Xi Jinping has taken the reins of the Communist Party. With multiple
domestic and international challenges mounting, there is much to be done.
Relativity is the key concept in
measuring the success of China’s power transition. By this standard, one has to grudgingly
congratulate the Chinese Communist Party for producing its first-ever,
nominally at least, complete transfer of power from one top leader to another
last week. The outgoing party chief, Hu
Jintao, retired from both his party post and his position as the
commander-in-chief, allowing Xi Jinping, now China’s new leader, to claim full
authority in one stroke. Had Hu followed
the precedent set by his predecessors, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, and
decided to stay on for two extra years as the chairman of the party’s central
military affairs committee, this would have been a semi-failed transition.
The good news does not stop
there. As expected, the Politburo
Standing Committee, the party’s most powerful decision-making body, has been
downsized from nine to seven, thus making it easier for Xi to build a coalition
in a body often paralyzed by decision-making through consensus.
Perhaps the best news for Xi is
that the bar for his success has been set relatively low by the departing
administration’s failure to pursue real reforms during the preceding
decade. So even minor initiatives to tackle
some of China’s social and economic problems should make Xi look good by
comparison.
Judging by his first, albeit
brief, public speech, Xi certainly did not disappoint. His remarks at the ceremony unveiling the new
standing committee on November 15 were direct and notable for the lack of tired
official slogans and rhetoric. His
confident demeanor strengthened his public image as well.
Unfortunately, that is where the
good news ends. Compared with Hu’s rise
to the top a decade ago, Xi certainly has gained more power. But it is worth pointing out that he will
face enormous constraints, at least in the short term, in gaining decisive
influence at the top level of the Chinese power hierarchy.
The most immediate obstacle to
any prospects of major policy shifts lies at the very top. The new standing committee has a strong
conservative presence. The perception of
the new team is that it is dominated by relatively mediocre and risk-averse leaders. Xi may not find many allies who would support
an agenda of bold reforms, assuming that Xi has such an agenda in mind
(something we honestly do not know). The
line-up of the new committee confirms that the selection was based partly on
seniority (all the two-term Politburo members under 68 were promoted), but
mainly on the need to maintain a balance of power among various factions and
interests. Such considerations have
produced a team that lacks reform credentials or shared policy
preferences. It would be too optimistic
or premature to believe that such a delicately balanced body could address
China’s problems quickly and decisively.
Xi must also be concerned with
the influence of retired leaders, in particular, Jiang Zemin, 86, and Hu
Jintao, 70. Jiang proved his enduring political clout by managing to put two to
three of his loyalists on the committee.
Hu was less successful in appointing his supporters to the standing
committee, but apparently got a good deal for “retiring naked” (quitting all
positions). Of the 15 new Politburo
members, at least half are his protégés, including one 49-year-old rising star
who will be well-positioned to contend for a spot on the standing committee in
five years’ time. If anything, Hu’s
influence will remain considerable in the coming five years.
Because of these political
constraints, Xi will have to balance the imperative for him to establish his
image as a decisive and different leader with the political necessity of
getting along with his colleagues on the standing committee and the retired
leaders. The result of this delicate balancing act is likely a cautious start
characterized by the adoption of relatively easy policy measures designed
mainly to differentiate the new leadership from its immediate predecessor.
One such measure may be a
thorough reform of the hukou system (household registration) that denies rural
migrants full citizenship rights.
Allowing them to become full urban residents enjoying all the rights and
benefits of city dwellers will be both socially just and economically beneficial. In the past, opposition from large cities in
coastal areas and the public security apparatus has blocked the reform. But today, since more than 200 million
migrants have settled in the cities already over the few decades, and improving
their status can unleash enormous economic dynamism as well as create an
instant constituency for Xi, it is highly likely that Xi will make this issue a
top priority.
Another issue that may further
enhance Xi’s political capital is the abolition of the much-hated one-child
policy. Political opposition to this
reform is even weaker – one can think of only one interest group, the
family-planning commission, that will try to block such a move. Obviously, one important political
consideration is that this bold move will effectively overturn a policy closely
associated with Deng Xiaoping. But on
balance, Xi may conclude that this is a risk worth taking.
On the economic front, however,
Xi’s room for maneuver is smaller. While
he may continue to expand some promising experiments on financial
liberalization, significant reforms that will hurt the state-owned enterprises,
local governments, central bureaucracy and families of the elites are certain
to encounter fierce opposition. Xi may
choose not to pick a fight he cannot expect to win easily.
Political reform – at least of
the kind that will introduce more democracy and civil liberties – is extremely
unlikely. The risks for Xi are simply
too high. The two Politburo members
perceived to be reformers – Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang – failed to make it into
the standing committee mainly because they are seen as likely champions of
political reform. Xi is obviously aware
of what happened to the two top leaders, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who
advocated political reform during the 1980s (Both lost their jobs).
Compared with the constraints he
faces on the domestic policy front, foreign policy actually may be an area over
which Xi will gain control more quickly and decisively. Given the urgency of the escalating
Sino-Japanese tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Xi will have to act
fast to avoid a foreign policy
crisis. Of course, Xi’s long-term
foreign policy objective is stabilizing Beijing’s relations with Washington
since the underlying competitive dynamics are driving the two countries further
apart. But this goal will be elusive
unless and until he fixes Sino-Japanese ties.
Whether Xi can pull this off is
anybody’s guess. He will have to invest
some political capital and take real risks in moderating China’s positions and
stopping the now routine patrols of the waters close to the disputed islands
(such patrols are designed to contest Japan’s sovereignty claims, but may
trigger a tough response from Tokyo that leads to further escalations). Japan’s political establishment will also
have to cooperate by not taking actions that make it impossible for Xi to make
symbolic concessions.
So the bottom line in evaluating
China’s new leadership in general, and Xi in particular: he and his colleagues will have to walk the
walk. His predecessors have done enough talking already.
Minxin Pei
Business & Investment Opportunities
YourVietnamExpert is a division of Saigon Business Corporation Pte Ltd (SBC), Incorporated in Singapore since 1994. As Your Business Companion, we propose a range of services in Strategy, Investment and Management, focusing Healthcare and Life Science with expertise in ASEAN. Since we are currently changing the platform of www.yourvietnamexpert.com, if any request, please, contact directly Dr Christian SIODMAK, business strategist, owner and CEO of SBC at christian.siodmak@gmail.com. Many thanks.
No comments:
Post a Comment