The farm sector’s influence is on the wane in
Japan, although you wouldn’t know it from the TPP talks.
In a
meeting with his economic advisers on April 2, 2013, Japanese Prime Minister
Abe clarified his definition of economic restructuring – the “third arrow” of
his much-vaunted Abenomics – explaining that he wished to “eliminate
bottlenecks and facilitate more business activity and investments.” Yet Abe is
currently undermining his stated goal by balking on lifting agricultural import
quotas as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, despite
joining the TPP talks with the understanding that the end goal was a
comprehensive free trade deal. Japan’s behavior at the twelve-nation Ottawa
meeting last week led New Zealand to suggest that Japan should be eliminated
from the TPP if it does not open its markets to more farm imports.
Despite boasting a majority in the Upper and Lower
Houses of the Japanese Diet, it appears that Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP)-New Komeito coalition remains beholden to Japan’s agricultural interests.
But even though agriculture’s influence seems to be holding steady, in the long
run, Japanese farmers’ influence on Japan’s foreign policymaking will only
dwindle as they increasingly lose clout in Japan’s domestic political process.
Farmers
have been a bastion of conservative political support since the very beginning
of electoral politics in Japan. The LDP used agricultural ministries and farm
organizations to extend control over the rural electorate at the grass roots
level, where populist parties were most threatening. Even though the LDP’s vote
share in both Houses steadily declined in the 1970s due to increased
urbanization, the LDP was able to stay in power due to malapportionment of
votes and the variation in the district magnitude of electoral districts. In
short, rural districts had more elected legislators per voter and smaller
district magnitudes. Agricultural interests held sway over the government with
their ability to elect LDP politicians dependent on them for winning public
office, and therefore keen to protect their interests. These politicians were
known as norin zoku (literally, agricultural policy tribe). For example,
political retaliation for liberalizing agricultural trade with the 1988 beef
and citrus agreement was swift and decisive: farmer support for the LDP dropped
from 81 percent in the 1986 Upper House elections to 50 percent in 1989. The
1989 election reminded the LDP of its traditional dependence on the farm vote.
In
recent years, however, the LDP has begun to reduce its reliance on Japan’s
agricultural cooperative, Japan Agriculture (JA). This is exemplified by Abe’s
success in last July’s Upper House election following his March announcement
that Japan would join the TPP over JA’s opposition. JA opposes the TPP because
this liberal trade regime would challenge Japan’s existing agricultural welfare
state. Electoral reforms in 1994 played a key role in Abe’s success, as
redistricting reduced the acuity of malapportionment in favor of rural districts
and the change from all multimember districts to a mix of single member
districts and proportional representation increased the importance of broad
electoral appeal.
Along
with these electoral reforms curtailing JA’s influence, JA is simply no longer
the vote-getting machine that it once was. Pundits contend that the rural vote
is growing “soft” as they reacted to Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s
proposals for “structural reforms” by refusing to vote in the 2003 election.
More recently, when famers started to benefit from the Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ) Ozawa Ichiro’s direct compensation program, they began defying JA
recommendations and voting for DPJ candidates in the 2007 Upper House and 2009
Lower House elections. JA’s political difficulties are compounded by a
demographic inevitability: the average age of Japan’s protected farmers is now
70. As The Economist commented on last year’s election, “The election result
[…] shows that some key opponents of the party’s economic-reform agenda, such
as farmers, were in the event unable to punish it for adopting policies they
dislike.”
The
growing influence of Keidanren, the pressure group representing Japan’s
business and manufacturing interests, is likely to counteract JA’s involvement
in crafting future trade policies as well. Because credible issue linkage is
built into the TPP negotiation structure, Keidanren is determined to see TPP
succeed. Keidanren explicitly acknowledges this linkage by declaring in its
joint statement with the Japan-U.S. Business Council, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
and U.S.-Japan Business Council: “For Japan, it is essential to meet the
commitment made to the United States and other TPP members upon admission to
the TPP in April 2013 to subject all goods to negotiation, including agricultural
products, with the goal of eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers on all.”
If
Japan were to be left out of the TPP, manufacturing interests would suffer
immensely, as they would be disadvantaged in their export and production
activities. Keidanren supports trade liberalization as a catalyst for
liberalizing uncompetitive sectors, and is strongly motivated by loss avoidance
to keep Japan in the TPP. In 2005, Keidanren successfully pressured the
government to sign a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico to defend members’
commercial interests. Members suffered a disadvantage against North American
and European competitors because of the North America Free Trade Agreement and
Mexico-EU Free Trade Agreement. Keidanren actively lobbied norin zoku members,
and political contributions played a key role in this.
Though
Keidanren had ceased political donations in September 1993, in May 2003 it
decided to resume them. Political contributions again stopped in 2009 after the
DPJ’s victory, but there is speculation that Sadayuki Sakakibara, the new
chairman of Keidanren as of this June, may increase Keidanren’s political
engagement in support of Abe’s economic policies. As The Japan Times puts it,
“one question attracting strong media attention is whether Sakakibara will
re-involve Keidanren in its member companies’ campaign contribution decisions,
historically a tool with which the lobby has exerted influence in the political
sphere.”
If
Sakakibara decides that Keidanren will play a larger political role, some of
that money will undoubtedly be used to help cement Japan’s position in the TPP.
In the same joint statement cited earlier, the signors continue, “we will
proactively advocate for the domestic political support required to ratify it
in Japan and the United States.” Sakakibara has shown he has the diplomatic and
international vision to take Keidanren’s lead on TPP, as he has already stated
that he wants Japan to improve ties with China and South Korea. JA’s influence
will diminish at an accelerated pace should Keidanren venture back into the
game.
However,
Keidanren must move quickly if it wants to secure Japan’s place in the TPP. Abe
hopes that the “strategic value” argument is enough to placate TPP member
states disgruntled by Japan’s foot-dragging, however, this line of argument is
much more persuasive to Japan and the U.S. than it is to the other ten, as an
editorial in The New Zealand Herald laments. Neither Australia nor New Zealand
are as “keen” as Abe is “to use the TPP for a geostrategic political purpose.
Both countries value a relationship with China as much, if not more, than their
relationship with Japan.” China’s economic importance to the ten states – and
their reluctance to choose between China and the U.S. – is illustrated by the
fact that six of them are also members of the China-centered Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Singapore and Vietnam).
If
Japan is to restructure its stagnant economy, it must not lose its momentum on
TPP. Agriculture’s political influence is on the decline, and Abe should act
that way, discarding his unnecessarily antagonistic “geostrategic” rhetoric and
demonstrating Japan’s clear commitment to free trade. Only then can Japan
thrive in the 21st century’s global economy.
Mina
Pollmann
Mina Pollmann studies at Georgetown
University’s School of Foreign Service, majoring in International
Politics/Foreign Policy.
Business & Investment Opportunities
Saigon Business Corporation Pte Ltd (SBC) is incorporated
in Singapore since 1994.
