As Myanmar experiments with a new democratic system, several new
political forces have emerged that are shifting the country's previous
military-dominated course. Beyond the myriad ethnic minority groups, four
different mainstream forces are redefining the country's international
relations, perhaps most crucially with neighboring China.
The new political power centers include the government
led by President Thein Sein; the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)
steered by parliamentary head Shwe Mann; the military commanded by senior
general Min Aung Hlaing, and the democratic opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi.
China is now building separate and distinct relations
with each of the four mentioned groups. Understanding China's policies toward
each group is thus key to accurately assessing Beijing's broader country
strategy and internal calculations.
On the formal government level, China and Myanmar seem
to have smoothed over many of their previous problems. Those issues came to the
fore in 2011, coincident with a warming trend in diplomatic relations with the
West. Now, after China's strong intervention on the Kachin rebel issue in early
2013, border tranquility has been mostly restored. Thein Sein's government has
meanwhile agreed to the resumption of the locally opposed Letpadaung copper
mine, while a solution to the suspended US$3.6 billion Myitsone dam is under
negotiation.
Thein Sein visited China in April for the annual Boao
Forum and met with new Chinese leader Xi Jinping. He also met with Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang in October during the East Asia Summit. In public, bilateral
ties seem even-keeled, with officials and state media on both sides regularly
extolling the historical friendship. (Myanmar's now unfettered private media
has more critically assessed the bilateral relationship.)
Those friendly official portrayals, however, conceal a
more tepid bilateral reality. Most strikingly, Chinese leaders have recently
dropped Myanmar from their regional itineraries. For instance, no member of the
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) has visited Myanmar since their
inauguration in November 2012.
During China's regional charm offensive this fall,
President Xi and Premier Li paid back-to-back visits to five of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries, namely Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, along with visits to Cambodia and Singapore by
PBSC members Liu Yunshan and Zhang Gaoli, respectively. Since his inauguration
in March, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has made six trips to eight
different Southeast Asian countries, barring only Myanmar and the Philippines.
On the economic front, relations have recently cooled.
Compared with fiscal year 2011, Chinese direct investment to Myanmar fell by
more than 90% to US$407 million over the same period in 2012. Large Chinese
state-owned enterprises have historically been the largest investors in
Myanmar, but the suspension of certain Chinese projects and policy uncertainty
have sapped that earlier enthusiasm. As Chinese investments in Myanmar have
slowed, commitments to other Southeast Asian countries have accelerated.
While Beijing has clearly been irked by Thein Sein's
government and certain of its policies, the negativity does not necessarily
extend to the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). That's
because Beijing believes Thein Sein, rather than the USDP, is mainly
responsible for the policy shifts that have undermined China's substantial
interests in the country.
China is hopeful that the USDP will remain a
China-friendly political force and discreetly praises the political strength
and ambitions of Shwe Mann, the present USDP chairman and speaker of the Lower
House. Chinese analysts privately perceive him as the most likely winner of the
presidency in the 2015 elections. To this end, Beijing has been eager to
cultivate close relations with him and assist the USDP in capacity building.
Opposition outreach
In a clear political hedge, China is also working to
build a better relationship with Myanmar's democratic opposition and civil
society groups. Their rising political influence especially that of National
League for Democracy (NLD) leader Suu Kyi, has been demonstrated in both
domestic and foreign policies.
China has extended olive branches to the democratic
opposition since late 2011.
Ambassadors from Bangkok have held a series of
unprecedented meetings with Suu Kyi, while Chinese officials, scholars and
companies have begun to engage the political opposition and civil society
groups. As a part of this diplomatic outreach, dozens of groups of Myanmar
journalists, civil society leaders and political parties have been invited to
visit China, including delegations from the NLD.
Whether and how to invite Suu Kyi for a formal visit
to China is still a nettlesome question for Chinese policy-makers. As a global
pro-democracy icon, Suu Kyi symbolizes values that are out of step with China's
prevailing authoritarian order. Her fellow Nobel Peace Prize laureates the
Dalai Lama and Liu Xiaobo are both considered "enemies of the state"
in China. Some policy-makers even believe a Suu Kyi visit could spark social
uncertainty and political instability inside China.
As Suu Kyi evolves from pro-democracy icon to
mainstream politician, such concerns are gradually lifting in Beijing. China
now views Suu Kyi as making decisions based on political need rather than
idealistic principle, including her decision to support the continuation of the
controversial China-invested Letpadaung copper mine and her refraining from
critical comment on the politically sensitive issue of Rohingyas, a minority
Muslim ethnic group that has been subject to racial attacks by Buddhist Burmese.
Suu Kyi has also publicly indicated her support for a
robust relationship with China, helping to mitigate somewhat Beijing's concern
about her future international alignment choices. Many Chinese analysts now see
Suu Kyi as seeking China's support for her bid for the presidency in 2015,
which at present she is constitutionally barred from serving. Some Chinese
analysts believe Beijing will extend a formal invitation for her to visit the
country in her official capacity as an opposition politician some time in 2014.
Among all the political forces jockeying for position
in Myanmar's new political order, the military is perhaps the most
China-friendly group. This is partially a legacy of China's special
relationship with the previous military government and strong personal ties
with individual generals who wielded influence before 2011. These special ties
are strengthened by certain shared political values and common economic
interests.
In Beijing's view, there are few problems in
military-to-military ties. Despite the tepid political and economic relations
at the government level, senior military exchanges and visits have been robust
in 2013. In January, for instance, the Deputy Chief of Staff of China's
People's Liberation Army, Qi Jianguo, co-chaired the first Sino-Myanmar
strategic security consultation with Myanmar's Deputy Commander-in-Chief Vice
Senior General Soe Win.
Fan Changlong, Vice Chair of the Central Military
Commission, China's supreme military organ, visited Myanmar in July. These
visits were reciprocated by a trip to Beijing by the Myanmar military's
commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing in October to meet with top Chinese leaders.
Democratic reforms in Myanmar have apparently not affected bilateral Chinese
arms sales, training and military assistance.
China's differentiated approaches and policies toward
different political power centers in Myanmar indicate a more sophisticated
country strategy and nuanced diplomacy. After two years of relative
disorientation and confusion, China is now actively catching up with Myanmar's
new political reality.
Yun Sun
Yun Sun is a Fellow in the East Asia program at the Stimson Center, a
nonprofit and nonpartisan think tank that studies peace and security challenges
around the world.
Business & Investment Opportunities
Saigon Business Corporation Pte Ltd (SBC) is incorporated
in Singapore since 1994.
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