The ongoing standoff between the Philippines
and China raises troubling questions about the response to Chinese territorial
assertiveness in the South China Sea.
The
ongoing naval standoff between China and the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal
clearly indicates the difficulties in constraining Beijing from unilaterally
asserting its “indisputable sovereignty” over all of the islands, rocks, and
adjacent waters in the South China Sea. The reality is that China’s actions in
prolonging the standoff are a portent of the difficulties that the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will face in trying to constrain China by
negotiating a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
The
current standoff began early last month, when the Philippines dispatched the
naval frigate BRP Gregorio del Pilar to investigate an earlier sighting of
several Chinese fishing boats in the lagoon at Scarborough Shoal. An armed
boarding party from the frigate discovered that one of the fishing boats
contained large amounts of giant clams, coral, and live sharks that appeared to
have been illegally harvested from waters lying within the Philippines’
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Two
unarmed China Marine Surveillance (CMS) vessels interposed themselves between
the fishermen and the frigate, thus precipitating the standoff. China and the
Philippines proceeded to trade diplomatic protests over this incident. In an
effort to diffuse tensions, the Philippines replaced the navy frigate with the
Coast Guard cutter BRP Edsa
China,
meanwhile, reinforced its presence by dispatching an armed Fishery Law Enforcement
Command (FLEC) ship to relieve one of the CMS vessels. The Chinese fishing
boats later slipped away with their catch. On April 20, China further
reinforced its presence at Scarborough Shoal with the arrival of its most
advanced FLEC ship, Yuzheng 310.
Both
China and the Philippines claim sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal and argue
that that it’s an integral part of their national territory. Under the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a rock is entitled to a 12 nautical
mile territorial sea. The Philippines further claims that the waters
surrounding Scarborough Shoal fall within its 200 nautical mile EEZ.
The
Philippines has invited China to join it in submitting claims to the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea for arbitration. This is an
inappropriate forum, however, as the Tribunal can only decide matters of
maritime jurisdiction, not questions of sovereignty which need to be solved
first.
China’s
claim to sovereignty rests on historic rights arising from prior discovery. The
Philippines, on the other hand, bases its claims to sovereignty on intermittent
occupation and continual administration since independence. This matter could
be decided bilaterally by China and the Philippines or by an international
court if both parties agree. Neither prospect seems likely given that the
Philippines refuses to negotiate bilaterally and China refuses to place the
matter before an international court.
The
Philippines has thus turned to ASEAN and the United States for support. But the
standoff over Scarborough Shoal has provoked a domestic outcry and made it
abundantly clear that the Philippines holds misconceived expectations over the
roles that ASEAN and the U.S. can play.
ASEAN
divisions over how to best handle sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea
date back over a decade. ASEAN members and China first began negotiations on
sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea in 2000. Even at this juncture, the
Philippines pushed strongly for a Code of Conduct (COC) to constrain China’s “creeping
assertiveness,” but failed to gather sufficient support from its fellow ASEAN
members and consequentially had to accept a watered down version in the form of
the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).
The DOC
is merely a non-binding political statement calling on parties to undertake
confidence building measures and cooperative activities pending the settlement
of sovereignty disputes. Moreover, progress on implementing the DOC didn’t
occur until last summer when China and the ASEAN member states finally adopted
guidelines to implement the DOC. Even still, progress has been limited to
setting up four expert working groups (marine environmental protection; marine
scientific research; search and rescue operation; and transnational crime) and
planning future workshops. Even a fifth proposed cooperative activity on safety
of navigation and communication at sea proved too contentious an issue for
China and ASEAN members to agree upon.
The
2002 DOC took note of the Code of Conduct and pledged that the parties would
“work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this
objective.” With the adoption of the DOC Guidelines in 2011, the proposal for a
more legally binding COC resurfaced.
In
2011, ASEAN senior officials began drafting a COC with the intention of
presenting a final agreed upon draft to China for discussion. When ASEAN
foreign ministers met in Cambodia in January 2012, however, it quickly became
apparent that they were divided over three Filipino proposals. The first of
these called for an ASEAN-sponsored meeting between China and the claimant
states. The other two proposals advocated including provisions in the COC that
would distinguish betweendisputed areas and non-disputed areas in the South
China Sea and establishing a dispute settlement mechanism.
Internal
ASEAN divisions also resurfaced at the 20th ASEAN Summit held in Phnom Penh
from April 3 to 4 under the chairmanship of Cambodia. Prior to the summit,
Chinese President Hu Jintao made a high-profile visit to Cambodia, where he
made clear to Prime Minister Hun Sen that Beijing opposed holding talks on a
binding Code of Conduct too quickly.
Whether
acting under Chinese inducement or not, Cambodia, as ASEAN chair, reportedly
removed formal discussion of the South China Sea from the summit agenda. The
Philippines and Vietnam objected and pressed their case at a meeting of ASEAN
foreign ministers held the day before the summit and again at the summit
itself.
The
main area of disagreement at last month’s summit, however, was over the timing
of China’s inclusion in the COC drafting process. At the pre-summit meeting,
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa argued that ASEAN should “listen
and…hear what China’s views are so that we can really develop a position that
is cohesive and coherent.” Cambodia supported this proposal.
On the
other hand, Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs del Rosario stated: “We’re
saying that we’re happy to invite China but this should be done after the
approval of the COC (by ASEAN). I think that we should be masters of our own
destiny as far as the COC is concerned,” adding that Vietnam expressed a
similar sentiment. Del Rosario also made clear that as long as the Philippines
and Vietnam objected, ASEAN would find it difficult to reach consensus on
including China’s early in the drafting process.
The
Philippines and Vietnam also rejected outright a Chinese proposal to set up a
ten-member group of experts and eminent statesmen that would help propose
solutions. Other ASEAN members, particularly Indonesia, objected to the
Philippines’ proposal to include a dispute settlement mechanism in the draft
COC.
These
disagreements were revisited at the ASEAN Summit itself. On the first day,
President Benigno Aquino argued that it was “important we maintain ASEAN
centrality” and ASEAN should meet with China on the draft COC only after it has
been finalized by ASEAN members.
South
China Sea issues were then taken up at the informal ASEAN Leaders’ retreat held
on the last day of the summit. The gist of these discussions were summarized in
the Chairman’s Statement issued after the summit under the heading South China
Sea: “We reaffirmed…to move for the eventual realization of a regional code of
conduct (COC)” and “stressed the need to intensify efforts to ensure the
effective and full implementation of the DOC based on the Guidelines for the
implementation of the DOC.”
At a
post-summit press conference, Indonesia’s foreign minister revealed that a
compromise on China’s participation had been reached. According to Marty
Natalegawa: “This is not necessarily a neat sequential process isn’t it. Of
course, ASEAN… first and foremost, must have a solid consolidated position. But
at the same time as we proceed, there will be constant communication through
the ASEAN-China framework, so that whatever final position ASEAN comes up with
will have benefited from having some kind of communication with China.”
The
standoff at Scarborough Shoal occurred less than a week after the ASEAN Summit.
China’s actions produced a strong domestic reaction in the Philippines. Key
Filipino senators and congressmen were critical of ASEAN and the United States
for not initially supporting the Philippines. Sen. Joker Arroyo stated, for example,
“not even a resolution of concern or of sympathy” had been issued by ASEAN. “We
are left to fend for ourselves. What happened to us? We’re like orphans…without
allies. That’s our dilemma.”
Arroyo’s
remarks, which were echoed by many of his colleagues, reveal the Philippines’
misconceived expectations about the role of ASEAN and the United States. Not
only is ASEAN divided on the issue, but several of its members are critical of
the Philippines handling of its dispute with China. One Malaysian commentator
has gone so far as to assert that the Philippines hijacked the ASEAN Summit.
And
while the Philippines and the United States are treaty allies, their bilateral
Mutual Defense Treaty can only be invoked when “the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by
external armed attack in the Pacific.”So far, China has refrained from the use
or threat of force and U.S. policy is to not take sides in territorial
disputes, although the U.S. today reaffirmed its commitment to mutual defense
with the Philippines.
The
Scarborough Shoal standoff reveals that China’s continual assertion of
“indisputable sovereignty” in the South China Sea based on historic rights
provides little basis for resolving disputes according to international law.
ASEAN’s
single minded focus on implementing the DOC’s confidence building measures and
cooperative activities, meanwhile, simply doesn’t address the security
challenges posed by Chinese assertiveness. A Code of Conduct that doesn’t
identify the areas in dispute and which contains no enforcement mechanism will
not constrain China from acting unilaterally.
Both
the DOC and COC are premised on maintenance of the status quo until sovereignty
disputes are resolved. This is a false premise as long as China unilaterally
responds to any activity it objects to within its nine-dash line ambit claim to
the South China Sea. And, whatever Philippine expectations might be, its Mutual
Defense Treaty with the United States is not an appropriate instrument to
respond to China’s tactics of using civilian paramilitary ships and
intimidation to enforce its sovereignty claims.
Carlyle
A. Thayer
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