Thailand - Daring double game in Thailand

BANGKOK - Is Thailand headed towards national reconciliation or new confrontation?

While Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra has taken a conciliatory tack to the country's still unresolved seven-year-old political conflict, her self-exiled elder brother, former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, and his advisers have worked from behind the scenes to consolidate political power at the expense of rival royalist establishment interests.

Bureaucratic reshuffles, newly laid or threatened criminal charges and proposed constitutional changes have all enhanced the criminally convicted Thaksin's negotiating leverage vis-a-vis royalist power centers, including in the military, judiciary and palace, to achieve a political amnesty that would restore his court-confiscated wealth and ultimately allow for his return to Thailand as a free man.

A new drive to achieve an amnesty through parliamentary means has met predictable resistance from the opposition Democrat party and anti-Thaksin People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protest group, and raised the specter of new instability after over a year of relative political calm.

Recommendations submitted by a local think-tank to a parliamentary reconciliation subcommittee proposed an amnesty for offenses committed on both sides of the political divide and a reversal of decisions handed down against Thaksin by military coup maker-created bodies.

A similar amnesty proposal in 2008 by a previous Thaksin-aligned government provided the initial spark for PAD protests that for months laid siege to Government House and temporarily shut down Bangkok's international airport. While the Democrats and PAD have claimed that adoption of the new amnesty recommendations could lead to new instability, that will likely depend more on how the military's royalist leadership perceives the latest proposed deal.

Military, palace and Thaksin representatives reached an accommodation brokered in Brunei ahead of the 2011 elections that were eventually won by Yingluck and Thaksin's Puea Thai party. That deal centered on a top brass vow to accept the poll results in exchange for a Thaksin promise to refrain from prosecuting soldiers for deaths caused in 2010 street violence and to rein in known anti-monarchy elements in his camp.

Over a year since the secret deal was concluded, it appears that its terms have only partially held. Yingluck has bowed deeply and often to royal authority, and expanded a Democrat-initiated crackdown on anti-monarchy materials posted to the Internet. At the same time, Thaksin and his allies have moved aggressively to challenge the military top brass, currently led by army commander and palace favorite General Prayuth Chan-ocha.

The challenge has included potential criminal charges for the military's role in the lethal crackdown on Thaksin-supported United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) street protestors in April-May 2010. A police investigation has found that state actors were responsible for at least 16 of 92 protest-related deaths. If pursued, Prayuth will likely be implicated as the top of the suppression operation's chain of command.

The appointment in January of known Thaksin ally Air Chief Marshal Sukumpol Suwanathat as defense minister was also viewed as provocative by many top royalists and signaled Prayuth's potential removal at the main military reshuffle in October. Sukumpol's cousin, General Prin Suwanathat, served as Thaksin's First Army Region commander, a key position responsible for Bangkok's security, when the 2006 coup toppled Thaksin's caretaker government.

Prin reportedly had a gun put to his head during the Special Forces-led operation and was later sidelined as coupmakers moved to purge Thaksin loyalists from top military commands. Despite serving as a commissioned officer, Prin reportedly played a key operational role in the "war room" that directed the UDD's militant wing's operations during the 2010 street violence and unrest.

Prayuth and Sukumpol reportedly wrestled over a recent mini-reshuffle list, including over Prayuth's bid to elevate his brother to the Third Army Region command's top post. One military insider, however, says that Prayuth mostly had his way over the promotion list which is due to take effect in April.

A government reform initiative to give more civilian control over military reshuffles is another growing point of contention between the two sides. Diplomats speculate that Yingluck could move to appoint a deputy defense minister, currently a vacant post, that would tilt future six-member Defense Council votes on military reshuffles and appointments in Thaksin's favor.

Carrot and stick

Whether Thaksin would be willing to ease these pressures in exchange for an agreement on amnesty is unclear but would be consistent with his past negotiating tactics. One source familiar with Thaksin's recent thinking claims he has grown "tired" of reconciliation efforts and is prepared to use "force" to push his agenda. The well-placed source believes that recent swings between reconciliation and confrontation are often reflective of the former premier's mood swings.

Pansak Vinyaratn, one of Thaksin's current strategists and past chief policy adviser, has said alternately in recent meetings with foreign delegations that Thaksin's side is "winning" or has "already won" the political conflict. He has suggested to different audiences that the royal establishment, including the military top brass, can be co-opted and subdued through cash and contracts, according to people involved in the recent discussions.

Until Thaksin wins an amnesty deal or elevates enough of his loyalists into positions of military power, fears for his personal security will likely preclude his return. Diplomats here speak in hushed tones about a possible "Aquino moment", reference to former Philippine senator Benigno Aquino who was assassinated at Manila's airport in 1983 upon returning from exile, should Thaksin attempt to return before the conflict is considered mutually settled.

That said, there are indications that the royal establishment's resistance to Thaksin's push has weakened and that past tactics - including the mobilization of threats to the monarchy - are less likely to have the same popular appeal in future. The establishment is also apparently divided on whether its interests would be best served by mobilizing again around the PAD.

The PAD's recent decision to call off a planned mass rally against proposed constitutional changes came amid a weak popular showing and is indicative of the broad establishment's lack of support for more destabilizing street protests. New illegal assembly charges filed against PAD leaders were likely also factored into the PAD's decision to remain inactive.

Nonetheless, there is still the potential for the PAD and UDD to be mobilized simultaneously on Bangkok's streets, setting the stage for possible confrontations in the months ahead. Thaksin recently mobilized and goaded his red-clad group to pre-empt the supposed threat of an incipient military coup and rally behind constitutional change.

Some analysts warn that future street fights could become more personalized than past mobilizations, with rival protest groups openly targeting business groups and interests perceived as red or yellow leaning. UDD supporters launched bomb attacks against Bangkok Bank branches after the group's leaders criticized the bank's alignment with establishment interests, including alleged financial support for the PAD.

If competing "red" and "yellow" groups were allowed to establish encampments and launch attacks against one another, the breakdown in public order could provide national security-related pretext for another military intervention that ousts Yingluck. Some suggest the scenario could be sparked to pre-empt Thaksin's anticipated attempt to consolidate his power inside the armed forces, including through Prayuth's removal at the annual reshuffle due in October.

Breakaway threat

While the 2006 coup was widely criticized for setting back Thai democracy, conservative groups, including the military, have since seen a resurgence in power and influence. At the same time, diplomats and analysts believe another military coup would be highly unpopular, both domestically and internationally, and could provide the spark for the provincial level armed resistance Thaksin has suggested but not realized during past Bangkok-centric confrontations.

After the 2010 military crackdown, there were only isolated and short-lived incidents of upcountry unrest, including arson attacks on government buildings in two northeastern provinces. The threat of a pro-Thaksin insurgency has since gained more traction with the mushrooming of so-called "red shirt" villages, some of which have openly pledged their allegiance to Thaksin over Bangkok's central authority, in his northern and northeastern regional strongholds. Reports of gun-running in the same areas has underlined the threat of a possible wider, more damaging future conflict.

Faced with these potential lose-lose scenarios, some analysts believe the top brass will ultimately agree to some form of amnesty, though more in the spirit of detente than reconciliation. One military insider says that Prayuth and his allies have come to the conclusion that neither side can win an absolute victory in the conflict and that a new power-sharing arrangement would be in the national interest. At the same time, the insider says, the top brass is wary of Thaksin's failure to honor fully previous behind-the-scenes agreements, including the pre-election Brunei deal.

Barring new rounds of conflict, Thaksin's camp hopes that a new constitution passed by national referendum later this year will pave the way for general elections staged in the name of national reconciliation in early 2013. Diplomats here believe that Yingluck and Puea Thai, soon to be boosted by the return of 110 Thaksin-aligned politicians who were banned from politics for five years after the 2006 coup, would likely win an even stronger majority over the Democrats. That, they suggest, is why the Democrats are so strongly opposed to an amnesty that would effectively absolve former premier and now opposition leader Abhisit Vejjajiva for the protest-related deaths on his government's watch.

A longer view, however, foresees that Thailand's political impasse will not be resolved until the royal succession from King Bhumibol Adulyadej to heir apparent Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn is complete. The construction of an apparent new palace in Bangkok's Dusit district, a royal tradition known as "wang na", is indicative of quiet preparations underway for the first royal transition in the country in over six decades.

Without a recent precedent, there is still uncertainty about how exactly the process will play out and how royal authority will be exercised during an interregnum period of national mourning. The palace apparently tried to allay some of those concerns in a recent authorized biography of Bhumibol that includes a chapter outlining the succession process, but there are still questions about the limitations of the royal advisory Privy Council's role between the announcement and crowning of the next king.

Some analysts have suggested that Thaksin could receive more sympathetic royal treatment, and perhaps even a royal advisory role, after the transition due to his known close ties with Vajiralongkorn. Calls for a royal pardon for Thaksin, including in the run-up to Bhumibol's 84-year birthday celebrations last December, have consistently fallen on deaf royal ears and sparked criticism that Thaksin's camp has put undue pressure on the ailing monarch.

While his allies push for a parliamentary amnesty, it is believed that Thaksin's return to Thailand will still ultimately require a royal pardon of his criminal corruption conviction. Some of his supporters suggest that after an amnesty is passed through parliament the Ministry of Justice will recommend a royal pardon of his conviction that will pass from Yingluck up to the palace.

But while some foresee a scenario where a royally pardoned Thaksin is allowed to return home to make a cathartic gesture of obeisance at Bhumibol's feet, it is just as likely that his next call for royal mercy will be met with the same steely silence.

Shawn W Crispin

Asia Times

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