The
colossal multinational humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) effort in the
aftermath of Super Typhoon Haiyan aptly highlights the utility of naval forces;
in particular large amphibious landing ships (LALS). Unlike fixed-wing air
transports that often have to rely on prepared airstrips – which may not always
be available in a disaster zone – naval forces can be deployed off the coasts
to disembark personnel and materiel onto the affected areas using small,
shallow-draft landing craft and helicopters. Such utility was demonstrated
during the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004.
International
media have carried images of extra-regional navies involved in the HADR
operations. The aircraft carrier U.S.S. George Washington spearheaded
the initial American effort. Meanwhile, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
deployed JDS Ise, one of its 18,000-ton Hyuga-class
helicopter destroyers as well as the slighter smaller landing platform dock
(LPD) JDS Osumi.
In
contrast, the ASEAN navies were largely absent. Excluding the Philippines, to
date only Brunei and Thailand have deployed warships to assist in the HADR, but
these pale in comparison to the ships furnished by the extra-regional navies.
ASEAN
Naval HADR Limitations
It
would seem that the overall HADR capacity shortfalls of the ASEAN navies
resulted in a muted ASEAN collective response to the disaster via the ASEAN
Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) mechanism
promulgated in 2005.
ASEAN
navies are deemed small, “light” fleets optimized for littoral surveillance and
defense with sealift capabilities relegated to secondary importance. They
comprise mainly patrol vessels and fast attack craft save for a handful of
frigates, the largest type displacing no more than 4,300-ton at full load, as
well as even smaller corvettes.
Their
small physical sizes impose capacity constraints on their ability to execute
large-scale HADR operations. For example, the Philippine Navy’s new BRP Ramon
Alcaraz, a 3,353-ton ex-U.S. Coast Guard cutter, delivered less than 125
tons of materiel in a single sortie for her maiden HADR effort.
Moreover,
such vessels typically carry a couple of tiny rigid-hull inflatable boats
(RHIBs) that are useful for vessel boarding, search and seizure operations but
are unable to transport significant personnel and materiel onto the beaches in
disaster zones.
Given
that not all ships of the small ASEAN frigate force combined can be operational
at any one time, the HADR capacity shortfalls are further magnified, even more
so when this limited force has other pressing missions (as in the case of
Indonesia and Thailand).
In the
aftermath of a major disaster, when the inflow of massive amounts of HADR
materiel and the swift evacuation of disaster victims are deemed critical,
especially where paved runways discount the utility of fixed-wing air
transports, the best platform will be LALS of the landing ship, tank (LST)
category and above.
Typically
sporting voluminous capacity, high endurance and versatility, LALS also carry
at least one or two medium-sized helicopters and landing craft – significantly
larger than RHIBs carried onboard frigates – besides other specialized
shipboard equipment and facilities for the rapid evacuation and transfer of significant
aid in the disaster zones.
Despite
their obvious utility in HADR operations, however, only a few ASEAN navies
muster significant LALS capabilities. The Philippine Navy, once boasting one of
Southeast Asia’s most sizeable sealift capacities, has seen its LALS fleet
steadily fall into a state of disrepair.
Only a
pair of U.S.-built, 4,265-ton Bacolod City-class LSTs can be deemed
current and these were likely overworked in the Haiyan HADR efforts. Indonesia
acquired five modern South Korean-built, 11,583-ton Makassar-class
LPDs, one of which was outfitted as a hospital ship, after the 2004 tsunami.
However,
the bulk of its LALS fleet is made up of vintage American and East German ships
with questionable operational readiness.
Malaysia’s
sole ex-American LPD – the 8,450-ton KD Sri Inderapura – was
decommissioned after a serious fire onboard in 2010 and no long-term
replacement has been found since. Singapore has four 8,500-ton Endurance-class
LPDs which acquitted themselves well during the 2004 tsunami. However, these
ships are noticeably absent in the Haiyan HADR efforts.
They
are likely confined to a reduced operating tempo and servicing “down-times”
after years of intense involvement in international security operations.
With the decommissioning of older ships, Thailand’s LALS fleet is smaller, with
a pair of LSTs and one Singapore-built LPD HTMS Ang Thong. Vietnam
possesses a handful of vintage Soviet- and American-built LSTs with dubious
operational statuses.
Sealift
Capabilities
The
2004 tsunami did spur regional interest in LALS for HADR operations but
procurements have been uneven, with Indonesia and to a lesser extent Thailand
making substantial moves ever since. For most part of the history of post-Cold
War ASEAN naval modernization efforts, acquisition of LALS has been relegated
to secondary importance compared to conventional warfighting and surveillance
assets. This reflects overarching concerns over transnational maritime security
challenges in waters of and surrounding Southeast Asia.
Recent
security developments have merely reinforced this procurement pattern. Notably,
a pair of tanker hijacking cases reported in the October-November period in the
Malacca Strait and the South China Sea prompted concerns of resurgent pirate
attacks in the region. The Indonesian Navy continues to be preoccupied with
addressing a complex range of transnational maritime security issues, most
lately being the boat refugee problem in waters bordering Australia. Malaysia
has diverted a sizeable chunk of her maritime forces towards the maintenance of
East Sabah Security Zone against illegal infiltration and in the South China
Sea.
Indonesia
ordered seven LSTs to be built in local shipyards in 2010, but nothing further
has been heard since, whereas the acquisition of submarines and locally built
patrol and fast attack craft has been prioritized. Malaysia and the Philippines
were cognizant of their inherent LALS weaknesses, but so far their respective
Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS) and Strategic Sealift Vessel (SSV) programs have
been either stuck in limbo for lack of funds (in stark contrast to the
Second-Generation Patrol Vessel program) or are only in the initial process of
bidding. There are no known further expansion plans for Singapore and
Thailand’s LALS fleets while Vietnam’s near-term naval modernization remains
fixed on strengthening conventional warfighting capabilities.
Because
of the diverse and complex range of maritime security interests, ASEAN naval
modernization will continue to be characterized by discrete, often
uncoordinated national capacity-building efforts. An ASEAN-wide coordinated
naval acquisition framework is out of the question, at least for the
foreseeable future. It is on this basis that ASEAN navies simply cobble
together whichever available national assets in response to contingencies, as
was observed back in December 2004. The relative absence of ASEAN navies in
Typhoon Haiyan HADR efforts reflects this ominous shortfall in their collective
HADR capacity. Simply depending only on a handful of ASEAN navies to furnish
LALS capabilities is not sustainable in the future and insufficient to
operationalize the seaborne pillar of AADMER.
Capacity-Building
It is
likely that the scale of devastation of future natural calamities may equal or
exceed that of Typhoon Haiyan. For the foreseeable future, it may be necessary
for ASEAN navies to revisit their capacity-building efforts with an eye towards
strengthening niche LALS capabilities to cope with such contingencies, beyond
the assets offered by extra-regional navies.
To
bolster the collective ASEAN seaborne HADR capacity, further discussion and
coordination within the AADMER framework is crucial to facilitate national
capacity-building efforts and augment existing LALS capabilities mainly fielded
by Indonesia and Singapore. Malaysia and the Philippines will certainly
contribute significantly to this pool of assets when their respective MRSS and
SSV programs reach fruition. The question is whether the political commitment
and funds are there.
External
agencies and partners may also explore the feasibility of providing technical
and fiscal assistance to building up ASEAN navies’ seaborne HADR capacity.
Typically cash-strapped ASEAN navies may consider unique, cost-effective
solutions such as the acquisition of large, versatile, multi-functional ships
that embody modular mission-tailored concepts, rather than having to procure
separate types of warships optimized for only certain specialist roles. The
Royal Danish Navy’s Absalon-class Flexible Support Ship is one
example of how small navies can harness limited defense dollars to fulfill a
diverse range of constabulary missions, including counter-piracy and HADR
operations, using fewer numbers of but highly versatile multi-functional ships.
Typhoon
Haiyan is an opportune moment for ASEAN navies to reexamine the need for better
burden-sharing and coordination in building up the regional naval HADR
capacity, to give AADMER more teeth. The greater self-sufficiency envisioned
will come in handy in the future, since ASEAN navies ought to reach disaster
zones within Southeast Asia faster than their extra-regional counterparts and
should be spearheading recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts.
Without
sufficient naval HADR capacity on hand, not only will it be difficult for ASEAN
to operationalize AADMER but future responses to similar contingencies will
have to continue to be vested in the extra-regional navies.
Koh
Swee Lean Collin
Koh
Swee Lean Collin is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence
and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies at Nanyang Technological University. He focuses on
research in naval affairs in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Southeast
Asia.
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