and according to the New York Times, the F-35 is now “facing concerns about its relatively short flight range as possible threats grow from Asia.”

Even if, somehow, Obama and his new national security team – with a new secretary of state, a new secretary of defense, and a new CIA director in 2013 – can cobble together the cash for a military buildup in Asia, the result of the effort may be to create the very adversary it’s intended to balance. As noted in a March report by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service: “The perception among many that the ‘rebalancing’ is targeted against China could strengthen the hand of Chinese hard-liners. Such an impression could also potentially make it more difficult for the United States to gain China’s cooperation on a range of issues.” And, of course, more expensive.

So far, the administration has taken only baby steps, mostly symbolic, toward an Asian buildup, by rotating contingents of up to 2,500 Marines in Australia, renewing aid to Indonesian paramilitary forces, deploying the U.S. Navy to Singapore, and strengthening military cooperation with the Philippines. But its redoubled interest in finding partners in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, the third tour of the region since June for Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and President Obama’s visit to Myanmar – plus a series of strategic reviews by U.S. national security agencies – signal a vast escalation to come.

If the money is there. As yet, the administration hasn’t put its money where its mouth is: For example, last year Congress zeroed out funding for military construction to expand facilities in Guam. And in an era of trillion-dollar deficits, few in Washington believe that American voters will support greater defense spending if it means cuts to entitlement spending programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security.

Winslow Wheeler, director of the Straus Military Reform Project of the Project On Government Oversight, is a veteran military budget analyst. Asked whether the United States can put together enough money to fund a buildup in Asia, Wheeler says no. “It’s not going to happen,” he says. “It’s that simple. The military budget is going down.” The Pentagon, Wheeler says, cannot afford either more ships and planes or what some people believe is a quick-fix solution, namely, greater use of high-tech, remote-warfare drones, other unmanned vehicles, and long-range options. “It’s all too expensive,” he says.

Sometimes, it appears, administration officials make a little too much of the pivot. In August, Ashton Carter, the U.S. deputy secretary of defense, said in a speech in New York that “we will have a net increase of one aircraft carrier, four destroyers, three Zumwalt destroyers, ten Littoral Combat Ships, and two submarines in the Pacific in the coming years.” In October, Carter said in a speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington that the United States is prepared to spend what it takes, and that other assets will be redirected from the Middle East. “With our allies and partners, I think you’ll see, we are, in fact, across the Asia-Pacific region able to invest to sustain peace and prosperity. In other words, we are not just talking the talk, we are walking the walk. And I’d ask if you don’t believe us, to just watch our steps over coming months and years, and you’ll see us implement the rebalance,” he said. “By 2020, we will have shifted 60 percent of our naval assets to the Pacific. … Naval assets that will be released from Afghanistan and the Middle East include surface combatants, amphibious ships, and, eventually, aircraft carriers.” But an independent study concluded that the United States already has nearly 54 percent of its fleet home-ported in Asia and the Pacific, and that Carter’s touted increase would only raise that number to 57 percent, not 60 percent.

Diplomacy, of course, is cheap. And a big part of the U.S. pivot will rely on military aid and support for partner countries in the region and strengthened alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. But plenty of big-ticket items are involved. According to the CRS study, the United States eliminated a planned cut in the number of aircraft carrier task forces, plans to expand the Navy’s purchases of Aegis-class destroyers and Littoral Combat Ships, build a 33-vessel flotilla for the Marines, and continue production of attack submarines, equipped with a new, high-tech cruise missile.

Even if the looming “fiscal cliff,” which includes automatic cuts in Pentagon spending of up to $600 billion over the next decade – on top of an existing, planned $487 billion reduction – is avoided, there are plenty of questions about whether all this can be sustained. Just maintaining U.S. force levels in Japan and South Korea will be increasingly costly, and there is concern in both countries that the United States might ask them to share more of the cost of those deployments.

In Washington, there is no shortage of calls to expand the navy and the air force to prepare for a stepped-up presence in Asia and the Pacific. Patrick Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, has written, “The United States must move in the direction of the 346-ship fleet recommended by the bipartisan Quadrennial Defense Review independent panel or face the danger of slipping from the present 284 combatant ships to a fleet of just 250 warships. Otherwise, it will lack the balance of power needed to credibly control — or at least defend — access to the sea lines of communication in and around the South China Sea, through which about half of all global maritime commerce passes.” Cronin recently told the Washington Times that the Obama administration has “articulated the pivot without considering the real resources that it would require.”

Wheeler agrees. “The idea of a 300-ship navy is a delusion,” he says.

Members of a coalition of conservative, pro-defense think tanks called Defending Defense – including the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Foreign Policy Initiative – accuse the Obama administration of massively underfunding its pivot to Asia.

A pair of analysts writing for the Heritage Foundation say that at a minimum the United States must greatly expand the navy, air force and marine corps. with a long list of costly items: a new, long-range next-generation bomber, reopening production of F-22 combat aircraft, slowing the retirement of 300 aircraft from fighter squadrons, and building a wide assortment of naval ships, aircraft carriers, and submarines. Without significant increases in military outlays, they write, “The Obama Administration’s Asia Pivot represents a strategy of hope: a hope that large-scale wars are a thing of the past; a hope that America’s allies will do more; and a hope that fewer resources do not jeopardize the lives of American soldiers. The much-vaunted Asia Pivot represents a shift in focus—not in forces.”

During the just-concluded presidential campaign in the United States, Mitt Romney accused President Obama of cutting defense spending too sharply, and Obama shot back that Romney was seeking “$2 trillion in additional military spending that the military hasn’t asked for.” Now that the campaign is over, and America is faced with intense fiscal pressures, what is the likelihood that the White House will ask for more funding for its pivot to Asia and, if it does, what are the chances that Congress will go along. According to Douglas Macgregor, a retired army colonel who has written frequently on facilities from defense spending, “Increased defense spending to expand and modernize military Alaska to Guam won’t make much sense to voters who fear the country is in a fiscal ‘free fall.’ Moreover, there is no reason to assume lawmakers and the next President will cooperate at all after November.”

Robert Dreyfuss

http://thediplomat.com

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Singapore - New chapter in Obama's Asia pivot

President Barack Obama's upcoming trip to Southeast Asia marks the beginning of a new phase in the United States' strategic "pivot" towards the Asia-Pacific, senior administration officials said yesterday.

This will mean increased efforts to strengthen alliances, deepen engagement with regional institutions and promote democracy and human rights - elements which will feature prominently in Obama's visit to Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia beginning Sunday.

"It is telling that Asia will be the first trip that the President makes since his re-election (last week)," US National Security Adviser Tom Donilon told a forum here on Thursday.

"It sends a powerful statement that the Asia-Pacific will continue to be a strategic priority in his second term, as it was in his first term."

The Obama administration began its outreach to the region within weeks of assuming power in 2009, dispatching top diplomat Hillary Clinton to Asia on her inaugural trip. But the pivot, or "strategic rebalancing" towards the region as most officials prefer to call it, was not formally introduced until late last year.

The region welcomed Washington's decision to shift resources and attention away from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan towards the Asia-Pacific, but was unsure if the nascent policy would survive the presidential election.

Obama won a second term last Tuesday after defeating his Republican rival Mitt Romney, and looks set to make his Asia policy a major part of his legacy.

One of Obama's top foreign policy advisers, Ben Rhodes, said in a conference call on Thursday: "Continuing to fill in our pivot to Asia will be a critical part of the President's second term and, ultimately, his foreign policy legacy.

"We see this as an opportunity to dramatically increase US exports, to increase US leadership in the fastest-growing part of the world and in advancing our values and interests, which this trip is designed to do."

In Thailand, where Obama begins his fifth visit to Asia in four years, the President aims to shore up ties with America's oldest ally in South-east Asia. He will have an audience with the Thai King and hold a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra.

In Myanmar, US officials said Obama is looking to further encourage the political reforms which have swept the Southeast Asian country since last year. He will also hold meetings with President Thein Sein as well as opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

He will cap his visit in Cambodia, where he will hold talks with Asean leaders and attend the annual East Asia Summit (EAS) which Phnom Penh is hosting this year. He will meet outgoing Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda.

The decision to commit to the EAS meetings came after some debate in the White House, said Donilon, adding: "We reached the decision this way: You are either all in or you're not with respect to this strategy. And the President said the United States is all in.

"You can either look at these institutions and wait for them to perfect themselves, or you can participate on the ground and help these institutions achieve (their) goals."

There have been criticisms, however, that the US pivot strategy and its renewed engagement in the region are aimed at keeping China in check. Senior US officials refuted those assertions yesterday, maintaining that its broad interests in the region go beyond areas of competition with China.

"US policy in Asia is about US interests. It's not about China," said Danny Russel, senior director for Asia at the National Security Council.

"Our objective is to shape the environment in the Asia-Pacific region in which the peaceful rise of important countries, including China, contributes to the common good, is fundamentally stabilising and not destabilising, and in which every party can contribute to the work at hand."

Chua Chin Hon

 
The Straits Times

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