The bloc continues to be hamstrung by a lack of leadership. Could
Indonesia step up?
ASEAN is riding high. It recently held a successful
summit. Myanmar’s ascension to the leadership mantle is a sign the country is
moving in a positive direction, reflecting well on the entire Southeast Asian
bloc of countries. Relative to other parts of the world, ASEAN countries are
robust economic performers. Indeed, according to the OECD, ASEAN economies are
tipped to grow more than five percent over the next five years, with Indonesia
leading the way at more than six percent growth. The oft-discussed and
much-anticipated ASEAN Economic Community is supposed to come into existence in
2015. An increasingly confident ASEAN has waded into hot-button issues like the
maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas. And above all, with all of
the attention ASEAN has received from China, the U.S., India and Japan, it has
seen its global profile and standing rise markedly.
Still, it isn’t entirely smooth sailing for ASEAN. The
regional body has a number of issues it needs to address going forward. It must
shrink the development gaps between the most and least economically successful
countries within the bloc. It will have to respond to disasters like the deadly
typhoon Haiyan, and environmental problems, such as pollution and the haze. ASEAN
must find a way to improve its record on human rights. It must do a better job
at acting as a troubleshooter on issues like regional maritime disputes.
Probably most importantly, ASEAN has to weather the rise of China, which is
problematic on a number of levels. Let’s explore the last issue – the rise of
China – in more detail.
A dominant, assertive China impacts security relations
in Southeast Asia. It has already raised the ire of the Philippines, caused
concern in Vietnam, and put the rest of the region on notice. To dampen these
prevailing views in ASEAN capitals, China has tried to cozy up to member
countries, signing all sorts of cooperative agreements. But the story doesn’t
end there. The rise of China has stoked concern in Japan, the U.S. and India,
all of which worry about their places within the region. India and Japan have
ramped up their military hardware and budgets. And the U.S., with its so-called
pivot, has decided to place more military assets in Asia, particularly in East
Asia. Moreover, like China, all three powers have made vigorous attempts to woo
ASEAN members.
All of this can have a deeply profound impact on the
regional bloc. Great power politics, with the major powers in the region
dominating media attention and government agendas throughout Southeast Asia,
threatens to relegate ASEAN itself to irrelevance, just a talking workshop for
bureaucrats and diplomats. ASEAN has to be careful about being pushed aside,
viewed as an afterthought to the key issues and actors in the region. The bloc
must also be vigilant about being bullied into submission by much stronger
military and economic powers.
Great power politics also raises the chance that ASEAN
could get pulled apart and polarized, fractured into competing sides. China
already has Cambodia in its back pocket, and, under Xi Jinping, is actively
courting the remaining ASEAN countries. The U.S. has the Philippines on its
side, has made great strides in wooing Vietnam, and has taken the lead in
trying to get Myanmar to lean towards the West. Meanwhile, both China and the
U.S. view Indonesia as a giant prize, as both have invested considerable time
and attention and resources on Jakarta.
And don’t forget Japan and India. In an effort to find
new allies to balance against China, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has
visited all ten member countries since he returned to office. In particular,
Japan has taken steps to strengthen its relations with Vietnam and the
Philippines, two countries that, like Japan, have maritime disputes with China.
Meantime, with a heavy emphasis on economic, business and cultural ties, ASEAN
is the center of India’s “look east” policy. And the ASEAN-India relationship
is on an upward swing, being upgraded to a “Strategic Partnership” just last
December.
As India, China, Japan and the U.S. pull and stretch
ASEAN in all sorts of directions, who or what within ASEAN can help it respond?
And how can ASEAN contain the extent of the damage (such as reduced regional
cooperation, more regional disagreements, regional hostilities, and a weak and
ineffective ASEAN) that results from the four powers attempting to divide the
bloc up into parts?
How ASEAN, as an entity, responds to the rise of
China, as well as any of the other issues and problems it faces, is in part a
function of the makeup of the ASEAN member countries.
As pointed out by Endy Bayuni, an expert on Indonesian
affairs, the group’s members are a somewhat motley collection of countries.
Indeed, within ASEAN, political systems run the gamut from more or less
authoritarianism (Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos), forms of semi-democracy
(Myanmar, Singapore and Malaysia), struggling democracy (Thailand) to
consolidated democracy (the Philippines and Indonesia).
This means the bloc isn’t particularly cohesive.
States have different interests and self-identity, all of which bleeds into
policy. In this kind of environment, it is hard to agree on matters and get
deals done, and when they are sealed, they are usually reactive in nature and
scope.
Additionally, ASEAN lacks a major player with the
bloc. Instead, what we have are mostly middle powers and developing countries.
Some might suggest that having countries roughly on the same plane is a good
thing. The downside, though, is that there isn’t a leader to mobilize support
and action within the group. As a result, ASEAN is often rudderless, aimless.
Indonesia bills itself as a leader within ASEAN, and
it has done some good things. It has been a key dispute mediator within the
bloc, as its role in resolving intra-ASEAN disputes at the 2012 ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting attests. Its economy powers growth throughout ASEAN
countries. Its democracy, while far from perfect, is a model for other ASEAN
countries struggling through authoritarianism or democratic transitions. Its
commitment to peace and cooperation has helped to create stability in Southeast
Asia.
Indonesia has also been a source of interesting
foreign policy ideas for the region. Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has
coined his strategic vision for Southeast Asia and Asia more generally as
“dynamic equilibrium.” The term nicely captures how Indonesia and other ASEAN
members would like international political relations in Southeast Asia to look
and operate: increasingly integrative, cooperative and peaceful.
In a 2010 speech at the Council on Foreign Relations,
Natalegawa argued that he sees dynamic equilibrium as “not quite in a classic
balance-of-power situation where not one country is preponderant in our region,
but in a more holistic and a more hopefully positive sense, in the sense that
we don’t wish to see our region dominated by one country, whoever that country
is, but we wish to see inclusivity, more countries, the merrier – the more, the
merrier; and for countries to be engaged in multisectoral issues, not only
security but also political and also environment, economic, social-cultural, et
cetera.”
Unfortunately, Indonesia often acts passively and
seeks to avoid controversy, within and beyond ASEAN, which means that it
doesn’t give ASEAN the kind of steady leadership it needs on tough issues. For
instance, it is hard to envision Indonesia standing up to China on its maritime
claims and pressing Beijing to begin negotiating in earnest on a code of
conduct for the South China Sea. Sure, economic ties with China will inevitably
restrain Indonesia’s desire to get tough with Beijing. But beyond that,
Indonesia is reluctant to exert the kind of pressure on China that’s needed at
times.
Because Indonesia, or any other ASEAN member for that
matter, isn’t strong enough or willing enough to defend and advance ASEAN
interests and coordinate a unified foreign policy, those jobs inevitably fall
to the Chair and the Secretariat. Unfortunately, those aren’t good options. The
Secretariat doesn’t have the kind of power needed to break deadlocks and
stimulate change. And the Chair, as was the case when Cambodia held the spot in
2012, can be swayed and influenced by outside powers.
If Indonesia wants to be the leader that it thinks
that it is – and that the bloc desperately needs – then it needs to step up its
game and fill the power vacuum that exists within the bloc. This doesn’t mean
that it has to throw its weight around Southeast Asia, or flex its economic or
military muscles. Instead, it can take the initiative by proactively putting
ideas to solve the host of problems and difficulties that plague ASEAN – both
the institution and its member countries – into action and galvanizing domestic
and regional support. This requires political will and persuasive skills,
attributes compatible with Indonesia’s preference for conflict avoidance,
inter-state policy coordination and regional consensus building.
Alas, with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s term in office
soon to end and a new parliament ready to take power, change in Indonesia’s
role within ASEAN is unlikely to be imminent. It will be up to the next set of
leaders to decide whether to take Indonesia in a more proactive direction.
Whichever direction they decide for Indonesia, let’s hope they recognize what’s
at stake for ASEAN and Indonesia.
Brad Nelson
Brad Nelson is president and co-founder of Center for World Conflict and
Peace, a research organization, and is also a lecturer in international
relations at Saint Xavier University starting January 2014. He can be found on
Twitter @BNNelson74.
Business & Investment Opportunities
Saigon Business Corporation Pte Ltd (SBC) is incorporated
in Singapore since 1994.
No comments:
Post a Comment